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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the impact of incomplete information and behavioral biases
in the context of market design.
In chapter 2, I analyze centralizedmatchingmarkets and rationalizewhy the arguably
most heavily used mechanism in applications, the deferred acceptance mechanism,
has been so successful in practice, despite the fact that it provides participants with
opportunities to “game the system.” Accounting for the lack of information that
participants typically have in these markets in practice, I introduce a new notion
of behavior under uncertainty that captures participants’ aversion to experience
regret. I show that participants optimally choose not to manipulate the deferred
acceptance mechanism in order to avoid regret. Moreover, the deferred acceptance
mechanism is the unique mechanism within an interesting class (quantile stable) to
induce honesty from participants in this way.
In chapter 3, co-authored with Leeat Yariv, we study the impacts of incomplete
information on centralized one-to-onematchingmarkets. We focus on the commonly
used deferred acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We characterize
settings in which many of the results known when information is complete are
overturned. In particular, small (complete-information) cores may still be associated
with multiple outcomes and incentives to misreport, selection of equilibria can affect
the set of individuals who are unmatched—i.e., there is no analogue for the Rural
Hospital Theorem, and agents might prefer to be on the receiving side of the of the
algorithm underlying the mechanism. Nonetheless, when either side of the market
has assortative preferences, incomplete information does not hinder stability, and
results from the complete-information setting carry through.
In chapter 4, co-authored with Tatiana Mayskaya, we present a dynamic model that
illustrates three forces that shape the effect of overconfidence (overprecision of con-
sumed information) on the amount of collected information. The first force comes
from overestimating the precision of the next consumed piece of information. The
second force is related to overestimating the precision of already collected informa-
tion. The third force reflects the discrepancy between how much information the
agent expects to collect and how much information he actually collects in expec-
tation. The first force pushes an overconfident agent to collect more information,
while the second and the third forces work in the other direction. We show that under
iv
some symmetry conditions, the second and third force unequivocally dominate the
first, leading to underinvestment in information.
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1C h a p t e r 1
INTRODUCTION
In this thesis I investigate the consequences of incomplete information and behavioral
biases in the context of market design. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the implications
of incomplete information in the context of matching markets, like the ones that are
used to assign doctors to residency programs in theU.S., or students to public schools
in cities like Boston and New York. Chapter 4, studies the impact of overconfidence
on the quality of decisions made by a decision maker, such as a judge’s verdict
during a bench trial.
In chapter 2, I provide a rationalization as of why the most frequently used matching
mechanism, the deferred acceptance mechanism, has been so successful in practice,
despite the fact that it is know to provide participants with incentives to “game
the system.” To do so I rely on two novel features: First, I take into account the
limited amount of information that participants typically have in these markets.
Second, I define a new notion of regret, and ask what should participants do if
they wish to avoid regret. With these two elements I show that a participant will
uniquely and optimally choose not to game the system in order to avoid regret, when
the clearinghouse uses the deferred acceptance. And, moreover, that the deferred
acceptance is the unique rule within an interesting class, to induce agents not to
game the system as a way to avoid regret.
In chapter 3, co-authored with Leeat Yariv, we study the impact of incomplete infor-
mation in centralized matching markets that use the deferred acceptance mechanism
from a Bayesian perspective. In this context, we show that several desirable features
that these markets present under complete information, cease to hold when informa-
tion is incomplete, even when the underlying cores are unique. For instance, among
others: (i) unstable matching outcomes are supported as Bayes Nash equilibria of
the game induced by the direct revelation deferred acceptance mechanism; (ii) par-
ticipants may benefit from being on the receiving side of the deferred acceptance;
(iii) the number of matched individuals need not be the same across Bayes Nash
equilibria outcomes. Nonetheless, we show that when all participants on either
side of the market agree on the ranking of their potential matching partners, these
desirable features are recovered.
2In chapter 4, co-authored with Tatiana Mayskaya, we study the impact of overcon-
fidence on the decisions to invest in costly information of an agent. We identify
three forces that shape the impact of overconfidence on these investment decisions.
These forces relate to the overvaluing the value of the information to be acquired,
overvaluing the information already acquired, and the misinterpretation of noise as
signal. Under some symmetry conditions, we show that overconfidence unequivo-
cally leads to the agent underinvesting in information, and thus to a lower quality of
decisions.
3C h a p t e r 2
DEFERRED ACCEPTANCE AND REGRET-FREE
TRUTH-TELLING
2.1 Introduction
The deferred acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962) occupies a central
place in the practice of market design. Among its various applications, it is used
to assign graduating medical students to their first position as residents in the U.S.,
as well as to allocate entering students to public high schools in New York City.1
However, it is known that participantsmay have the opportunity to “game the system”
when the deferred acceptance is employed. In this paper, I argue that participants
of these markets may optimally choose not to manipulate the deferred acceptance
mechanism, if they wish to avoid regret (in a precise sense that I define). Moreover, I
show that the deferred acceptance is unique within a class of mechanisms in the way
that it induces all participants to be honest. Thus, the paper provides a rationalization
of the success of the deferred acceptance in practice, as well as its salience with
respect to other mechanisms.
In the typical design of a matching market, a centralized clearinghouse elicits the
preferences of participants over their potential partners in the form of ranked order
lists. It then uses this information to generate a matching using a known rule,
particularly the deferred acceptance algorithm. Participants know their preferences,
and the private report that they provide to the clearinghouse. However, they generally
do not know each others preferences or reports. Moreover, privacy concerns limit
the amount of information that is revealed even after the matching is implemented;
meaning the reports remain private even ex-post.
A crucial element for the success of a matching market is that it generates matchings
that are stable.2 Broadly speaking, stable matchings are immune to renegotia-
1 For a history of the NRMP and a list of labor markets that adopted the deferred acceptance see
Roth (2008, Table 1). For the design of the New York City high school match, see Abdulkadiroğlu,
Pathak, Roth, and Sönmez (2005), Abdulkadiroğlu, Agarwal, and Pathak (2017) and references
therein. The UK and Israeli matchingmarkets are discussed in Roth (1991) and Bronfman, Hassidim,
Afek, Romm, Shreberk, Hassidim, and Massler (2015), respectively.
2 Stable mechanisms have been reported to outlive their unstable counterparts, and in several
instances have replaced them altogether (see Roth, 2008).
4tion given the agents’ preferences.3 The deferred acceptance mechanism produces
matchings that are stable with respect to the reported preferences. Thus, the clear-
inghouse’s capacity to generate a stable matching depends on its ability to elicit
agents’ preferences truthfully. However, when agents know each others’ prefer-
ences, theoretical results establish that mechanisms that generate matchings that are
stable with respect to their reported preferences, such as the deferred acceptance,
are manipulable; that is they provide incentives to agents to lie to the clearinghouse
regarding their preference ranking. Thus, as pointed out in Roth and Rothblum
(1999), there is a gap in our understanding as of why the deferred acceptance works
so well in practice.
This paper reconciles stable and truth-tellingmatchingmechanisms by taking a novel
approach to incentives, and leveraging the presence of incomplete information found
in most real-world markets. To do so, I introduce a notion of regret: an agent suffers
regret if she takes an action, and ex-post she finds it to be dominated. I show that
the most prominent matching mechanism, the deferred acceptance (DA), provides
agents (on both sides of the market) incentives to report their preferences truthfully
if they wish to avoid regret when the environment presents the features of a typical
matching market discussed above. Additionally, I show that, for any agent, truth is
the unique report that is guaranteed to be free of regret in a market that uses the DA.
Furthermore, DA is the unique quantile stable mechanism for which truth-telling is
regret-free.
To illustrate the notion of regret consider the following example:4 Dr. Bob is looking
for a residency program. He must participate in the National Residency Matching
Program which runs the DA.5 Assume (for expositional simplicity), that the NRMP
is using the Hospital-proposing DA. There are only two hospitals in the market,
Johns Hopkins (JH) and Mount Sinai (MS), with one available position each. Bob
prefers Johns Hopkins over Mount Sinai. He also knows there is a second doctor,
Dr. Alice, participating in the matching process.
All doctors and hospitals are required to send to the NRMP a list of partners ranked
according to their preference. The hospital-proposingDA, orH-DA, uses the reports
to simulate a sequence of proposals and rejections leading to a matching. In it, the
3 Stability requires that there is no pair of agents on opposite sides of the market that prefer each
other to their assigned partner in the matching, and that there is no agent that rather be unmatched to
their assigned partner in the matching.
4 To see how regret-avoidance compares to other standard notions of behavior see section 2.5.
5 The workings and properties of this mechanism are described in section 2.2.
5hospitals make proposals to their favorite doctors according to their reports. Doctors
tentatively hold the best offer among those received, and reject the rest. Hospitals
that were rejected can make new offers to doctors that have not rejected them yet.
The process iterates until there are no more rejections.
Suppose Bob knows that the true and reported preferences of everyone in the market
are:
Bob :Johns Hopkins  Mount Sinai Johns Hopkins :Alice  Bob
Alice :Mount Sinai  Johns Hopkins Mount Sinai :Bob  Alice
Bob decides to try to game the system and lists only Johns Hopkins. Given the
preferences and the rules of DA, this strategy is in fact successful. Had Bob told
the truth he would have been matched to Mount Sinai. By deviating from the truth,
in this scenario, he is matched to Johns Hopkins which is his top choice. This
strategy is known as a truncation, it is a salient strategy in the literature and under
complete information, it is sufficient to consider deviations from truth of the form
of truncation strategies.
True Bob Alice False Bob Alice
1st MS JH MS JH
2nd JH,MS
3rd JH
Matching MS JH JH MS
Table 2.1: Matchings resulting from hospital-proposing DA if Bob tells the truth
(left) versus if he truncates (right). The rows correspond to the rounds in DA. Bold
denotes an accepted offer, while italics denoted a rejected offer.
However, in real-world applications the participants have incomplete information;
they do not know the preferences of others nor their reports. WouldBob truncate if he
did not know the true preferences of the remaining players? Under this assumption
Bob does not know in advance the outcome of the mechanism. One possibility
is that Johns Hopkins actually finds Bob unacceptable, and if so, by performing a
truncation he would remain unmatched. Bob’s ex-post information consists of his
true preferences, what he reported, the rules of the mechanism, and the resulting
matching.
Can Bob come up with an alternative report that, given the information he now has,
would have yield him a better outcome than remaining unemployed? The answer
6is Yes. From the stability of DA, it follows that had he told the truth, he could not
be worse off than remaining unemployed. Moreover, he knows that there exists a
possible scenario (e.g. the one depicted above) where Mount Sinai wanted to hire
him, but where his truncation prevented that matching from occurring. In such
scenario, had he told the truth, he would have been matched to Mount Sinai which is
strictly better for him than being unemployed. That means that truncating is ex-post
dominated for Bob when he finds himself unemployed. In this case we say that Bob
regrets truncating.
Regret is notmerely a theoretical construct. There is evidence both in the psychology
and experimental literature that (i) people have regret, (ii) fear of regret affects
behavior, and (iii) the effect of anticipated regret is related to the information the
subject knowswill be revealed to him; see Gilovich andMedvec (1995); Bell (1982);
Loomes and Sugden (1982, 1987).6
Formally, I focus on two-sided one-to-one matching problems where an individual’s
ordinal preference over his partners is private information.7 Agents report their
preferences to a centralized mechanism that chooses a matching for the reported
preferences. The rules of the mechanism are common knowledge. The resulting
matching is the only information observable ex-post; preferences of others remain
unobserved.
In this paper I show that when the mechanism is DA, for every agent (on both
sides of the market) and every possible deviation from the truth they could try,
there is a scenario where the agent regrets deviating. The argument is based on
the intuition presented in the above example. Moreover I show that when an agent
regrets a deviation she only needs to consider truth as the report that dominates
the deviation. More importantly, I show that an agent cannot regret reporting her
preferences truthfully in DA. This stems from two observations. First, there are
deviations from the truth that do not affect the resulting matching, e.g. permuting
the order of alternatives that are preferred to the assigned partner. Second, for those
deviations that may be profitable in some situation (e.g. truncations), there is an
alternative preference profile, consistent with the observed matching, such that the
deviation would yield a detrimental outcome. This ensures that the agent will never
6 There are two other observations: (iv) there are different levels of regret; and (v) regret from
an negative action taken is greater than regret of benefits by omitted action. The notion of regret in
this paper captures the first three observations, but abstracts from the last two.
7 Even though in practice most mechanism are many-to-one I restrict attention to one-to-one as
a stepping stone in the analysis of DA and regret-free truth-telling.
7suffer regret. Consequently, truth is a regret-free report. A regret-free report allows
an agent to always be able to justify her action ex-post. It needs to be highlighted
that in DA, truth is a regret-free report for both sides of the market.
Is regret-free truth-telling a property of stable mechanisms in general or is there
something unique about DA? I study this question in the context of quantile stable
mechanisms, a family that includes DA. Quantile stable mechanisms are the gen-
eralization of the median stable mechanism. The median stable mechanism ranks
all stable matchings according to the preferences of one side of the market, and
assigns each agent the partner they have in the median matching over that ordered
set. This turns out to be a stable matching itself. The median stable matching has
been shown to be a focal point in decentralized matching markets in the laboratory,
see Echenique and Yariv (2011), and appears as a compromise solution contrasting
the extremeness of DA. Quantile stable mechanisms are the generalization where,
instead of the median, another quantile over the ordered set is selected, see Klaus
and Klijn (2006); Chen, Egesdal, Pycia, and Yenmez (2014).
I show that among the set of quantile stable mechanisms described above, DA
is the unique one that satisfies regret-free truth-telling. For any quantile stable
mechanism that is not DA, there is a market and an agent who regrets reporting
truthfully. To this end, I construct the report that dominates truth ex-post. To do so
I fix a possible resulting matching from the mechanism and define the dominating
report as respecting binary orders between alternatives, but declaring all alternatives
that are worse than the resulting matching as unacceptable. I refer to this type of
deviation as a “soft-truncation." I then show that all elements of the stable set under
the “soft-truncation" contain weakly preferred matchings to the resulting matching.
Therefore the quantile mechanism over a weakly preferred set results in a weakly
better matching. For any quantile I give a construction that ensures the agent can
be made strictly better through this “soft-truncation," thus obtaining that the agent
regrets truth-telling when the quantile stable mechanism is not DA.
The paper contributes to several strands of literature within matching, reviewed in
detail in section 2.7. The characterization of the DA through regret-free truth-telling
complements the analysis of Chen, Egesdal, Pycia, and Yenmez (2016) and Pathak
and Sönmez (2013) on selecting a stable mechanism based on its manipulability
properties. An insightful strand of literature rationalizes the success of stable
mechanisms by showing that the gains from manipulations can be small (in an
appropriate sense) when the markets are large (Roth and Peranson, 1999; Immorlica
8and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Lee, 2017, among others). The
characterization of the DA through regret-free truth-telling complements the large
markets approach, since the latter is generally not able to distinguish among the
incentives provided by different stable mechanisms. The paper also contributes
to the analysis of stable matching under incomplete information under different
behavioral notions (Barberà and Dutta, 1995; Roth and Rothblum, 1999; Ehlers,
2008; Ehlers and Massó, 2007, 2015), and to the understanding of what makes the
deferred acceptance special (Kojima and Manea, 2010).
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the framework and
basic definitions in matching, including quantile stable mechanisms. Section 2.3
introduces the notion of regret. Section 2.4 presents themain characterization result.
Section 2.5 discusses the relation between regret-free truth-telling and other notions
of incentive compatibility. Section 2.6 concludes. Section 2.7 discusses the related
literature. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
2.2 Framework
This section introduces basic definitions and recalls known results from the literature
that are used later on, Roth and Sotomayor (1990) is the standard reference.
A one-to-one matching market is a triple (M,W,) whereM is a finite set of men,
W a finite set of women, and  a preference profile composed of the preference
relations of all men and women in the economy, that is the (|M | + |W |)-tuple
= ((m)m∈M , (w)w∈W ). Each man m is endowed with a strict preference
relation over W ∪ {m} denoted (m), where the alternative {m} represents the
possibility of remaining single. Similarly (w) is woman w’s strict preference on
M ∪ {w}. The reflexive closure of i is denoted by i. Pi and P−i denote the set
of all possible preference relations of agent i and agents other than i respectively.
The set of all possible preference profiles is denoted by P .
A matching is a function µ : M ∪W →M ∪W that assigns to each man (woman)
either a woman (man) or himself (herself). Furthermore, the matching is restricted
to be consistent, that is if a man is assigned a woman, that woman is getting assigned
to him, reciprocally. Formally,
(i) µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m}, ∀m ∈M ;
(ii) µ(w) ∈M ∪ {w}, ∀w ∈ W ;
(iii) µ(m) = w iff µ(w) = m, ∀m ∈M, ∀w ∈ W .
9Denote M the set of all matchings for a fixed marriage market. µ(m) is m’s
partner under µ. Woman w is acceptable to m whenever w m m, otherwise w is
unacceptable to m. The acceptable set for m is Am(m) = {w ∈ W : w m m},
and Um(m) = W \ Am(m) is the unacceptable set form.
A matching µ is individually rational if every agent prefers their assigned partner
to remaining single; that is, µ(i) i i, ∀i ∈ M ∪W . A matching µ is blocked
by a pair (m,w) at  if they prefer each other over their assigned partners; that is,
m w µ(w) and w m µ(m). A matching is stable if it is individually rational at
and it is not blocked by any pair (m,w) at. S() is the set of all stable matchings
under preference profile .
A centralized matching mechanism is an institution that receives reports of pref-
erences from all agents in the economy and produces a matching; formally, it is a
mapping φ : P →M. The notation φ()(i) = j means that j is i’s partner under
mechanism φ when the reported preferences are. The mechanism φ is commonly
known.
A matching mechanism is stable if ∀ ∈ P , φ() ∈ S(). Gale and Shapley
(1962) showed that the set of stable matchings S() is non-empty for any one-
to-one matching market. In doing so, they introduced the deferred acceptance
algorithm (DA) described below.
• Step 0. Given a marriage market (M,W,), denote the set of active men at
time t = 1 by A1 and set it to be all men A1 = M .
• Step 1. Eachman in the active setA1 proposes to his highest ranked acceptable
woman according to m. Each woman selects the (w)-best acceptable
partner out of those who proposed to her (if any) and they are tentatively
matched; all other proposals are declared rejected. Set A2 to be the set of
all men who made a proposal and were rejected. If A2 = ∅, stop; otherwise
continue to step 2.
• Step t ≥ 2. Each man in the active set At proposes to his highest ranked
acceptable woman out of those who have not rejected him yet. Each woman
then selects the best acceptable partner out of those who proposed to her at t
and her tentative partner from t− 1 (if any), and they are tentatively matched;
all other proposals are declared rejected. Set At+1 to be the set of all men
who made a proposal at t and were rejected together with the set of men who
10
were tentatively matched at t− 1 but rejected by their tentative match at t. If
At+1 = ∅, stop; otherwise continue to step t+ 1.
This algorithm stops in finitely many steps and the resulting outcome is a stable
matching. The above description corresponds to theMen-proposing or men-optimal
stable matching (M -DA), where every man (weakly) prefers their assigned partner
under this algorithm to the partner they would get in any other stable matching. In
an analogous manner one can define the women-optimal (W -DA) stable matching.
Abusing notation, it is useful to have the binary relation m hold over matchings
µ, µ′ ∈ M: µ m µ′ ⇐⇒ µ(m) m µ′(m). That is m prefers matching µ
over µ′ if and only if he prefers his partner under µ to his partner under matching
µ′. Notice that a man is indifferent between two matches if he is matched to the
same woman under both. The (side-)unanimous partial order M is then defined
as: µ M µ′ ⇐⇒ (∀m ∈M) [µ m µ′] Similarly, the order M is defined as
µ M µ′ ⇐⇒ [µ M µ′ and ∃m ∈M : µ m µ′]. The orders M ,M represent
the aligned preferences of men. A matching is M preferable to another only if
every man is weakly better and at least one is made strictly better off. Analogous
definitions and constructions hold for women.
A known yet key fact is that the stable set forms a (distributive) lattice under order
M , with the men-optimal and women-optimal stable matchings as the extremal
elements of this set under M . Any two elements of the stable set are ranked
inversely by men and women: µ, µ′ ∈ S(), µ M µ′ ⇐⇒ µ′ W µ, which
is known as the opposition of interest property. An immediate corollary is that
the men-optimal is the women-pessimal stable matching and vice versa. Another
important property is that the set of agents who are matched is the same across all
stable matchings. This property is referred to as the Lone Wolf or Rural Hospital
Theorem (McVitie and Wilson, 1970).
An important property is that the men-optimal stable matching mechanism is
strategy-proof for men. A matching mechanism φ is strategy-proof if ∀ ∈ P
and ∀i ∈ M ∪W it holds that φ(i, ˜−i) i φ(′i, ˜−i), ∀ ′i,∀˜−i. Strategy-
proof for men requires the condition to hold only for men. That is, no matter
what other men and women are reporting, a man cannot achieve a better partner by
misrepresenting his preferences than he gets by reporting them truthfully.
The domain in which I focus on is the family of quantile stable mechanism, see Teo
and Sethuraman (1998); Klaus and Klijn (2006); Chen, Egesdal, Pycia, and Yenmez
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(2014).
Definition 2.1 (Chen, Egesdal, Pycia, and Yenmez (2014)). Let q ∈ [0, 1]. The
q-quantile stable matching mechanism is the mapping {φq : P → M|µ : ∀m ∈
M, µ(m) is manm’s partner in his dkqe-th best stable matching according to order
m, where k = |S()|}.8
An easy way to interpret quantile stable mechanisms is to think about the stable set
as the size of a pie to be distributed between the set of men and set of women, and
q ∈ [0, 1] as the share women are going to get. By choosing q, the designer anchors
the ex-post distribution of payoffs across sides of the market, making it constant,
regardless of other details such as the number of participants in the market, or their
reports.
The distribution of payoffs being constant across markets also implies that quantile
stable mechanisms are “easy to write," since they can be completely described
with one parameter q. This is in the spirit of Wilson’s critique (Wilson, 1987),
posing as a desideratum for a mechanism not to depend on the fine details of the
economy.9 A particular case is that of the median stable matching mechanism,
(q = 1/2) which assigns each individual the partner they have in the median-
preferred stable matching. The median stable matching mechanism appears as a
compromise solution between the two side-optimal stable mechanisms. Median
stable matchings have been found to be salient in decentralized two-sided matching
problem Echenique and Yariv (2011). The family of quantile stable mechanism is
the family of all such compromises.
2.3 Regret and Regret-free Truth-telling
In this section I introduce the notion of regret, and define what it means for a
mechanism to be regret-free truth-telling. In section 2.5 I discuss the relation of
regret-free truth-telling to existing incentive compatibility notions.
8 For simplicity of exposition we take d0e = 1 such that φ0(·) = φM (·); that isM -DA. Nothing
depends on this assumption, alternatively one could define quantile over W and let q = 1.
9 To illustrate this point consider a mechanism (see details in appendix A.3) that partitions the
set of possible preference profiles into sets B and C, such that φ() = φM () for ∈ B and
φ() = φW () for ∈ C. This mechanism is stable since it always coincides with one of the
allocations that a DA would assign. However one might find this mechanism undesirable since
inessential changes (e.g. rearranging the order among the alternatives in an agent’s unacceptable set)
in the reported preference profile can lead to large jumps in the distribution of payoffs across men
and women.
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Regret captures the idea that individuals extremely dislike being provenwrong. That
is, being able to infer given the outcome and observables that they could have done
better (for sure) by taking a different action. There is strong evidence both in the
psychology and experimental literature that (i) people have regret, (ii) fear of regret
affects behavior, and (iii) the effect of anticipated regret is related to the information
the subject knows will be revealed to him; see Gilovich and Medvec (1995); Bell
(1982); Loomes and Sugden (1982, 1987).10
In what follows I assume that each agent knows their own preference, but not that
of others. After the mechanism has generated a matching, the whole matching is
observable to all agents, but the reports given to the mechanism remain private. Fix
a matching market (M,W,) and a mechanism φ, and suppose agent i reports′i to
mechanism φ(·).M|′i = {µ ∈M : (∃ −i∈ P−i) [φ(′i,−i) = µ]} is the set of
matchings that are consistent with i’s report and the known rules of the mechanism.
This means that when reporting′i agent i knows that the resulting matching µmust
belong toM|′i . Suppose (ex-post) one such µ ∈ M|′i is observed by i. Then the
inference set I(µ;′i, φ) = {−i∈ P−i : φ(′i,−i) = µ} identifies the preference
reports that are consistent with the observed matching, given his report, and the
known rules of the mechanism. Player i knows that the reported preference profile
is in this set.
Definition 2.2. i regrets (reporting) ′i at µ ∈ M|′i through ′′i in φ(·) if
∃ ′′i∈ Pi such that
(i) for each −i∈ I(µ;′i, φ) it holds that [φ(′′i ,−i) i µ]; and
(ii) for some ˜−i ∈ I(µ;′i, φ) it holds that [φ(′′i , ˜−i) i µ].
In this context regretting a report simply means that the agent knows ex-post that
his report is weakly dominated. Agent i knows that the reported preference profile
lies within the inference set and, furthermore, there existed an alternative report that
would have resulted in either matching him/her to the same or a strictly preferred
partner.
Definition 2.3. A report′i is regret-free in φ(·) if @(µ,′′i ) ∈ (M|′i ,Pi) such that
i regrets ′i at µ through ′′i in φ(·).
10 There are two other observations: (iv) there are different levels of regret; and (v) regret from
an negative action taken is greater than regret of benefits by omitted action. The notion of regret in
this paper captures the first three observations, but abstracts from the last two since the environment
has ordinal preferences.
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A regret-free report guarantees agents that they will never face regret. The criterion
is stringent in that if a report is susceptible of regret at some matching, then no
matter how unlikely that matching is, it is not regret-free. Standard and familiar
notions use the same type of criteria. For example, dominant strategy incentive
compatibility requires that reporting truthfully is weakly better than any other report
for every possible report others could make (regardless of the probability that they
will effectively use such report).
Definition 2.4. A mechanism φ(·) is regret-free truth-telling if for every market
(M,W,) and every agent in it, truth-telling is regret-free.
A regret-free truth-telling mechanism is one that assures agents they will not be
proven wrong by stating their true preferences, using arguments that depend only in
the same information the agent has.
2.4 Main Result
In this section I show that the DA (both men- and women-proposing) provides
incentives to report truthfully to agents on both sides of the market if they want to
avoid regret. Moreover, these incentives characterize the DA among quantile stable
mechanisms (Theorem 2.1). The incentives are strict in the sense that truth is found
to be the unique regret-free report in DA (Proposition 2.1).
Theorem 2.1. A mechanism φ(·) is a quantile stable regret-free truth-telling mech-
anism if and only if it is (either the men- or women-proposing) deferred acceptance
mechanism.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
I discuss the structure of the argument that carries the proof aided by an example.
First, I argue that in the case of DA, no agent ever regrets reporting their preferences
truthfully. Then, I show that for any quantile stable mechanism that is not DA, truth
is susceptible of regret.
(DA is regret-free truth-telling). Supposeφ(·) is themen-proposingDA, thenφ(·) is
strategy-proof formenwhichmeans truth is a dominant-strategy in the induced direct
revelation game, and therefore a fortiori truth is regret-free for men. Consequently
the argument needs to address the incentives to report truthfully that the DA provides
to the receiving side (women). I show that no deviation can dominate truth ex-post
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in DA, for each type of possible deviation a woman can have; that is, there is no
alternative report through which the agent may regret reporting truthfully.
For concreteness, consider a market (M,W,) with |M | = |W | = 511 where
womanW1 has preferences
W1 : m1  m2  m3  m4  m5.
The set of possible outcomes she faces by reporting truthfully can be divided into
those in which she is matched to a man and those where she remains single. By
the Rural Hospital Theorem, if she is not matched in the M -DA then she is not
matched in any stable matching. This implies she would have remained single even
if the mechanism had beenW -DA. Therefore, there is no deviation that could have
generated a better outcome. Basically, if she was unmatched in M -DA, it means
she did not receive any proposals in the course of the algorithm. Consequently
how she ranked her partners was irrelevant. Thus, she will not regret reporting her
preferences truthfully if the matching she observes has her unmatched.
On the other hand, for any man that is acceptable to her there exist reports of others
(−W1) such that each of man is her assigned stable partner inM -DA. The argument
that follows will apply to any such matching, but it serves to go through a specific
case: SupposeW1 reports her preferences honestly and observes the matching:
φ(W1 , ·) =
(
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5
m3 m2 m1 m4 m5
)
.
Any report that could lead W1 to regret must be belong to one (or a combination)
of the following:
(i) permute the order among alternatives that are preferred by her to her assigned
match,
(ii) declare someone who is preferred to the observed match as less preferred to it,
(iii) declare as preferable to the observed match someone who is not,
(iv) permute the order among alternatives that are less preferred to the observed
match.
11 I use a market of size five so that there is enough richness to portray all types of deviations a
woman may have.
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Examples of these are,
W1 :m1  m2  m3  m4  m5, (true)
W ′1 :m2 ′ m1 ′ m3 ′ m4 ′ m5, (i)
W ′1 :m1 ′ m3 ′ m2 ′ m4 ′ m5, (ii)
W ′1 :m1 ′ m2 ′W1 ′ m3 ′ . . . , (iii)
W ′1 :m1 ′ m2 ′ m4 ′ m3 ′ m5, (iii’)
W ′1 :m1 ′ m2 ′ m3 ′ m5 ′ m4. (iv)
In order to affect the outcome ofM -DA by changing her report, the woman needs to
change the set of offers that are made to her during the process of the algorithm. The
only way to do so is to change some decision she made over the offers she received
when she was honest. Otherwise the same matching would ensue.
Permuting the order of the alternatives that are preferred to the observed match as in
(i) is innocuous, that is it results in the same matching outcome. The reason is that,
as the DA algorithm progresses, women are made weakly better off in each round. If
W1 had gotten an offer from eitherm1 orm2, given that she reported her preferences
truthfully, she would have accepted it. That partner would be a lower bound to her
matching outcome, and thus contradict the observed matching. Therefore no such
offers could have beenmade, and howW1 ranked themwas irrelevant. It follows that
changing the order among men in the upper contour set of the observed matching
does not affect the result of the algorithm.
By the same reason as (i), declaring someone who is preferred to the assigned match
as less preferred, as in (ii), is also innocuous. The set of decisions over received
offers made by the algorithm on behalf of W1 remains unchanged, and the same
matching would result.
Reports of the form (iii) are known as truncations. Truncation happens when W1
declares several acceptable men as unacceptable without changing their relative
order. Truncations are known to be profitable deviations from the truth for agents in
the receiving side in the context of complete information (Roth, 1982). This means
there exist preference profiles for which truncating would yieldW1 a strictly better
outcome. The question then becomes whether W1 can be sure of a truncation’s
profitability given an observed matching. If so, truth would not be regret-free. I
argue that, given thatW1 observes the resultingmatching, but not the exact report that
gave rise to the observe matching, she cannot conclude that a truncation dominates
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truth-telling. A truncation involves risk, even ex-post when the agent has learned
the resulting match.
To see thatW1 cannot regret reporting truthfully through a truncation, consider the
preference profile where each individual finds their assigned partner as the only
acceptable alternative, i: φ()(i)  i, ∀i 6= W1. It is straightforward to verify
that this profile belongs to W1’s inference set.12 Particularly, she might only be
acceptable to m3.13 If so, by reporting m3 to be unacceptable as in (iii) she would
remain single which is a strictly worse outcome according to her true preferences.
This shows that a truncation never dominates truth-telling ex-post (given the assumed
information structure), and thereforeW1 cannot regret reporting truthfully through
a truncation. A similar argument holds for (iii’).
Truncation reports are salient in the literature for several reasons. First, truncations
play a key role in proving that no stable strategy-proof mechanism exists (Roth,
1982). Second, considering truncations is sufficient to analyze profitable manipu-
lations in the context of complete information, since the outcome of any profitable
deviation can be achieved through a truncation (Roth and Vande Vate, 1991). Third,
in a Bayesian setup and under a symmetry condition on agents beliefs, truncations
are shown to first order stochastically dominate other untruthful reports (Roth and
Rothblum, 1999). However, no unequivocal order between truncation and truthful
reporting arises in their analysis. Ruling truncations susceptible of regret and truth
regret-free is therefore relevant.
Lastly consider whether W1 may regret truth-telling through an alternative report
as in (iv). The preferences of the rest of the economy depicted in Figure 2.1a are
in W1’s inference set, as Figure 2.1b shows. If these are the reported preferences
by other participants, it means that by reporting honestly W1 is able to obtain m3
because at some point during the course of the DA she was faced with the decision
of choosing between m4 and m5. By accepting m4 over m5 she generated a chain
reaction of proposals that leadm3 to propose to her (Figure 2.1b). Had she decided
to accept m5 over m4 as (iv) prescribes, no such chain would have occurred. She
would have been matched tom5 who is less preferred by her tom3, see Figure 2.1c.
Thus there does not exist a report through which W1 can regret reporting her true
12 If this was the case, then the DA process would be: every man made only one offer, to a
distinct woman, in particular to their observed partner. Each woman accepted the offer received.
The observed matching resulted.
13 There is no need to assume she is unacceptable to everyone except m3. The same argument
holds if every man other thanm3 finds her acceptable, but less preferred than the observed partner.
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W2 :m2  W2
W3 :m1  W3
W4 :m4  W4
W5 :m5  m3
m1 :W3  m1
m2 :W2  m2
m3 :W5  W1
m4 :W1  W4
m5 :W1  W5
(a) Preferences of −W1
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5
m4,m5 m2 m1 m3
m3,m5
m3,m4
m4


(b) DA with W1
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5
m4,m5 m2 m1 m3
m4


(c) DA with ′W1
Figure 2.1
preference profile.
Although the argument was shown in the context of a specific example, Appendix
A.1 shows it works for any agent and any market. Therefore DA is regret-free
truth-telling.
Having argued that the DA is regret-free truth-telling, I now turn to other quantile
stable mechanisms and show that no quantile mechanism except DA is regret-free
truth-telling. To illustrate the argument I provide an example where an agent regrets
truth-telling in the context of the median mechanism. The proof for general quantile
mechanisms can be found in the Appendix A.1.
(Regretting truth in the median mechanism). Consider amatchingmarketwith |M | =
|W | = 5, and letW1’s preferences be
W1 : m1  m2  m3  m4  m5.
Suppose that W1 reports her preferences honestly to a clearinghouse that uses the
median stable mechanism (q = 1/2) to generate matchings, and that she observes
the matching:
φ(W1 , ·) =
(
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5
m3 m2 m1 m4 m5
)
= µ.
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I claim thatW1 regrets truth-telling when she observes µ, and she does so through
the alternative report:
W ′1 : m1 ′ m2 ′ m3 ′ W1 ′ m4 ′ m5.
To show the claim I procede in two steps: Step 1. Under the alternative ′W1 , W1
would obtain a matching that is weakly better than the observed one for any report
of others inW1’s inference set; thus satisfying condition (i) of the regret definition.
Step 2. Under the alternative′W1 ,W1 would obtain a matching that is strictly better
than the observed one for some report of others in W1’s inference; thus satisfying
condition (ii) of the regret definition.
Step 1. In order to show that W1 regrets truth-telling through ′W1 one needs to
understand how the matching outcome whenW1 reports ′W1 compares to the one
obtained whenW1 reports W1 , given the observed matching µ. Since a q-quantile
stable matching mechanism depends on the whole set of stable matchings it is
important to see how these relate.
The following lemma says that any stable matching under (′W1 ,−W1) is also a
stable matching under (W1 ,−W1). This provides crucial information about what
the stable set would look like under each type of report, and consequently about what
matching would be implemented under each report. In fact, the stable matchings
under (′W1 ,−W1) are exactly those that are stable under (W1 ,−W1) and that
are weakly preferred by W1 to µ. The lemma has the key implication that ex-post
W1 knows she would have incurred in no risk by using ′W1 instead of W1 .
Lemma 2.1. S(′W1 ,−W1) = {µ′ ∈ S(W1 ,−W1) : µ′ W1 µ = φq()},
∀ −W1∈ I(µ;W1 , φq).
Proof. In Appendix A.1.
The lemma implies that instead of having to compute the stable set under ′W1 ,
it is sufficient to look at the set of stable matchings under W1 that are weakly
preferred to µ; a fact I will leverage on later. Since W1 takes the reports of others
in the inference set as given, one only has to deal with the change in the stability
constraints that involve W1; that is, whether by changing her report she is creating
a new block, individual or pairwise. For W1, any individual rational matching
that is weakly better than µ is also an individually rational matching under W1 ,
and vice versa. This follows immediately from AW1(′W1) = {m1,m2,m3} ⊆
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{m1,m2,m3,m4,m5} = AW1(W1) and φq(·) being a stable mechanism. The fact
that′W1 respectsm1’s preference relations amongst men ensures she does not create
new blocking pairs. Lastly, sinceW1 is matched under µ (µ(W1) = m3) it follows
from the Rural Hospital Theorem that she must be matched in every stable matching,
in particular in the Women-optimal stable matching, which by its optimality must
match her to a weakly preferred partner: φW (W1 ,−W1)(W1) ∈ {m1,m2,m3}.
Consequently φW (′W1 ,−W1)(W1) ∈ {m1,m2,m3}, since the W -DA algorithm
progresses using the same sequence of proposals under both W1 and ′W1 . Again,
by the Rural Hospital Theorem, it implies thatW1 would be matched in the Women-
pessimal/Men-optimal stable matching under′W1; that is, φM(′W1 ,−W1)(W1) ∈
{m1,m2,m3}
An immediate but important corollary of lemma 2.1 is that the matching thatM -DA
would produce under′W1 must be the same that the q-quantile mechanism produces
underW1 . In terms of the example, it meansW1 must be gettingm3 as her assigned
partner inM -DA when she reports′W1 , which coincides with her assigned partner
in the median matching when reporting W1 .
Corollary 2.1. φq(′W1 ,−W1) W1 φM(′W1 ,−W1) = φq(W1 ,−W1).
Consequently, given the observed matching,W1 knows she would have done at least
as well by reporting ′W1 than by reporting W1 . Thus, ′W1 satisfies requirement
(i) from the definition of regret at µ.
Step 2. It remains to be shown that for some report of others in the inference set,
reporting ′W1 would generate a matching that is strictly preferred byW1 to µ; i.e.
′W1 satisfies condition (ii) from the regret definition at µ. Given corollary 2.1, it
is enough to show that ∃ −W1∈ I(µ;W1 , φq=
1
2 ) such that φq(′W1 ,−W1) W1
φM(′W1 ,−W1).
The structure of the argument is as follows: I show that there is a preference profile
in the inference set such thatW1 is matched to each of her acceptable partners in the
stable set. Moreover she is matched to a different man in each stable matching. By
performing a soft-truncation she forces the mechanism to calculate the quantile with
respect to a set that contains only weakly preferred matchings to the one obtained
through truth-telling. I show that in fact the quantile over this set selects a partner
forW1 that she strictly prefers.
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Consider the preferences:
m1 :W2  W3  W4  W5  W1 W1 :m1  m2  m3  m4  m5
m2 :W3  W4  W5  W1  W2 W2 :m2  m3  m4  m5  m1 (∗)
m3 :W4  W5  W1  W2  W3 W3 :m3  m4  m5  m1  m2
m4 :W5  W1  W2  W3  W4 W4 :m4  m5  m1  m2  m3
m5 :W1  W2  W3  W4  W5 W5 :m5  m1  m2  m3  m4
In this case there exist exactly five stable matchings
µ1 =
(
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5
)
, µ2 =
(
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5
m2 m3 m4 m5 m1
)
,
µ3 =
(
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5
m3 m4 m5 m1 m2
)
= µ,
µ4 =
(
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5
m4 m5 m1 m2 m3
)
, µ5 =
(
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5
m5 m1 m2 m3 m1
)
.
|S(W1 ,−W1)| = 5 implies that dkqe = d512e = 3, so the median stable mecha-
nism selects the partner associatedwith eachman/woman’s 3-rd best stablematching
for this economy. Since all women share the same ranking/preference over the set
of stable matchings (µ1 W µ2 W µ3 W µ4 W µ5) then
φq=
1
2 (W1 ,−W1) = µ3 = µ.
Thus, preference report (∗) is consistent with W1’s report, the rules of the median
stable mechanism (q = 1/2) and the observedmatching µ; that is,−W1∈ I(µ;W1
, φq=
1
2 ).
What would have happened if she had reported ′W1?,
W ′1 : m1 ′ m2 ′ m3 ′ W1 ′ m4 ′ m5.
By lemma 2.1 it follows that S(′W1 ,−W1) = {µ1, µ2, µ3}, |S(′m1 ,m1)| = 3
implies dkqe = d31
2
e = 2. The median stable mechanism selects the partner
associated with each man/woman’s 2-nd best stable matching, therefore
φq(′W1 ,−W1) = µ2 W1 µ3 = φq(W1 ,−W1).
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Then, ′W1 satisfies condition (ii) of the definition of regret at µ.
Step 1. and 2. together imply that, given her inference set after reporting truthfully
and observing µ, W1 knows she would have done at least as well by reporting
′W1 as by reporting W1 ; additionally, she knows there exists a preference profile
consistent with the observed matching where the report ′W1 would have yielded
a strictly preferred matching to the one obtain through truth. That is, W1 regrets
W1 at µ through′W1 in the median stable mechanism. The same argument can be
extended to quantile stable mechanisms in general, as shown in Appendix A.1.
The following proposition shows that in the DA truth-telling is the unique regret-
free report. Thus obtaining truthful reports from all agents is not a consequence
of making the behavioral criterion (regret) arbitrarily coarse. If so, not only truth-
telling, but also other reports to be regret-free.
Proposition 2.1 (Uniqueness). Truth is the essentially unique regret-free report in
the DA mechanism. Moreover, an agent regrets any other report through truth.
The qualifier “essentially" refers to the existence of regret-free reports that are
essentially equivalent to truth-telling; i.e. those that differ from it only in how they
rank the alternatives in the unacceptable set.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
To illustrate how an agent may regret misrepresenting their preferences in the DA, I
reproduce the example from the introduction in the notation of themarriagemarket.14
The example shows that if an agent performs a truncation, and observes an outcome
where she is unmatched, then the agent regrets the truncation. Particularly, she
regrets truncating by considering the outcomes that would have been generated if
she had told the truth.
(Regretting a truncation). Consider a market with two men and two women that
runs the M -DA. Suppose W1’s preferences are W1 : m2  m1  W1, but she
chooses to report man m1 as unacceptable; i.e. W1 performs a truncation. Namely
14 Dr. Bob would beW1, and Johns Hopkins would bem2.
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she reportsW ′1 : m2 ′ W1 ′ m1.
φM(′W1 ,′−W1) =
(
m1 m2 ·
W2 · W1
) m1 : W1 ′W2 ′ m1
m2 : W2 ′m2 ′ W1
W2 : m1 ′m2 ′ W2
where ′−W1 is one of the possible preference profile for agents other thanW1 that
are consistent with the observed outcome, the rules ofM -DA and whatW1 reported;
that is, ′−W1∈ I.
DoesW1 regret reporting′W1? Yes. WhenW1 finds herself single after performing
a truncation she knows that, had she told the truth, (i) she could not have done worse
since the mechanism is individually rational; ∀ −W1∈ I,
φ()(W1) W1 W1 = φM(′W1 ,−W1)(W1),
and (ii) there exists the possibility (namely′−W1) that she could have been matched
tom1 by just reporting truthfully,
φM(W1 ,′−W1) =
(
m1 m2
W1 W2
)
,
φM(W1 ,′−W1)(W1) = m1 W1 W1 = φM(′W1 ,′−W1)(W1).
Woman W1 has conclusive evidence at the end of the game that she would have
done better just by reporting truthfully. Consequently she regrets performing the
truncation through truth-telling.
The example shows an agent regretting a truncation. The arguments that address
other type of misrepresentations are tackled in Appendix A.1. The basic intuition
is that a reversion in the ordering of partners and the option of remaining single,
makes the agent to susceptible to being matched to a less preferred alternative. In
those situations, there is always an outcome that could have been improved upon by
truth-telling. Thus, in order to regret a misrepresentation, the agent only needs to
bear in mind truth-telling, and not necessarily some other complex reports.
2.5 Further Remarks
This section briefly discusses how regret-free truth-telling relates to standard notions
of incentive compatibility.
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The first observation is that if a mechanism is strategy-proof, then it is regret-free
truth-telling since if truth is a dominant strategy (in the associated direct revelation
game) then it is necessarily undominated ex-post. Yet, the converse is not true.
The fact that DA is regret-free truth-telling yet not strategy-proof for agents in the
receiving side establishes this.
Regret-free truth-telling does not imply ex-post incentive compatibility. Ex-post
incentive compatibility requires truth-telling to be optimal even if the agent were to
learn the true state of the world. Regret-free is a weaker concept in this regard. If a
mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible, then truth is weakly dominant in every
state of the world and therefore regret-free.
The notion of regret and the implied regret-minimization presented in this paper
does not coincide with worst-case minimization à la von Neumann-Morgenstern.
Under worst-case minimization, the agent expects to remain single irrespective of
her report in a stable matching. Therefore, she is indifferent among all reports. In
contrast, truth-telling is the unique regret-free report in the case of DA.
The definition of regret presented in this paper is by no means the only possible one.
The literature on regret is too vast to survey. Instead I address the most prominent
notion, that of minimizing maximum regret in the sense of Stoye (2011). Under
this notion an individual computes her regret as the difference in outcomes between
what would have been the optimal action at the true state of the world and the action
she takes (see Bell, 1982) This requires a knowledge of the true preference profile
at the end of the game which is absent in the setup analyzed in this paper, since
in most applications privacy concerns prevent this sort of information revelation.
Moreover, it requires a cardinal computation, both absent in this paper’s setup, as
well as in the data that is elicited from participants. The report that would minimize
an agent’s maximum regret in the sense of Stoye (2011) does not generally coincide
with a regret-free report for that agent.
The question of existence and uniqueness of a regret-free report are beyond the
scope of the present paper, and are left for future research. However, a few remarks
are in order.
Remark 2.1. There exists a mechanism φ such that no agent has a regret-free report,
namely the Boston Mechanism. In contrast, every report is regret-free in a constant
mechanism.
Remark 2.2. φ(·) being stable does not imply, nor is it implied by, truth being
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regret-free in φ(·).
Remark 2.3. Regret is not transitive, i regretting ′i through ′′i and regretting ′′i
through ′′′i does not imply i regrets ′i through ′′′i .
Proofs. See Appendix A.2.
Remark 2.1 shows that neither existence nor uniqueness are guaranteed in general.
Remark 2.2 says that a regret-free truth-telling mechanismmay not be stable. Lastly,
remark 2.3 highlights that this notion of regret is not transitive since regret may be
happening at different matches. Intransitivity is not surprising since Bikhchandani
and Segal (2011) showed that intransitivity is built into any definition of regret-based
behavior that is not expected utility.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper I present the notion of regret-free truth-telling and through it show that
the most salient matching mechanism, the deferred acceptance, provides incentives
to agents on both sides of the market to report their preferences truthfully. Moreover,
the incentives provided by the DA are strict: if an agent wishes to avoid regret, she
has a unique choice, to report her preferences honestly. The main result is that DA
is the unique quantile stable matching mechanisms to provide such incentives. The
result helps to understand the success and salience of the DA in practice, despite
being manipulable.
2.7 Related Literature
This paper contributes to understanding the incentives DA provides for truth-telling.
The main result in the literature in this regard is negative, Roth (1982) and Dubins
and Freedman (1981) show that there exists no stable strategy-proof mechanism.
Additionally, in recent contributions Chen, Egesdal, Pycia, and Yenmez (2016) and
Pathak and Sönmez (2013) show that ranking stable mechanisms by their manip-
ulability is equivalent to ranking them by preferences. The important implication
of their analysis is that stable mechanisms cannot be ranked by their manipulability
for all agents. Based on these observations it would seem we are left with multiple
stable mechanisms and no clear way of choosing among them in terms of their
incentives for truthful reporting. This identifies incentives that DA provides agents
to report truthfully that are not provided by any other quantile stable mechanism.
These incentives are a relaxation of the concepts of strategy-proofness and ex-post
incentive compatibility.
25
Trying to understand the incentives in the context of incomplete information, Roth
and Rothblum (1999) and Ehlers (2008) look at the problem of incentives in DA
from theBayesian point of view, where expected utilitymaximizing participants have
prior beliefs over each other’s preferences. They find that truncation strategies first
order stochastically dominate other false reports under some symmetry conditions
on the priors. However, there is no clear order between truncation strategies and
truth-telling since it depends on the agent’s attitude towards risk.
The most recent and fruitful approach has focused on the incentives agents face
in large markets; see Roth and Peranson (1999), Immorlica and Mahdian (2005),
Kojima and Pathak (2009) and Lee (2017). The main message is that as the market
grows large, the core of the market shrinks (in an appropriate sense) and so do the
gains of deviating from truth-telling. Lee (2017) distinguishes itself from the rest
by not having to rely on limited acceptability assumptions. His analysis hinges on
both large markets and on agents having (random) cardinal utilities. In general this
approach does not offer unequivocal advice for participants of small markets and
requires participants to be able to compare cardinally the possible matches which is
a departure from the traditional ordinal approach in matching literature. In contrast
the treatment in this paper maintains the ordinal preference approach tradition in
matching and looks for incentives in the spirit of the “Wilson doctrine"15 (Wilson,
1987) and robust mechanism (Ledyard, 1977; Bergemann and Morris, 2008) to
search for mechanisms whose properties do not critically depend on the common
knowledge of agents about distributions of beliefs, types, etc.
The closest papers are Kojima and Manea (2010) and Barberà and Dutta (1995).16
Kojima and Manea (2010) also provide a characterization in the case of two-sided
matching as the unique stable weakly Maskin monotonic mechanism. The basic
interpretation of their axiom is that when an agent makes fewer claims over partners
on the other side of the market, his side of the market must be made weakly better
off. Surprisingly, weak Maskin monotonicity is defined using only the primitives
of one side of the market. They do not approach the issue of incentives for truthful
reporting.17 In contrast I characterize DA through stability and regret-free truth-
15 “Game theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the consequences of trading rules that
presumably are really common knowledge; it is deficient to the extent it assumes other features to be common
knowledge, such as one agent’s probability assessment about another’s preferences or information. I foresee the
progress of game theory as depending on successive reductions in the base of common knowledge required to
conduct useful analyses of practical problems. Only by repeated weakening of common knowledge assumptions
will the theory approximate reality." —Wilson (1987).
16 I am indebted to Laura Doval for bringing Barberà and Dutta (1995) to my attention.
17 Other known characterizations areGale and Shapley (1962), in their seminal paper, characterize
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telling in the class of quantile stable mechanism.
Barberà and Dutta (1995) introduce the notion of protective strategies and show
that truth-telling is the unique protective strategy equilibrium in the revelation game
associated with the deferred acceptance. The concept of protective strategies is a
refinement of worst-case minimization. Two strategies that have the same worst
outcome are distinguished by their 2nd-worst outcome; if the latter coincides, then
they are that distinguished by the 3rd-worst outcome, etc. If one assumes that
the agents observe only their own matching partner, and nothing else, then the
regret-free criterion would coincide with protective strategies. However, in general
these two criteria are distinct. For example, in an environment under complete
information, truth-telling is a protective strategy for any participant of the DA, but
it is not regret-free.
The family of quantile stablemechanisms is discussed inTeo andSethuraman (1998),
Klaus and Klijn (2006) and Chen, Egesdal, Pycia, and Yenmez (2014) among others.
Teo and Sethuraman (1998) take a polyhedral approach to stable marriage problem
exploiting linear programming techniques. They show that every fractional stable
matching as a convex combination of solutions to the stable marriage problem.
Using this technique they prove existence of the quantile stable mechanisms. Klaus
and Klijn (2006) provides a simple proof of the existence through purely lattice-
theoretical arguments. Chen, Egesdal, Pycia, and Yenmez (2014) take on quantile
stable mechanism in a context of matching with contracts. They show that if
preference satisfy strong substitutability condition and the law of aggregate demand
then quantile stable matchings exist and are well defined. This paper builds upon
their work analyzing regret based incentives and use these notions to characterize
DA.
DA as constrained efficiency subject to stability. Balinski and Sönmez (1999) characterize DA as
the unique stable mechanism that respects improvements. Alcalde and Barberà (1994) characterize
DA by stability and strategy-proofness under the domain restriction of preferences satisfying top-
dominance.
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C h a p t e r 3
CENTRALIZED MATCHING WITH INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION
3.1 Introduction
Overview
The large literature on two-sided matching has been successful in its application to
various markets, ranging from the matching of newly-minted doctors and residency
positions, to the matching of kids to schools, to the matching of medical patients and
organ donors. Most of this literature assumes complete information of preferences
in the market: market participants are assumed to be perfectly informed of all other
participants’ preferences, in addition to their own. This assumption allowed for im-
portant theoretical advances. However, in applications, it is by no means innocuous.
Many matching markets are large and therefore imply limited communication be-
tween participants. For instance, the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP)
involves around 70, 000 participants annually, the number of kids and schools in big
cities such as NYC and Boston is in the hundreds of thousands, etc. The goal of the
current paper is to characterize some of the potential consequences of incomplete
information in centralized matching markets.
One of the most commonly used clearinghouses for two-sided matching markets
is the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm, DA for short, first introduced by
Gale and Shapley (1962). In practice, market participants report their preferences
simultaneously to the clearinghouse, which emulates the Gale and Shapley (1962)
algorithm. This mechanism has several desirable features (see Roth and Sotomayor,
1990). The resulting matching is stable with respect to reported preferences and
therefore Pareto optimal. Furthermore, the generated stable matching is the most
preferred, with respect to the reported preferences, for the “proposing" side (doctors
in the NRMP; kids in centralized school choice system). It is known, however,
that the DA matching mechanism is generally not incentive compatible: whenever
the market has more than one stable matching, there are incentives to misreport
preferences. Nonetheless, with complete information, and under mild assumptions
on behavior, the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of stable match-
ings. Therefore, strategic behavior is still expected to generate outcomes retaining
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the desirable features of stability. Moreover, the Rural Hospital Theorem (McVitie
and Wilson, 1970) guarantees that the set of unmatched individuals is the same
across stable matchings. Therefore, with complete information, the selection of
equilibrium does not impact the set of matched participants.
In this paper, we ask whether these insights carry over to the case in which infor-
mation is incomplete. Under what conditions would we still expect equilibrium
outcomes of DA to be stable with respect to the underlying preferences? Would the
proposing side be expected to maintain an advantage? Would selection of equilibria
remain an ineffective instrument for inducing different sets of matched participants?
In ourmodel, firms andworkers—that could be ametaphor for doctors and hospitals,
kids and schools, etc.—match using the firm-proposing DA mechanism. At the
outset, preferences over match partners are realized according to a commonly-
known distribution. We consider a setting in which deviations from the complete
information environment are “small." In particular, we assume that firms, who act
as proposers, know the realized preferences in the market. Each worker, however,
knows only his own realized match preferences over others.
In the complete information world, markets with a unique stable matching do not
exhibit incentive compatibility issues. Furthermore, a significant body of work
tackling incentive compatibility issues has focused on environments in which small
cores emerge as markets grow large, ones where incomplete information is indeed
more likely to be important (see Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak,
2009; Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno, 2017). We therefore assume that for any
realized preference profile, the market entails a unique stable matching. Certainly,
with incomplete information on both sides, or markets that entail multiple stable
matchings, some of the negative results we illustrate are easier to achieve.1 In that
respect, our assumptions on preferences are designed to stack the cards in favor of
stable outcomes.
In this setting, our first result characterizes a rich class of environments in which
equilibrium outcomes do not correspond to stable matchings with respect to the
underlying preferences. Such environments can emerge even when the (complete-
information) stable matching is the same across possible preference realizations; in
other words, when there is no uncertainty over what is the stable matching. Our
1 Roth (1989) suggested one example with two-sided incomplete information and multiple stable
matchings for realized markets that yields an equilibrium that is unstable in each realized market.
See our discussion in the literature review below.
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characterization result is a “one and a half cycle" theorem.
In rough terms, the result identifies two conditions on a preference profile such that
there is an incomplete-information economy with that profile in its support and a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium that does not coincide with the stable matching for each
realized preference profile. The first condition is the existence of a preference cycle.
Namely, there is a sub-market in which the induced preferences exhibit multiple
stable matchings. Due to our assumption of a unique stable matching in the market
as a whole, theremust be a worker who is a “spoiler" and blocks one of thematchings
in the sub-market with a firm participating in the cycle. The second condition is that
this spoiler takes part in a “half cycle." That is, workers’ preferences are such that
it is possible to construct (alternative) firms’ preferences to create a cycle involving
the spoiler. The idea of the proof is then to consider an additional state in which
that cycle exists. As it turns out, such a construction allows workers to “trade"
match partners across possible preference realizations. Intuitively, the spoiler in one
market drops his claim for the firm he prefers under one preference realization to
gain a firm he prefers in another.
Equilibria of these sort may be desirable for the receiving side, i.e. the workers.
In fact, we show settings in which all workers prefer to be on the receiving side of
the DA mechanism and select an “unstable" equilibrium. This stands in contrast
with the common wisdom held for the complete information case, suggesting that
the proposing side is advantaged. Indeed, this common wisdom was an important
argument for the switch in the late 1990s from the hospital-proposing to the doctor-
proposing version of DA in the NRMP (see Roth and Peranson, 1999). It is also
the central reason for having children, or their parents, propose in most applications
of DA to school choice. Our results suggest that market designers should carefully
inspect the information and preferences market participants hold before deeming
which segment of the market should be on the proposing side of the DAmechanism.
Our second result characterizes settings in which, with incomplete information,
equilibria may be associated with different distributions over the set of unmatched
individuals. Namely, we show that whenever we start with an economy in which
there is an equilibrium outcome that is not (complete-information) stable for some
preference realizations, one can add one worker and one firm to generate an econ-
omy with different sets of matched individuals across equilibria. In such settings,
selection could potentially constitute an instrument for generating more matches of
particular sets of participants, affecting e.g. the number of filled residency positions
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in rural hospitals, or the number of kids of certain demographics who get matched.
It is important to contrast our results with some of the existing results tackling issues
of incentive compatibility in the DA mechanism. As alluded to above, the literature
has taken three approaches, all focusing on large markets. The first approach argues
empirically (Roth and Peranson, 1999) and theoretically (Immorlica and Mahdian,
2005;Kojima and Pathak, 2009) that in largemarkets cores are small. In otherwords,
as markets grow large, with high likelihood there is a unique stable matching and,
therefore, no incentive compatibility issues. In the same spirit, the second approach
argues that when markets are imbalanced, cores shrink rapidly (Ashlagi, Kanoria,
and Leshno, 2017). Again, with imbalanced markets, under some conditions, we
expect small cores and incentive compatibility issues disappear. The third approach
argues that in large markets, the incentives to misreport vanish, when everyone
else is reporting truthfully (Lee, 2017). In comparison, our results illustrate that
even when cores are small, with a unique stable matching for each realization of
preferences, incomplete information may imply strategic misreporting. In other
words, to the extent that incomplete information may be important in some of the
matching applications, small cores are no theoretical panacea. Empirically, even if
we expect cores to be small for any realization of preferences, we cannot assume
that participants are truthfully reporting their preferences.
Our last results are more positive in nature. We identify classes of preferences in
which incomplete information has no impact. Namely, whenever preferences are
assortative as in Becker (1973), on either side—either firms share ordinal rankings
over workers in each preference realization, or workers share ordinal rankings over
firms (that are the same across preference realizations)—there is a unique equi-
librium of the induced game with incomplete information that realizes the unique
stable matching for any realized preferences. This result holds regardless of the un-
derlying assortative preferences that occur with positive probability in the economy,
the match utilities that represent them, or the precise probability distribution that
governs which are more likely to arise.
Related Literature
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) offers a review of the seminal work onmatchingmarkets
with complete information. In the years since, several papers considered the potential
impacts of incomplete information in both decentralized and centralized settings.
In the decentralized, non-cooperative, setting, there has been a long-standing quest
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for a natural notion of stability with incomplete information. Liu, Mailath, Postle-
waite, and Samuelson (2014) offer such a notion formatchingmarketswith one-sided
incomplete information, similar to ours, and transfers. Bikhchandani (2017) also
considers markets with one-sided incomplete information and offers a stability no-
tion that does not entail transfers.2 Several papers allow for incomplete information
when modeling decentralized interactions as a non-cooperative dynamic game (see
Niederle and Yariv, 2009, and references therein). Similar to our setting, these
papers often look for a characterization of economies in which equilibrium results
in the complete-information stable matching in all realized markets.
With respect to centralized settings, Roth (1989) is possibly the closest to the
current paper. He offers an example of a market with incomplete information on
both sides in which there exists no stable mechanism implementing the (complete-
information) stable matching for each realization of preferences. Importantly, in
the example, preference profiles that can conceivably be realized are associated
with multiple stable matchings. The message that incomplete information may
upset some of the basic conclusions derived with complete information is common
to both this paper and ours. Our contribution relative to Roth (1989) is four-
fold. First, we provide a general characterization of when stable mechanisms fail
in guaranteeing stable outcomes in equilibrium when information is incomplete.
Second, we illustrate that the impacts of incomplete information can be severe
even when incomplete information is only one-sided, there is no uncertainty on
the stable matching itself, and there is a unique stable matching for each realized
preference profile. This last item is important as multiplicity of stable matchings
is associated with incentive compatibility issues even in the complete information
setting. Third, we illustrate other results that can be overturned when incomplete
information is present: the optimality of truncation strategies, the usefulness of
equilibrium selection for affecting the set of unmatched participants, etc. Last, we
also characterize a class of economies in which incomplete information does not
impact centralized outcomes.3
2 Chakraborty, Citanna, and Ostrovsky (2010) study a many-to-one school choice setting with
one-sided incomplete information. They suggest that stability should be defined in conjunction
with the mechanism the generates the matching in place as different mechanisms allow for different
learning patterns from outcomes. The characterize settings in which there exist mechanisms allowing
for an ex-post notion of stability.
3 Roth and Rothblum (1999) consider economies where information is “symmetric." Roughly,
for any two firms f and f ′, the likelihood of every profile of preferences for workers is the same
as the likelihood of that profile where f and f ′ are swapped in all rankings. Under this symmetry
assumption, there are always optimal truncation strategies in the firm-proposing DA. We show that
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Ehlers and Massó (2007) identify a link between small cores and the existence of
ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria implementing the (complete-information) stable
outcome for any realized market when information is incomplete. In our setting, we
assume cores are small and, indeed, (complete-information) stable outcomes can
always be implemented through a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In contrast, our focus
is on cases that give rise to other equilibrium outcomes.4
A growing empirical literature estimates preferences in matching markets using
constraints implied by stability (see review in Chiappori and Salanié, 2016; Agarwal,
2015; Hsieh, 2011). Our results provide caution regarding the validity stability
constraints when analyzing outcomes of centralized settings. Even when markets
are such that one expects the set of stable matchings to be small, equilibrium
outcomes may not be stable. The assumption that outcomes are stable is then an
equilibrium-selection assumption. It is also important to note that empirical studies
of matching markets often consider rather few, if not one, instantiation of a market.
There is then a form of omitted variable as markets that could have been realized but
did not are not observed, yet could have an important impact on equilibrium play.
3.2 Motivating Example
Small Cores and Multiple Outcomes
Consider a market with three firms: f1, f2, and f3 and three workers: w1, w2, w3.
There are two states of the world that determine preferences: θ1 and θ2, which are
equally likely. For i = 1, 2, the preferences in state θi are given by U(θi) as follows:
3,2 1, 4 2, 2
2, 4 3,2 1, 4
1, 1 2, 1 3,1

U(θ1) =
3,2 1, 4 2, 2
1, 4 3,2 2, 4
1, 1 2, 1 3,1

U(θ2) =
Figure 3.1: Payoff matrix by state.
where Ujk(θi) = (U fjk(θi), Uwjk(θi)) describing the payoff U
f
jk(θi) to firm fj from
matching with worker wk in state θi, and the payoff Uwjk(θi) to worker wk from
matching with firm fj in state θi. That is, in the matrix notation above, each row
corresponds to one of the three firms and each column corresponds to one of the
this symmetry assumption is, in fact, quite stringent and illustrate cases in which truncation strategies
are sub-optimal.
4 Ehlers andMassó (2015) focus on many-to-one matching markets with incomplete information
and provide restrictions on strategies to constitute ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria.
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three workers. An entry then captures the payoffs of the corresponding firm and
worker pair. We assume that remaining unmatched generates a payoff of 0 for any
market participant.
The “centralized matching game” we consider proceeds as follows. At the outset,
the state is determined. Firms learn the state, while workers do not. Workers only
know their own vector of match payoffs, which does not vary across states, and the
(uniform) prior over states. Then, both firms and workers simultaneously submit
preference rankings to a firm-proposing DA mechanism that generates a matching.
Notice that in both states, there is a unique complete-information stable matching
highlighted in bold in the payoff matrices above. That is, if all participants knew the
state to be θi, the resulting unique stable matching and, unique equilibrium outcome
of the DA mechanism (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990), would be the matching µ,
µ(fj) = wj, j = 1, 2, 3. In particular, in our incomplete information setting, there
is no uncertainty on the (complete information) stable matching itself. In fact, the
only difference between the two states appears in the preferences of f2—she ranks
w1 and w3 differently in the two states.
There are several results that carry over from the complete information setting,
the details of which will be illustrated in greater generality below. First, truthful
reporting is still weakly dominant for the firms, for much the same reasons it is
in the complete-information setting. In what follows, we will therefore assume
firms report truthfully and focus on the induced game between workers. Second,
the complete-information stable matching in each state is an equilibrium outcome
of this game. Indeed, workers reporting their preferences truthfully constitutes an
equilibrium. However, we will now show that it is not the unique equilibrium
outcome. In fact, we will now show that there is another equilibrium generating an
outcome that is not (complete-information) stable in both states.
Specifically, wewill show that thematchings corresponding to the underlined entries
in the matrices above can be implemented in equilibrium. That is, we will show that
the matching λ(θi) in state θi, i = 1, 2, given by:
λ(θ1)(f1) = w2
λ(θ1)(f2) = w1
λ(θ1)(f3) = w3
and
λ(θ2)(f1) = w2
λ(θ2)(f2) = w3
λ(θ2)(f3) = w1
is an equilibrium outcome.
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Indeed, consider the following profile of strategies for workers:
w1 : f2  f3  w1
w2 : f1  f2  f3
w3 : f2  f3  w3.
That is, w2 reports his preferences truthfully, while w1 and w3 drop f1 from their
preference list and declare her unacceptable. Notice that these strategies are not
weakly dominated.
It is straightforward to check that these reports yield λ(θi) for i = 1, 2. Why are
they a best response? Consider w1, who receives an expected payoff of 0.5 ∗ 4 +
0.5 ∗ 1 = 2.5 in this candidate equilibrium. There are two natural deviations to
consider: truthful reporting and truncation. Given others’ reports, if w1 reports his
preferences truthfully, the unique (complete-information) stable matching would be
implemented in each state and he would expect a payoff of 2 < 2.5. Suppose w1
truncates his preferences and demands only his favorite firm, f2. In this case, he
would still be matched with f2 in state θ1, but remain unmatched in state θ2, yielding
an expected payoff of 0.5∗4+0.5∗0 = 2 < 2.5. Other deviations are not profitable
more directly and similar arguments follow for the other two workers. Thus, the
profile of strategies above is indeed an equilibrium, generating (λ(θ1), λ(θ2)) as an
outcome.
There are several notable features of this equilibrium. First, workers uniformly prefer
this equilibrium to the one generating the (complete-information) stable outcome in
each state. Furthermore, they might prefer being on the receiving side of DA and
selecting this equilibrium over being on the proposing side of DA. Indeed, when on
the proposing side, truth-telling would be weakly dominant for workers. If they use
truth-telling, since firms are informed of the state, the market in each state operates
as if all participants had complete information and there is a unique equilibrium
generating the (complete-information) stable matching in each state.
Second, there are only two pure-strategy equilibria corresponding to our incomplete-
information market “game," and neither is fragile to the precise specification of
payoffs. Indeed, a small perturbation of payoffs would not affect this result, and the
emergence of the additional equilibrium identified above is not a knife-edge result.
Third, the equilibrium involves dropping of firms from one’s rankings and truncation
strategies are not best responses. This is in contrastwith the results from the complete
information setting that illustrate that there are always truncation best responses,
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regardless of the profile of strategies used by others (see Roth and Vande Vate,
1991). As shown above, in this example, truncation is not a best response for
workers.
What is driving this example? Consider state θ1. Were f3 and w3 out of the
market, the remaining market would have two stable matching: the firm-optimal
one µ, µ(fj) = wj for j = 1, 2, and the worker-optimal one µ′, µ′(fj) = w3−j for
j = 1, 2. When firms report truthfully in the sub-market without f3 and w3, w1
could guarantee µ′ by “truncating" his preferences restricted to that sub-market and
declaring only f2 as acceptable. However, in the full market, w3 and f1 would block
any such attempt at a swap of partners by w1 and w2. In our terminology, w3 is a
“spoiler." However, the existence of state θ2 helps incentivize w3 to drop his claim
for f1. Indeed, in state θ2, without w1 and f3, the remaining market has two stable
matchings and w3 would benefit by “truncating" his preferences restricted to that
sub-market and, indeed, declaring f1 as unacceptable. In fact, payoffs are such that
this “truncation" is beneficial despite it meaning the foregone possible match with
f1 in θ1. Now, in state θ2, w1 is a “spoiler" and, with complete information, would
block the matching with f1. However, the existence of state θ1 induces w1 to drop
his claim for f1 as payoffs make it useful to do so when considering both states
possible ex-ante.
Theorem 3.1 below offers a generalization of this example and provides a charac-
terization of markets that entail equilibria yielding outcomes that do not coincide
with the (complete-information) stable matching in each state. As in the example,
dropping strategies, rather than truncation strategies, play an important role in such
markets.
Augmented Example and The Rural Hospital Theorem
With complete information, the set of stable matchings has two extrema—the firm-
optimal stable matching, which is the worker-pessimal stable matching, and the
worker-optimal stable matching, which is firm-pessimal stable matching. The exis-
tence of an extremal stable matching generates The Rural Hospital Theorem (McVi-
tie and Wilson, 1970). That important theorem states that the set of unmatched
individuals is constant across stable matchings. Under the assumption that firms
use their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling, the set of equilibrium outcomes
of the firm-proposing DA coincides with the set of stable matchings. The Rural
Hospital Theorem then suggests that selection of equilibria cannot be useful for
36
affecting the set of unmatched individuals.
As it turns out, this is no longer the case when information is incomplete. As an
example, consider an augmentation of our basic example above, where an additional
firm, f4, and additional worker, w4, are included. The market operates as before.
At the outset, one of two states, θ1 or θ2 is determined with equal probabilities. The
match payoffs in each state are given using the same notation as before as follows:
3,2 1, 4 2, 2 ∅,∅
2, 4 3,2 1, 4 ∅,∅
1, 0 2, 1 3,1 ∅,∅
∅, 1 ∅,∅ ∅,∅ 1,1


U(θ1) =
3,2 1, 4 2, 2 ∅,∅
1, 4 3,2 2, 4 ∅,∅
1, 0 2, 1 3,1 ∅,∅
2, 1 ∅,∅ ∅,∅ 1,1


U(θ2) =
Figure 3.2: Payoff matrix by state.
where∅ stands for the corresponding partner being unacceptable (and can be thought
of as a large and negative payoff). Remaining unmatched still generates a payoff of
0 for any participant.
In this case, there is still a unique (complete-information) stable matching that is
identical across the two states and corresponds to the diagonal highlighted in bold
in the matrices above. A similar construction to that described above generated
the underlined entries in each state as an equilibrium outcome. In this example,
there is no “extremal" equilibrium. Indeed, f3 and w4 prefer the equilibrium in
which the (complete-information) stable is implemented in each state. However,
other market participants prefer the other pure-strategy equilibrium. In line with
this observation, the set of matched individuals differs across equilibrium outcomes,
with one outcome entailing all agents being matched and another having f3 and w4
unmatched in state θ2.
Theorem 3.2 below provides a generalization of this augmented example and illus-
trates a class of markets in which equilibrium outcomes vary in terms of the set of
unmatched individuals they generate.
3.3 General Setup
The Environment
Amatchingmarket is a triplet (F ,W , U) composed of a finite set of firmsF = {f1, ..., fn} ,
a finite set of workersW = {w1, ..., wm}, and match utilitiesU =
({
ufij
}
,
{
uwij
})
.
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For each i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,m, ufij is firm fi’s utility from matching with
worker wj and uwij is worker wj’s utility from matching with firm fi. u
f
i∅ stands for
the utility of firm fi from remaining unmatched and, respectively, uw∅j stands for the
utility of worker wj from remaining unmatched. We assume that all preferences are
strict.5 We say a worker wj is acceptable to firm fi whenever ufij > u
f
i∅. Similarly,
we say a firm fi is acceptable whenever uwij > uw∅j .
Match utilities U induce a profile of ordinal preferences of firms over workers and
workers over firms, which we will denote by = ({fi}, {wj}). That is, fi is
the ordinal ranking of workers, as well as staying unmatched, that ufi· represents;
wj is defined analogously.
An economy is a quintuple (F ,W , {U(θ)}θ∈Θ ,Θ,Ψ), where Θ is a finite set of
states with each θ ∈ Θ corresponding to a different market (F ,W , U(θ)) with the
same set of firms F and workersW and Ψ is a probability distribution over states.
Without loss of generality, we assume Ψ has full support on Θ.
We consider a centralized matching economy game in which, at the outset, a state
θ ∈ Θ is selected according to Ψ. Firms are all informed of the realized state
θ, while each worker wj is privately informed only of her preferences, uwij(θ) for
i = 1, ..., n,∅. Workers and firms then participate in a firm-proposing DAmatching
mechanism. In particular, they simultaneously submit ordinal rankings that are
translated into a matching using the firm-proposing DA algorithm. The structure of
the game is common knowledge among all participants. In particular, workers can
update on the distribution over states, and therefore the realized preferences, after
observing their private information.
Certainly, if workers’ utilities are all different across states, workers’ private infor-
mation would allow them to distinguish between states and the analysis of the game
would follow that of the complete information variant, state by state. We will as-
sume that workers’ private information is not revealing of the state. In other words,
we will assume that for any θ′, θ′′ ∈ Θ, uij ≡ uwij(θ′) = uwij(θ′′). This implies that
workers are symmetrically informed.6
Much as in the complete information case, truthful reporting is weakly dominant
for firms.7 We will therefore assume throughout that firms report truthfully their
5 That is there exists no i, i′ and j, j′ such that ufij = u
f
ij′ , u
f
ij = u
f
i∅, u
w
ij = u
w
i′j , or uwij = uw∅j .
6 This assumption is similar to that made by Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2014),
who offer a stability notion for incomplete-information matching markets.
7 The proof follows the same lines as the proof for the complete information environment, see
38
preferences and focus on the induced game between workers. We will consider the
Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game.
It is important to note the impact of the proposing side in our economy. Suppose
workers were the proposing side in the DA matching mechanism, and using their
weakly dominant strategy of truthful reporting. In that case, in each state, workers
would behave just as they would were they fully informed and using their weakly
dominant strategy of truthful reporting. The resulting set of equilibrium outcomes
would then automatically correspond to the set of equilibrium outcomes emerging
when information is complete, namely the set of stable matchings in each state
(Roth, 1984; Gale and Sotomayor, 1985). This is why, to inspect the impact of
incomplete information on matching clearinghouses, we concentrate on the case in
which the uninformed side of the market is on the receiving side.
As mentioned in the Introduction, in the complete information benchmark, there are
no incentive compatibility issues when there is a unique stable matching. In order
to isolate the impacts of incomplete information on strategic behavior, we therefore
assume that each realized market corresponding to the support of the distribution
Ψ has a unique (complete-information) stable matching. Formally, we assume that
for each θ ∈ Θ, the matching market (F ,W , U(θ)) has a unique stable matching,
denoted µ(θ). In what follows, we will drop the allusion to complete information
whenever referring to the unique (complete information) stable matching in any
state.
Basic Definitions
In now define several notions that will be useful for our characterization. These
definitions identify features of sub-markets in particular states.
Definition 3.1 (Cycles). In a given state θ, a set of firmsG = {g1, . . . , gK} ⊂ F and
a set of workers V = {v1, . . . , vK} ⊂ W form a cycle if the following conditions
hold for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K}:8
(1) µ(θ; vk) = gk;
(2) gk+1 vk gk vk ∅;
(3) vk gk vk−1 gk ∅.
Dubins and Freedman (1981).
8 All indices are moduloK wherever necessary.
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Condition (1) requires that the firms and workers involved in the cycle are stable
partners in state θ. Conditions (2) and (3) imply that workers would like to trade
their stable partners among themselves, but firms would prefer to stick with the
stable allocation of partners.
The existence of a cycle involving firmsG andworkers V implies that the sub-market
involving these same firms and workers in state θ, with preferences induced by the
original preferences, has multiple (complete-information) stable matchings.9
Graphically, consider the addition of arrows to amatching payoffmatrix (ufij, uwij)i 6=∅,j 6=∅
as follows, assuming there is a unique stable matching in the corresponding market.
We draw a horizontal arrow originating from entry (i, j) and pointing at entry (i, k)
if and only if ufik > u
f
ij . Similarly, we draw a vertical arrow originating from entry
(i, j) and pointing at entry (k, j) if and only if uwkj > uwij . The existence of a cycle
defined as above corresponds to a graphical cycle in the matrix involving firms and
workers who are matched under the unique stable matching.
For example, consider U(θ1) in section 3.2. Firms {f1, f2} and workers {w1, w2}
form a cycle. Figure 3.3(a) corresponds to the visual cycle involving {f1, f2} and
{w1, w2}.
3, 2 1, 4 2, 2
2, 4 3, 2 1, 4
1, 1 2, 1 3, 1


(a)
3, 2 1, 4 2, 2
1, 4 3, 2 2, 4
1, 1 2, 1 3, 1


(b)
Figure 3.3: One and a half cycle
In principle, we could have defined cycles without restriction condition (1) in our
definition. That is, one could envision cycles involving firms and workers who need
not be matched under the stable matching. As it turns out, this condition will be
useful in our characterization. Intuitively, a cycle among firms and workers that are
9 µ(θ) is stable in this sub-market. To find an additional stable matching, construct the following.
First, all workers in G point to their favorite firms in F . Whenever a worker points to a firm no one
has pointed to, that worker and firm are matched. Whenever more than one worker points to the same
firm, match that firm to its favorite worker among those. Proceed recursively with the remaining
unmatched workers and firms. The resulting matching is stable, and does not coincide with µ(θ)
restricted to the sub-market.
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all dominated choices for one another should not impact strategic incentives much.
However, a cycle among stable match partners implies viable incentives to generate
unstable matches for the workers.
Suppose there is a cycle in state θ involving firms G = {g1, ..., gK} and workers
V = {v1, ..., vk} with the notation of Definition 3.1 above. Consider the matching
µ′(θ; vk) = gk+1 for k = 1, ..., K (where, again, we interpret gK+1 = g1) and
µ′(θ; v) = µ(θ; v) for any v ∈ W\V . That is, workers in V implement the desired
swap of firms that defined the cycle. We assumed there is a unique stable matching
in each state θ. Therefore, µ′(θ) must be blocked. In fact there must be a worker
w that does not benefit from this trade, w¯ ∈ W\V and a firm that suffers from
the trade, g = g
k¯
∈ G that block µ′(θ). Any such worker w¯ “spoils" the potential
matching µ′(θ) for workers in V . We refer to any such worker as a spoiler.
In our incomplete-information setting, preferences of workers coincide across states.
Therefore, for a cycle to be present in any particular state, the correspondingworkers’
preferences need to satisfy certain restrictions across states. Specifically, they need
to form a half cycle, defined as follows.
Definition 3.2 (Half Cycles). G = {g1, . . . , gK} ⊂ F and a set of workers V =
{v1, . . . , vK} ⊂ W form a half cycle if, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, gk+1 vk gk vk ∅
(where indices are modulo K as before).
The definition of a half cycle resembles the definition of a cycle, without placing
restrictions on firms’ preferences or requiring that the relevant firms and workers
are matched under a stable matching. Notice that the existence of a half cycle is not
tied to a particular state since it relies only on workers’ preferences, which are state-
invariant. Whenever there is a half cycle involving firms G and workers V in state
θ, the preferences of firms G could be modified so that both conditions (2) and (3)
of Definition 3.1 are satisfied. Graphically, using the same convention of drawing
arrows on the payoff matrices described above, with the modified preferences of the
firms in G, there would be a cycle in the matrix.10
Figure 3.3(b) illustrates a half cycle involving {f1, f2} and {w2, w3}. Notice that if
preferences of firms f1 and f2 were modified to those in Figure 3.3(b), there would
be a visual cycle in the matrix. Nonetheless, it would not be a cycle according to our
10 We note that the cycles introduced in Ergin (2002) and Kesten (2006) are special cases of our
half cycles when objects or schools are interpreted as firms in our setting and agents or students are
interpreted as workers in our setting.
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Definition 3.1 since the stable partners of {f1, f2} are not {w2, w3} in when match
payoffs are determined according to the matrix in Figure 3.3(a).
3.4 Economies with Unstable Equilibrium Outcomes
In the type of economies we consider, truth-telling by all participants always con-
stitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, truth-telling is not weakly
dominated for any participant. In particular, we have the following:
Proposition 3.1 (Implementation of StableOutcomes). For any economy (F ,W , {U(θ)}θ∈Θ ,Θ,Ψ)
with a unique stable matching µ(θ) in each market (F ,W , U(θ)) , θ ∈ Θ, there is
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the centralized matching economy game whose
outcome is µ(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
We note that Proposition 3.1 relies on there being a unique stable matching in each
market in the support of the economy. Indeed, even with complete information,
multiplicity of stable matchings implies that truthful reporting by all participants is
not an equilibrium. The setting we study is, therefore, conducive to implementing
stable outcomes, as we designed it to be.
Our goal in this section is to characterize economies in which there exist additional
equilibria that generate outcomes that are not stable in at least some markets in the
support of the economy.
We characterize preferences in one state, call it θ1, that can correspond to an economy
with multiple equilibrium outcomes. In other words, for any set of firms F and
workersW we characterize a preference profile = ({fi}, {wj}) such that we
can find an economy (F ,W , {U(θ)}θ∈Θ ,Θ,Ψ) that exhibitsmultiple BayesianNash
equilibrium outcomes such that U(θ1) represents .
One and a Half Cycle Condition We say that a preference profile , correspond-
ing to a unique stable matching µ, satisfies the One and Half Cycle Condition
if the following hold:
1.  has a cycle with a unique spoiler w¯. In that cycle, the spoiler is listed
between two workers belonging to the cycle by only one firm fk¯;
2. There is a half cycle that includes the spoiler w¯ and the firm fk¯, but does not
include the worker wk¯ = µ(fk¯). Within this half cycle, fk¯ is not w¯’s most
preferred firm.
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When the One and a Half Cycle Condition holds, preferences exhibit a cycle.
Suppose workers implement the swaps that the cycle suggests, while all other
workers and firms maintain their (unique) stable match partners. The resulting
matching is not stable and, from our discussion above, has a blocking pair (w¯, fk¯),
where fk¯ is part of the cycle and the spoiler w¯ is not. For ease of presentation
alone, restriction 1 requires that the spoiler w¯ and the firm with which he blocks the
matching resulting from the swap are unique for at least one cycle. This restriction
is weakened in the Online Appendix.
Intuitively, our characterization builds on the idea of constructing other states to
provide the spoiler w¯ with incentives to drop his claim for fk¯. Restriction 2 plants
the seeds for such a construction by requiring that the spoiler w¯ and firm fk¯ be
part of a half cycle and that the upper contour set of fk¯ is non-empty for w¯. This
implies that worker w¯ prefers forgoing a match with fk¯ for a match with some other
firm in the half cycle. As we will see, the requirement that the worker wk¯, whose
stable match partner is fk¯, does not take part in this half cycle is important in our
construction.
As an example, consider the preferences induced by the match utilities in Fig-
ure 3.3(a) and corresponding to state θ1 in our introductory example. Notice that the
One and a Half Cycle condition holds. The spoiler for the cycle involving {w1, w2}
and {f1, f2} is wk¯ = w3. An attempt by workers {w1, w2} to implement the swap
prescribed by the cycle and match wi with f3−i, i = 1, 2, will be blocked by the
spoiler w3 and the firm fk¯ = f1. Furthermore, {f1, f2} and {w2, w3} form a half
cycle that contains f2 w1 f1 and does not contain µ(f1) = w1.
We stress that the One and a Half Cycle Condition does not rule out the possibility
of multiple cycles. In fact, if the One and a Half Cycle Condition is satisfied with
various cycle and half cycle pairs, there may be multiple economies that induce 
in some state and yield multiple Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcomes.
We are now ready to state the first main result of this section.
Theorem 3.1 (Multiplicity of Equilibrium Outcomes). For any set of firms F and
workers W , let  be a preference profile satisfying the One and a Half Cycle
Condition. Then there exists an economy (F ,W , {U(θ)}θ∈Θ ,Θ,Ψ), where U(θ1)
represents , that exhibits multiple Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcomes. Further-
more, there exists such an economy in which |Θ| = 2.
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The details of the proof can be found in Appendix B. Below we discuss heuristi-
cally the main idea behind the proof, which generalizes the forces underlying the
introductory example of section 3.2.
Consider , with a unique stable matching µ, that satisfies the One and a Half
Cycle Condition. A cycle as defined in the definition of this condition implies that
there is a sub-market, involving the cycle’s participants, that entails multiple stable
matchings. In this sub-market, the implementation of the swap defined by the cycle
would be beneficial for the workers in the cycle. However, such a swap would be
blocked by worker w¯, the spoiler, and some firm fk¯. Notice that absent w¯, in the sub-
market induced by the cycle, “truncation" by one of the workers, say bywk¯ = µ(fk¯),
would allow the desirable swap by workers. How can we induce the spoiler w¯ to
drop his claim for firm fk¯? That is where the existence of a half cycle comes into
play. We construct another state in which firms’ preferences are such that at least
some of the firms and workers corresponding to the half cycle form a full cycle.
This imposes restrictions on preferences of firms that take part in the original half
cycle as well as on preferences of other firms. Indeed, the constructed state has to
exhibit a unique stable matching. Furthermore, in the cycle constructed in this new
state, participating firms and workers need to be matched to one another through the
unique stable matching. Importantly, since w¯ and fk¯ take part in this cycle, and fk¯ is
not w¯’s favorite within the half cycle, preferences can be constructed so that w¯ has an
incentive to truncate his preferences in the corresponding sub-market. In particular,
preferences can be constructed so that w¯ has an incentive to drop the claim for firm
fk¯. From uniqueness, there would then be spoilers in the new state and we would
need to make sure they drop their claims for blocking partners. As it turns out, we
can make sure the roles of w¯ and wk¯ = µ(fk¯) are reversed in the two states. In
particular, in the newly constructed state, wk¯ = µ(fk¯) is the unique spoiler whose
incentives to drop his claims for blocking firms is given symmetrically through his
participation in the cycle corresponding to our original preferences .
Ultimately, the spoiler w¯ in state θ1, corresponding to our preference profile , is
compensated for dropping his claim for his blocking partner fk¯ through the improved
match he receives in state θ2. Symmetrically, the spoiler in state θ2 is compensated
for dropping his claim for his blocking partner in that state through state θ1. That
drop allows him to implement a beneficial swap in the cycle we started out with in
state θ1.
By appropriately choosing cardinal presentations of preferences that are consistent
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with these implied preference orderings, we can make sure that spoilers best respond
by dropping claims for their blocking partners.
Several points are worth stressing. First, at the root of our construction is a spec-
ification of ordinal preferences in the added state. Cardinal presentations of these
preferences as well as the probabilities places on each state are important, as they
make sure that the dropping strategies are, in expectation beneficial. We note that, in
this case, where the construction involves only two states, θ1 and θ2, the precise spec-
ification of probabilities does not matter. Indeed, if the probability of θ1 is p in this
economy, we could construct another economy (F ,W ,
{
U˜(θ)
}
θ∈Θ
,Θ,Ψ) with the
same states that are equally likely, where U˜(θ1) = pU(θ1) and U˜(θ2) = (1−p)U(θ2).
That economy would also generate multiple equilibrium outcomes. More impor-
tantly, the set of utilities and probability distributions that guarantee multiplicity of
equilibrium outcomes is not knife-edge.11
Second, we assumed here that there is a cycle with a unique spoiler, who blocks the
cycle with only one firm. We relax this assumption in the Online Appendix. When
there are more spoilers or firms with which each spoiler blocks a candidate cycle,
more states may need to be added to make sure spoilers drop their claims for each
and every relevant blocking partner. The construction is similar to that described
here, but notationally more cumbersome.
Last, there is a connection between the cycle we identify in the preference profile
 and the cycles defined in Ergin (2002) and Kesten (2006) in the context of
assignment problems. For illustration, suppose the cycle we identify is between
workers {w1, w2} and firms {f1, f2} and suppose µ(fi) = wi, i = 1, 2. The
existence of a cycle implies that w1 f1 w2 f2 w1 and f1 w2 f2 w1 f1. That
is, workers w1 and w2 in this sub-market would like to swap stable partners and
implement µ′(fi) = w3−i, i = 1, 2. Since µ is the unique stable matching, there
must be a spoiler, sayw3, who blocks this swap with one of the two “swapped" firms,
say f1. This implies that w1 f1 w3 f1 w2. In addition, as stated, w2 f2 w1. This
is precisely the Cycle Condition in Definition 1 of Ergin (2002), where objects or
schools are interpreted as firms and agents or students are interpreted as workers. We
stress that our definition of a cycle is far more restrictive, as it imposes restrictions
on the preferences of the corresponding workers as well.
11 Namely, it has a positive Lebesgue measure.
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3.5 The Rural Hospital Theorem
TheRural Hospital Theorem (McVitie andWilson, 1970) guarantees that unmatched
individuals are identical across stable matchings. In the complete-information set-
ting, when the proposing side of DA truthfully reveals, the set of equilibrium out-
comes coincides with the set of stable matchings (Roth, 1984; Gale and Sotomayor,
1985). This implies that, with complete information, equilibrium selection in DA
will not affect the set of matched individuals.
At the root of the Rural Hospital Theorem is the existence of a stable matching µ
that is preferred by all members of one side of the market, say the firms, to any other
stable matching and is the worst for all members of the other side of the market,
the workers. Such a (complete-information) stable matching always exists. For
instance, the firm-proposing DA generates a stable matching that is firm-optimal
and worker-pessimal. Suppose µ leads to firms F and workers W being matched.
Take any stable matching µ′ that yields firms F ′ and workers W ′ being matched.
Since µ is the firm-optimal stable matching and, in particular, individually rational,
it must be that F ⊇ F ′. Similarly, since µ′ is preferable by the workers to µ and
individually rational, it must be that W ′ ⊇ W . Now, |F ′| = |W ′| and |F | = |W |,
which implies that F = F ′ andW = W ′.
In the example of section 3.2, the two equilibrium outcomes we identify do not have
the feature above—neither is optimal for one side of the market and pessimal for the
other. That is where the Rural Hospital Theorem breaks down.
The example highlighted in section 3.2 is not special. As it turns out, whenever
we start with an economy that exhibits multiplicity of equilibria, we can expand the
market by adding one firm and one worker and generate a new economy in which
the set of unmatched individuals differs across stable matchings. This addition can
be fairly minimal in that the set of states and the distributions over them remains
the same, as well as the match utilities derived from matching individuals in the
economy we started out with.
Formally, for any economy E = (F ,W , {U(θ)}θ∈Θ ,Θ,Ψ) and any firm f /∈ F
and worker w /∈ W , an augmented economy of E with firm f and worker w is an
economy E˜ = (F ∪ {f},W∪{w},
{
U˜(θ)
}
θ∈Θ
,Θ,Ψ) such that for any fi ∈ F and
wj ∈ W , for any state θ ∈ Θ,
u˜fij(θ) = u
f
ij(θ), u˜
w
ij(θ) = u
w
ij(θ), u˜
f
i∅(θ) = u
f
i∅(θ), u˜
w
∅j(θ) = u
w
∅j(θ).
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An augmented economy is restricted to satisfy our restriction that each realized
market entails a unique stable matching.12
Theorem3.2 (Unmatched Individuals in Equilibria). Take any economyE exhibiting
multiplicity of Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcomes. Suppose there is one such
equilibrium outcome in which, in some state, some worker is matched to a partner
inferior to his stable match partner. Then there exists an augmentation with one firm
and one worker that exhibits multiplicity of Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcomes
and different distributions of unmatched individuals across these outcomes.
The example in section 3.2 illustrated a case in which the unstable equilibrium
outcome entails fewer matched individuals than the stable one. As it turns out, this
is not generally the case. Unstable equilibrium outcomes may also correspond to
a larger set of matched individuals relative to the stable outcome. We provide an
example in the Online Appendix.
3.6 Economies with a Unique Stable Equilibrium Outcome
In previous sections we identified a class of markets in which, despite small cores
in each realized state, multiple equilibrium outcomes emerged. At the root of that
class of markets were cycles in preferences, at least in some states. In other words,
in at least some states, a sub-market entailed multiple (complete-information) stable
matchings. In the absence of such cycles, the construction we provide for generating
an economy with multiple equilibria could not be used. In fact, in this section, we
highlight economies that exhibit no such cycles and entail a unique equilibrium
implementing the unique stable matching in each state. Specifically, we focus on
markets in which participants on at least one side of the market are characterized by
assortative preferences (à la Becker, 1973).
Assortative Preferences of Firms
Assume that firms share the same ranking over workers in each state. That is, in
each state θi, there is a permutation pii : {1, ...,m} → {1, ...m} such that all firms
agree on the ranking
wpii(1)  wpii(2)  ...  wpii(m),
and, for ease of presentation, we assume that all workers are acceptable in each state.
12 Notice that such an augmentation always exists. Indeed, one can always specify firm f and
worker w as one another’s only acceptable partners in each state.
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Proposition 3.2. If firms share the same ranking over workers state by state, then
there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome corresponding to the unique
(complete-information) stable outcome in each state.
Intuitively, for any state θ, in the course of the firm-proposing DA, all firms that
are active apply to the same worker. This fact is driven by the common preferences
of firms and is independent of the workers’ reports. Thus, the set of active firms
constitutes a family of nested sets. Therefore, regardless of workers’ reports, each
worker is called to choose only once in the course of the firm-proposing DA and
a worker’s choice over the set of active firms is decisive. In particular, there is no
sense in which misreporting can be beneficial to workers. The only potential impact
of a worker misreporting is that he may forgo a firm he would otherwise match to
and, consequently, be matched to an inferior firm, or no firm at all.
In terms of our construction above, assortative preferences for firms ensure that
workers cannot generate a fictitious cycle through their reports, thus ensuring that
it is a dominant strategy to report truthfully, and ruling out any Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium that is (complete-information) unstable.
Assortative Preferences of Workers
Suppose now that workers share the same ranking of firms. Workers’ preferences are
identical across states and, without loss of generality, we can assume their ranking
is given by:
f1  f2  ...  fn.
Proposition 3.3. If workers share the same ranking over firms, then there is a
unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome corresponding to the unique (complete-
information) stable outcome in each state.
The intuition underlying this Proposition is the following. Suppose µ(θ) is the
unique (complete-information) stable matching in state θ and that there exists an
equilibrium yielding the matching λ(θ) in each state θ such that λ(θ) 6= µ(θ) for at
least one state θ. Consider the smallest integer k such that λ(θ; fk) 6= µ(θ; fk) for
some state θ.
It follows that worker w = µ(fk) either reports fk as unacceptable or reports λ(w)
as preferable to fk. Suppose that, in this equilibrium, w reports ∗ such that
fpi(k+1) ∗ fpi(k+2) ∗ ... ∗ w ∗ fpi(j) ∗ ... ∗ fpi(n)
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for some permutation pi : {k + 1, ..., n} → {k + 1, ..., n}. As it turns out, the
following deviation is profitable for w : a report of ′ such that
f1 ′ f2 ′ ... ′ fk ′ fpi(k+1) ′ fpi(k+2) ′ ... ′ w ′ fpi(j) ′ ... ′ fpi(n).
In this deviation, the worker reports truthfully his preferences over his true top k
firms and maintains the ranking used in the equilibrium yielding λ for all other
firms. In any state in which the worker is supposed to match with fj , j > k,
under the stable matching µ, these reports assure that the worker either receives the
partner he received under the original equilibrium, or a preferable firm (from the set
{f1, ...fk}). In any state in which the worker is supposed to match with fj ,j ≤ k,
under the stable outcomes, the minimality of k comes into play. Intuitively, since k
is chosen minimally, other workers’ reports will not impede on the agent getting his
stable match partner. In particular, in state θ, the worker would strictly improve on
his match partner.
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we focus on centralized matching clearinghouses that are often used in
applications. We highlight the fragility of several canonical results to the commonly
employed complete information assumption. The literature has argued extensively
that small cores resolve well-known incentive compatibility issues in such clear-
inghouses. In contrast, we show that small cores are no panacea. With arguably
a small amount of incomplete information, equilibrium outcomes can change dra-
matically when market participants are not fully informed of all other participants’
preferences.
In particular, there are four messages the paper suggests. First, incentive compatibil-
ity issues remain with small cores when incomplete information is present. Indeed,
our Theorem 1 provides a characterization of settings in which small cores coex-
ist with multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes that. Second, equilibrium outcomes
corresponding to unstable matchings may actually be desirable for the receiving
side in a DA clearinghouse, despite the traditional view of the proposing side as
advantaged. Third, the set of matched individuals may differ across equilibrium
outcomes and we offer a characterization of when that may happen. Unlike the
complete information benchmark, this insight suggests that selection of equilibria
can offer a useful instrument for affecting who gets matched. Last, we show that
several specific technical simplifications that are used frequently when information
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is complete, cease to hold when there is uncertainty about preferences. Specifically,
best responses no longer necessarily take the form of truncation strategies.
Taken together, the results illustrate the importance of taking into account details
pertaining to the information market participants have in centralized matching clear-
inghouses.
Turned on their head, our results offer caution for empirical studies of matching mar-
kets that use stability constraints to deduce participants’ preferences over partners.
Indeed, market features that guarantee small cores when information is complete,
such as large volumes of participants and market imbalances, may be insufficient
for guaranteeing unique equilibrium outcomes that are stable for the instantiation of
the market a researcher observes.
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C h a p t e r 4
IMPLICATIONS OF OVERCONFIDENCE ON INFORMATION
INVESTMENT
Overconfidence is awell documented behavioral bias bywhich an individual believes
to have better information or perform at a task better than he actually does. On the
other hand, a large body of literature has focused on understanding the decision
to invest in information made by purely rational agents. This issue is relevant to
several applications, such as bench trials, where a judge decides how much effort he
is going to spend to collect information relevant to the case. Whether the results of
this last strand of literature remain valid when agents are overconfident is an open
question.
Moore and Healy (2008) classify overconfidence into three categories: overestima-
tion, overplacement and overprecision. Overestimation and overplacement refer to
cases where an individual thinks he has performed in a task better than he actually
did or better than others, respectively. Overprecision is the case when an individ-
ual believes her information is more precise than it actually is. This paper deals
with overprecision, the most prevalent and the least reversed phenomenon of the
three (Moore and Healy, 2008; Benoît and Dubra, 2011; Ortoleva and Snowberg,
2015). In the reminder of the paper we refer to the overprecision-type bias as
overconfidence.
The leading example we are using in this paper is about a judge who must decide
whether to convict or acquit a defendant who can be either innocent or guilty. In
this example, what the judge decides affects not only the judge but a lot of people,
the defendant including. If we take the society as a whole, it cares about the quality
of the verdict, that is, it wants to acquit innocent and convict guilty defendant. The
question we address is how overconfidence in the judge’s perception of information
affects the probability that he reaches the correct verdict.
According to Moore and Healy (2008)’s informal definition, overconfidence is the
“excessive precision in one’s beliefs.” In general, there are two types of beliefs
— prior and posterior. Suppose the overconfidence occurs in the prior belief. For
example, the judge thinks he knows a lot about the case while he actually knows
less. Then his incentive to acquire additional information is lower than it should be.
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So, the overconfidence in the prior belief leads to the lower quality of the verdict.
Now suppose the overconfidence occurs in the posterior belief. By definition, the
posterior belief is the updated belief after acquiring information. So, the overcon-
fidence in posterior means the excessive precision of that information. The reason
for that might be that the judge overestimates his ability to analyze information.1 If
the judge thinks he gets information of higher quality, his incentives to acquire that
information is higher. This means that the overconfidence in the information quality
leads to the higher quality of the verdict.
Note that the notion of prior and posterior is relative, since today’s posterior becomes
tomorrow’s prior. In this paper we assume that the judge starts with a uniform prior
and consider a dynamic model of information collection. We model overconfidence
as the distortion in the perceived precision of information flow.2 With this model,
we argue that the total effect that overconfidence has on the probability of the judge
reaching the correct decision depends on the nature of the information collection
process. More specifically, it depends on how much control the judge has over the
amount of information he collects.
First, suppose an unbiased judge chooses whether to collect information or not, that
is the information investment choice space is binary (section 4.3). For example,
he decides whether to hold the trial or announce the verdict right away. Then
overestimating the quality of information (or equivalently, the ability to perceive
information) leads to higher willingness to pay for that information. This means
that overconfidence has a positive effect on the probability of the correct verdict.
Now suppose the judge can decide how much information to collect (section 4.3).
For example, he decides on the length of the trial. Then the effect of overconfidence
1 Another interpretation is more literal, when the decision maker overestimates the quality of
the information source (an expert, for example) he gets information from. In other words, perceiving
information as being more precise than it actually is can be seen as a sign of excessive gullibility of
the judge. In such interpretation, this phenomenon is the opposite of the most common formalization
of overconfidence as overprecision of the prior. We have two arguments in response to that concern.
First, one might think of the overconfidence ex-post, that is, at the time of the decision making.
Then the posterior becomes the prior and the traditional definition of the overconfidence is applied.
Moreover, in a dynamic model, — which is the main model in our paper, — this is no longer an issue
due to prior and posterior being relative notions. Second, we can appeal to our first interpretation
of this phenomenon as overestimation of one’s ability to analyze information (similar to Heidhues,
Koszegi, and Strack (2017) who model overconfidence as misperception of one’s ability, which leads
to misperception in the beliefs about the true state of the world). That essentially mixes two out of
three notions of overconfidence offered by Moore and Healy (2008).
2 By assuming no distortion in prior belief, we take as given the source of overconfidence (how
much the judge overestimates the precision of the incoming information) and get the overconfidence
in beliefs endogenously.
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can be either positive or negative, depending on how much a rational judge would
invest in information. If the rational judge invests very little (he holds a very short
trial), then overconfidence increases information investment. On the other hand, if
the rational judge invests a lot, overconfidence has the opposite effect. In general,
the effect is shaped by two forces. The first is the only active force in the binary
investment choice scenario. It comes from increasing the marginal benefit from
each hour of trial. The second force comes from increasing the total benefit from
a fixed investment. When the rational judge’s investment is high, the second force
prevails. Moreover, we show that there is an optimal level of belief distortion (either
to over-precision or to under-precision) that maximizes the probability of the correct
decision by balancing the two forces. This optimal level is higher when the judge
does not care too much about choosing the correct sentence.
Finally, suppose the judge can decide how much information to collect dynamically
(section 4.2). In contrast to the previous scenario, the judge does not have to decide
upfront how long the trial would be and can stop the trial at any moment in time.
In this setting we find the effect of overconfidence to be detrimental to the quality
of the judgment. The dynamic nature of information collection in this scenario
introduces a third force that pushes investment down. This third force describes
an excessive sensitivity to the noise in information flow. By overestimating the
quality of information, the judge treats unexpected noise as a meaningful signal and
therefore his belief about the defendant’s innocence reaches his desired standard of
proof threshold belief sooner than he (ex-ante) expects. It turns out that under the
assumptions of a normally distributed information flow and of a symmetric payoff,
the net effect from all three forces is negative, meaning that having an underconfident
judge is always better for the quality of the judgement. Intuitively, when the second
force is weak, that is, when the accumulated information is low, the judge is very
sensitive to noise, which makes the third force strong.
We can look at the forces from the prior-posterior perspective at a given moment
in time. The first force corresponds to having excessive precision in posterior, as it
comes from increasing the precision of information the decision maker is about to
collect. The other two forces come from excessive precision in prior, as they both
come from overestimating the quality of information already collected.
Since the dynamic setting introduces a third force that decreases the probability of
the correct verdict, it is natural to conjecture that restricting the overconfident judge
to commit upfront to the amount of information he is going to collect will increase
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the probability of the correct verdict. However, that logic is wrong because it does
not take into account the difference in the dynamic and the static benchmarks with
the rational judge, where all forces are absent. The dynamic benchmark gives the
judge additional flexibility and therefore the probability of the correct verdict is
higher than in the static benchmark. In section 4.4, we formally show that there is a
unique level of overconfidence such that below that level the dynamic settings leads
to the higher probability of the correct verdict, while when the actual level is higher,
its is socially optimal to restrict the overconfident judge to commit to the length of
the trial.
So far, we considered the probability of the correct verdict as the welfare criterion,
ignoring the cost of information collection. In section 4.4, we show that our
conclusions are robust to that assumption. More precisely, we consider a principal-
agent model, where a rational principal delegates the information collection and the
decision to an overconfident agent. For example, the society hires a judge whose job
is to held a trial and decide on a verdict. Now the judge himself does not care about
the quality of the verdict, so the society has to pay him differently depending on the
true state to create proper incentives. Under assumption that the payment cannot be
negative (that is, the principal cannot take money from the agent), we show that there
is a unique level of overconfidence such that below that level the optimal contract
does not require the agent to commit to the amount of information he is going to
collect, while this requirement is optimal above that level. Moreover, conditional
on the set of contracts without commitment, increasing overconfidence is always
bad, both from the principal’s perspective and from the social welfare perspective
(when the criterion is the sum of the principal’s and the agent’s objective expected
utility). However, conditional on the set of contracts with commitment, there is an
optimal level of overconfidence. This optimal level is higher from the principal’s
perspective than from the social welfare perspective, which reflects the principal’s
power to exploit the agent’s irrationality to her own advantage.
Related Literature
The overconfidence phenomenon has been studied in many settings, including (but
not limited to) financial markets (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Kyle, Obizhaeva,
and Wang, 2017), medicine (Berner and Graber, 2008), war (Johnson, 2009), po-
litical behavior (Ortoleva and Snowberg, 2015). Much evidence that people are
prone to overconfidence has been documented in literature. Barber and Odean
(2001); Chuang and Lee (2006); Goetzmann and Huang (2015) found empirical
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support for overconfidence in financial environments. One of the earliest studies,
Oskamp (1965), experimentally demonstrates overconfidence among actual judges
when they are presented with information about published cases. Klayman, Soll,
Gonzalez-Vallejo, and Barlas (1999) and Soll and Klayman (2004) provide more
recent experimental evidence for judges’ overconfidence. Using actual data on bail
decisions made by judges in New York City between 2008 and 2013, Kleinberg,
Lakkaraju, Leskovec, Ludwig, and Mullainathan (2017) show that judges appear
to “respond to ‘noise’ as if it were signal.” From the perspective of Moore and
Healy (2008)’s classification of overconfidence, this observation can be interpreted
as overprecision. By mixing the actual signal with noise, judges are effectively
boosting the perceived precision of all incoming information as a whole.
An alternative way to model overconfidence as misperception of the quality of
information is through correlation neglect. Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015) find
theoretically and verify empirically that overconfidence (modeled as correlation ne-
glect) leads to ideological extremeness, increased voter turnout and stronger partisan
identification. Levy and Razin (2015) focus on information aggregation, as opposed
to information investment, and find conditions under which correlation neglect can
lead to increased information aggregation. In contrast Glaeser and Sunstein (2009)
study a “credulous Bayesian" that neglects correlation in a context where there is
no cost of information acquisition and find overconfidence to be detrimental to in-
formation aggregation. We depart from these studies in modeling overconfidence
as a misperception of the precision parameter.3 In contrast to correlation neglect,
misperception of the precision can potentially occur in any setting, even if there is
actually no correlation in the incoming information (conditional on the true state).
In fact, we mostly focus on that case in this paper, though section 4.3 presents more
general results as well.
Our discussion about an overconfident judge can also be applied to a jury room,
where a juror misperceives the quality of her own information. This relates our
paper to the literature studying information acquisition or investment by committees.
Martinelli (2006) considers a setup when each committee member chooses how
much to invest in the precision of a binary signal when costs are convex. This setup
is very similar to our model in section 4.3. Chan, Lizzeri, Suen, and Yariv (2017)
work with a dynamic setup that are close to our model in section 4.2. All papers
3 Dubra (2004) defines overconfidence as an optimistic bias in prior beliefs. This interpretation
of overconfidence is orthogonal to a more popular definition of overconfidence as underestimating
the volatility (Alpert and Raiffa, 1982). We used the latter one.
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assume that the jurors are rational.
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Kyle, Obizhaeva, and Wang (2017) model over-
confidence in a way similar to our model in section 4.2. Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003) explain speculative bubbles using overconfidence. Overconfidence as mis-
perception of information quality generates disagreement about fundamentals which
results in a price bubble. Kyle, Obizhaeva, and Wang (2017) explain large trading
volume and price dampening using that disagreement. However, both papers did
not allow for the agents to choose whether to observe information flow or not.
4.1 Setup
Consider a single decisionmaker who has to decide between two actions. The payoff
from these actions depends on the true state of the world. For example, suppose this
decision maker is a judge who decides whether to acquit (v = A) or convict (v = C)
a defendant. The defendant might be either innocent (z = I) or guilty (z = G). In
this case z plays the role of the true state of the world.
We assume the decision maker gets a payoff u(v, z) from action v ∈ {A,C} if the
true state is z ∈ {I,G}. At the beginning, the decision maker has some prior beliefs
about the true state, p0 = IP (z = I). Given belief p, his expected utility from action
v is U(v, p) = pu(v, I) + (1− p)u(v,G).
Naturally, we assume that when the defendant is innocent, it is better to acquit her,
and when she is guilty, it is better to convict her. Moreover, for simplicity, we focus
on the symmetric case:
Assumption 4.1. u(A, I) = u(C,G) > u(C, I) = u(A,G).
Denote
Q = u(A, I)− u(C, I) = u(C,G)− u(A,G) > 0, R = u(C, I) = u(A,G).
Thus, the judge gets utility R from the incorrect verdict and utility Q + R, Q > 0,
from the correct verdict. Maximizing his expected utility, he gets
max
v∈{A,C}
U(v, p) =
pQ+R, p ≥ 12 ,(1− p)Q+R, p ≤ 1
2
.
Before deciding on the action, the decision maker can collect more information
about the true state. For simplicity, we restrict our analysis to a symmetric case
when the decision maker has no initial bias in his belief:
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Assumption 4.2 (Uniform prior belief). p0 = 0.5.
4.2 Dynamic Model
The decision maker collects information by observing the change in a Brownian
motion process with state-dependent drift:
dXt = µzdt+ σdWt, µz =
1, if z = I,−1, if z = G, (4.1)
whereWt is the standard Wiener process.
Information collection is costly. In a dynamic setting, we can differentiate two types
of costs, attention cost and time cost. The time cost is formalized through a discount
factor δ ≥ 0. For simplicity, we focus on the no-discounting case here (δ = 0).
Appendix C.13 shows that the case δ > 0 leads to the same conclusions.
The attention cost is proportional to the amount of time the decision maker spends
on the information collection. Formally, the decision maker chooses a stopping time
τ ≥ 0 (which is path-dependent, that is, whether or not the decision maker stops by
t depends onXt) and, upon stopping, a verdict v ∈ {A,C} (which depends onXτ ).
The utility he eventually gets is equal to u(v, z) − κτ , where κ > 0 is a parameter
of the model.
The problem the decision maker faces is called an optimal stopping problem. It has
already been studied in the literature, so we can take the solution off-the-shelf:
Theorem 4.1 (Shiryaev (2007), Chapter 4, Theorem 5, p.185).
The optimal strategy exists and is given by
τ = inf {t ≥ 0: pt /∈ (λ, 1− λ)} , v =
A, pτ ≥ 1− λ,C, pτ ≤ λ, (4.2)
where pt is the belief that the true state is I at time t. Threshold λ ∈ (0, 0.5) is
uniquely defined by
1− 2λ
2λ(1− λ) − log
(
λ
1− λ
)
=
Q
κσ2
. (4.3)
For completeness, we include the proof in Appendix C.1.
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When observing (4.1), the decision maker updates his belief about the state4
pt = IP [z = I | Xt] = 1
1 + e−
2Xt
σ2
, (4.4)
which is equivalent to
Xt =
σ2
2
log
(
pt
1− pt
)
. (4.5)
So, another way to write the optimal strategy (4.2) is
τ = inf {t ≥ 0: Xt /∈ (−χ, χ)} , v =
A, Xτ ≥ χ,C, Xτ ≤ −χ, (4.6)
where χ = σ2
2
log
(
1−λ
λ
)
> 0. The advantage of this representation is that it
expresses the strategy in terms of an external (observable) variable Xt and not in
terms of a mental quantity which is the decision maker’s belief. This distinction is
important to us since overconfidence introduces a distortion in the belief updating
rule, so that an overconfident person would form a different belief than a rational
one, given the same observed process Xt.
Definition 4.1. An η-type decision maker updates his belief according to
pt =
1
1 + e−
2Xtη
σ2
(4.7)
while observing
dXt = µzdt+ σdWt. (4.8)
In other words, the η-type decision maker believes the variance is η times lower
than it actually is. Parameter η captures the level of overconfidence, with η = 1
corresponding to the rational case. Thus, the η-type decision maker is overcon-
fident when η > 1 and he is underconfident (he underestimates the precision of
information) when η < 1.5
Given the observed process (4.8) and the strategy (4.6) with a fixed χ > 0, the
probability of the correct decision (the probability of acquittal if the defendant is
4 We assume X0 = 0.
5 Throughout the paper, we assume that the decision maker is not aware of his overconfidence.
If we allow the decision maker to learn the level of overconfidence dynamically, he would learn it
immediately. Indeed, by the properties of the Brownian motion, any uncertainty about the variance
is resolved on the spot.
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innocent and of conviction if the defendant is guilty) is
IP
v =
A, z = IC, z = G
 = IP [v = A | z = I] = IP [v = C | z = G] = 1
1 + e−
2χ
σ2
.
(4.9)
Indeed, this probability is equal to the probability that the decision is correct at the
time when this decision is made.
Consider the η-type decision maker. His optimal strategy is (4.6) with threshold
χ = X
(
σ2
η
)
, where
X (σ2) = σ2
2
log
(
1− λ (σ2)
λ (σ2)
)
, (4.10)
where λ (σ2) ∈ (0, 0.5) is the solution to (4.3).
Note that the probability of the correct decision (4.9) is increasing in the threshold
χ. Theorem 4.2 states that the higher the overconfidence level η, the lower the
probability of the correct decision.
Theorem 4.2. X (σ2) defined by (4.10) is increasing in σ2.
See Appendix C.2 for the proof.
Intuitively, the expression χ = σ2
2
log
(
1−λ
λ
)
shows that increasing σ2 has two effects
on χ. The direct effect increases χ. This effect comes from the attempt to keep
the same standard of proof by collecting more information that is less precise. The
indirect effect decreases χ through λ (λ is increasing in σ2). This effect comes from
the attempt to keep the same total cost of information by lowering the standard of
proof 1− λ. Theorem 4.2 states that the first effect always dominates the second.6
While being explicitly connected to the formula forX (σ2), these two effects give an
ambiguous prediction for the expected stopping time. On the one hand, increasing
χ without changing the variance increases the expected stopping time. On the
other hand, increasing the variance without changing the threshold decreases the
expected stopping time. Thus, if the variance is actually changing, the first effect has
an unclear prediction for whether the expected stopping time increases or decreases.
If the variance is not actually changing, yet the decision maker thinks it increases,
the second effect decreases the stopping time by lowering the perceived standard
6 This result is not robust to relaxing Assumption 4.1, see Appendix C.14.
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of proof and increases it by not updating aggressively enough. This distinction
is important for us because it illuminates a commitment aspect of the information
collection problem.
Suppose the decision maker has to decide ex-ante when to stop information collec-
tion, that is, he has to commit on the stopping time τ at time t = 0. Then there
are two forces that shape the overall effect on τ from increasing σ2. The first force
comes from decreasing the benefit of the marginal information piece dXt and there-
fore it lowers τ . The second force comes from decreasing the benefit of information
already collected, Xt, and therefore it increases τ . Once we drop the commitment
restriction, another force arises. This third force captures the discrepancy between
what the decision maker expects to see (information flow with a high variance)
and what he actually observes (information flow with a low variance). Though not
changing his perception of the variance once observingXt, the decision maker bases
his stopping decision on the low variance information flow. Thus, the third force
increases τ since the decision maker does not update enough thinking he observes
more noise than he actually does.
We elaborate on the commitment model and the first two forces in the next section.
We conclude this section by expanding the intuition for the third force.
Suppose that at time t = 0 the decisionmaker commits to stop collecting information
at a certain time τ . The commitment prevents the decision maker to collect more
information when |Xτ | is too small (which corresponds to low standard of proof).
It also prevents him from stopping the information collection process earlier when
|Xτ | is too large (high standard of proof). The optimal τ balances out these two
events based on distribution Xτ . An η-type decision maker expects to observe
µzτ +
σ√
η
Wτ distributed as N
(
µzτ,
σ2
η
)
, while he actually observes µzτ + σWτ
distributed as N (µzτ, σ2). Thus, the η-type decision maker, η > 1, underestimates
the probability |Xτ | being large. In other words, the η-type decision maker wants
to stop the information collection before the committed stopping time with higher
probability than he believes at t = 0. Thus, in the absence of commitment the η-type
decision maker stops sooner. This effect is captured by the third force.
4.3 General Static Model
The decision maker collects information by acquiring a signal S ∈ S that has
state-dependent distribution Fz(·). Upon observing S = s, the optimal verdict is
v = A if dFI(s) > dFG(s) and v = C otherwise. Denote set SA = {s : dFI(s) >
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dFG(s)} all realizations of S that leads to an acquittal decision. Similarly, denote
SC = {s : dFI(s) < dFG(s)} all realizations of S that leads to conviction. We
assume that the measure of S \ (SA ∪ SC) is zero under any state, so that the
decision maker is (almost) never indifferent between the two verdicts. Denote
pz,v = IP [S ∈ Sv | z] the probability of making the decision v ∈ {A,C}, given
state z. Then the probability of the correct decision is 1
2
(pI,A + pG,C) and therefore
the expected utility from signal S is 1
2
(pI,A + pG,C)Q + R. When the decision
maker does not use the signal, his expected utility is Q
2
+ R. Thus, the quality of
signal S can be summarized by
1
2
(pI,A + pG,C)− 1
2
.
We assume that the decision maker can increase the quality by paying more for the
signal. Formally, the quality of the signal is an increasing function of cost, h(c).
Thus, the expected utility is (
1
2
+ h(c)
)
Q+R− c
and the decision maker chooses cost c > 0. The first order condition is
h′(c)Q = 1. (4.11)
To guarantee that the solution to (4.11) exists, is unique and maximizes the expected
utility, we assume
Assumption 4.3. h : (0,+∞) → [0, 1
2
]
is such that h(0) = 0, lim
c→0
h′(c) = +∞,
lim
c→+∞
h′(c) = 0, h′′(c) < 0.
Given that general model, we impose the following definition of overconfidence:
Definition 4.2. An η-type decision maker perceives the quality of the signal being
h(ηc) while paying c.
Consider the η-type decision maker. His expected utility from signal S is(
1
2
+ h (ηc)
)
Q+R− c. (4.12)
Example (Normal distribution)When S ≡ Xt ∼ N (µzt, σ2t), its quality is equal
to f
(
t
σ2
)
, where
f(ρ) =
1√
pi
√
ρ
2∫
0
e−x
2
dx. (4.13)
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Figure 4.1: Function f(ρ) = 1√
pi
√
ρ
2∫
0
e−x
2
dx and its derivative.
Then a linear cost function c(t) = κ · t implies h(c) = f ( c
κσ2
)
. Figure 4.1 shows
that h(c) satisfies Assumption 4.3. Moreover, it is easy to see that Definition 4.2 is
the analog of Definition 4.1 for the static case.
Optimizing (4.12) over c > 0, we get
c > 0: ηh′ (ηc)Q = 1. (4.14)
Treating the solution to (4.14) as a function of the overconfidence level η, we have
c′(η) = −h
′ (ηc) + ηch′′ (ηc)
η2h′′ (ηc)
. (4.15)
A higher cmeans higher probability of the correct decision, 1
2
+h(c). As we increase
the level of overconfidence η, c increases if and only if h′ (ηc)+ηch′′ (ηc) is positive.
From Assumption 4.3, h′ (ηc) is always positive, while ηch′′ (ηc) is always negative.
The term h′ (ηc) corresponds to the first force: higher effective cost ηc increases the
quality of the signal because h is increasing. The term ηch′′ (ηc) corresponds to the
second force: higher effective cost ηc decreases the marginal benefit of information
because h′ is decreasing.
The total effect is captured by the behavior of function xh′(x), which derivative is
equal to h′(x) + xh′′(x). If it increases at point x = ηc(η), then increasing the level
of overconfidence makes the final decision better. If it decreases, the final decision
becomes worse with increased overconfidence.
Note the interpretation of xh′(x), x = ηc, as the marginal benefit of information.
The first x corresponds to the first force, which increases function xh′(x) as we
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increase x through the level of overconfidence η. The second x corresponds to the
second force, which decreases function xh′(x).
Withoutmaking any additional assumptions, it is hard to saymore about the behavior
of c(η). One interesting special case is when the following assumptions holds:
Assumption 4.4. There exists cˆ > 0 such that ch′(c) increases for c < cˆ and it
decreases for c > cˆ.
This assumption says that when the amount of collected information is below some
threshold, the second force is weaker than the first force, and vice versa. Recall that
the second force comes from changing the benefit of already collected information.
As we increase the amount of collected information is small, this force becomes
stronger. On the other hand, the first force comes from changing the benefit of
the marginal information piece and therefore it depends on the amount of collected
information only through the non-stationary properties of the information flow.
Assumption 4.4 says that the information flow is stationary enough to make sure
that there is a unique threshold such that the second force prevails if and only if the
amount of collected information is above that threshold.
Under Assumption 4.4, we can prove that there exists a unique optimal level of
overconfidence η∗ (which can be less than 1, which corresponds to underconfidence)
such that more overconfidence is good below that level and it is bad for all η above
η∗. Formally:
Theorem 4.3. The probability of choosing the correct action is increasing in η ∈
(0, η∗) and it is decreasing in η ∈ (η∗,+∞), where η∗ = 1
Qh′(cˆ) .
See Appendix C.3 for the proof.
Example (Normal distribution)
When S ≡ Xt ∼ N (µzt, σ2t), function ch′(c) = cκσ2f ′
(
c
κσ2
)
satisfies Assumption
4.4 (see Figure 4.2). In that case η∗ = 2
√
2epiκσ2
Q
.
Here is an example where Assumption 4.4 is violated.
Example (Binarydistribution)SupposeS ∈ {I,G},P [S = I | z = I] = P [S = G | z = G] ≥
1
2
. Then its quality h = P [S = z | z] − 1
2
. This means that the binary distribution
does not imply any specific form of function h(c).
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Figure 4.2: Function ρf ′(ρ) = e
− ρ2√ρ
2
√
2pi
defines how the marginal benefit of informa-
tion changes with the level of overconfidence under normal distribution assumption.
1. Suppose the agent payment is some decreasing function of the variance of the
random variable 1 (S = z), for example,
c = − log (4P [S = z | z] (1− P [S = z | z])) .
Then h(c) = P [S = z | z]− 1
2
= 1
2
√
1− e−c satisfies both Assumptions 4.3
and 4.4.
2. Function h(c) =
(
2c+ 1
c
sin(c)
) 1
4 − 1 satisfies Assumption 4.3 but not As-
sumption 4.4. See Figure 4.3.
Note that the optimal level of overconfidence is decreasing in Q. This means that
overconfidence is bad when the benefit from choosing the correct action is high.
Intuitively, when the benefit from choosing the correct action is very low, the rational
agent collects very little information. A distortion in his incentives by increasing the
perceived quality of information always has a positive effect. Indeed, an increase
in the quality of already collected information (the second force) does not have a
large effect since the amount of this information is small. So, overconfidence is
good for low Q. On the other hand, when the benefit from choosing the correct
action is very high, the rational agent collects a lot of information. This means that
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Figure 4.3: Functions h′(c) and ch′(c), where h(c) =
(
2c+ 1
c
sin(c)
) 1
4 − 1.
the second force has a lot of power as it works with a large amount of information.
Consequently, overconfidence is bad in this case.
At the end of this section we give an example of a model when only the first force
is active.
Binary Information Acquisition Decision
Suppose the decision maker can choose only between two values, c ∈ {0, c¯}. This
describes the situation when the agent simply has to decide whether to acquire
information or not. In this case the optimality condition (4.14) should be changed
to
c = c¯ ⇔ h(ηc¯)Q > c¯. (4.16)
Definition 4.3. The maximum cost the decision maker is ready to pay for the signal
is called the willingness to pay.
Given condition (4.16) and Assumption 4.3, the willingness to pay is equal to
c > 0: h(ηc)Q = c, ηh′(ηc)Q < 1. (4.17)
Treating the solution to (4.17) as a function of the overconfidence level η, we have
c′(η) > 0.
Theorem 4.4. The willingness to pay is increasing in η.
See Appendix C.4 for the proof.
In this model, there is no “already collected information” since the choice is binary,
either buy the signal or not. Thus, the second force is absent here and Theorem 4.4
result is driven by the first force.
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4.4 Optimal Delegation
Welfare Implications of Commitment
So far we only compared the probability of the correct decision for different levels
of overconfidence within the same model. In practice, the overconfidence level is
hard to change, which means the comparison has a descriptive nature. In contrast to
the overconfidence level, a model (an institution) can often be changed, which leads
us to the following normative question. How does the probability of the correct
decision change if we change the model, holding the level of overconfidence fixed?
More precisely, in this section we compare the probability of the correct decision in
the dynamic model with the one in the static model with normal distribution.
The probability of the correct decision in the dynamic model where the η-type
decision maker observes (4.1) is given by
ΠD
(
η,
Q
κσ2
)
=
1
1 +
(
λ
1−λ
) 1
η
, (4.18)
where λ ∈ (0, 0.5) solves
1− 2λ
2λ(1− λ) − log
(
λ
1− λ
)
=
Qη
κσ2
, (4.19)
as follows from (4.9) and (4.10).
If the η-type decision maker commits to a stopping time at time 0, this probability
is given by
ΠC
(
η,
Q
κσ2
)
=
1
2
+
1√
pi
√
ρ
η∫
0
e−x
2
dx (4.20)
where ρ > 0 solves
4eρ
√
piρ =
Qη
κσ2
, (4.21)
as follows from (4.13) and (4.14).
Note that in either model the probability of the correct decision depends only on
two parameters, the overconfidence level η and the ratio Q
κσ2
(recall that Q is the
bonus for the correct decision, κ is the per unit of time cost of information and
σ−2 characterizes the objective precision of the information flow). The ratio Q
κσ2
characterizes how valuable the process Xt is for the rational decision maker. In
other words, Q
κσ2
is the objective quality of the process Xt. In contrast, parameter η
is a subjective characteristic of an overconfident decision maker.
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Theorem 4.5 states that the commitment to a stopping time leads to a higher proba-
bility of the correct decision if and only if η is sufficiently high.
Theorem 4.5. For any Q
κσ2
, there is a unique level of overconfidence η∗∗ > 1 such
that ΠD
(
η, Q
κσ2
)
> ΠC
(
η, Q
κσ2
)
for all η ∈ (0, η∗∗) and ΠD (η, Q
κσ2
)
< ΠC
(
η, Q
κσ2
)
for all η ∈ (η∗∗,+∞).
See Appendix C.5 for the proof.
The threshold η∗∗ balances two effects. The first effect comes from the distortion that
overconfidence brings to the model. In particular, it reflects the third force. As we
discussed at the end of section 4.2, the higher the overconfidence level, the stronger
the third force which makes the η-type decision maker stop sooner in the absence of
commitment. Since this force decreases the probability of the correct decision, so as
the absence of commitment. The second effect comes from the objective nature of
commitment. From the η-type decision maker perspective, commitment is always
bad since it limits his flexibility and therefore decreases his expected utility. In
particular, commitment leads to a lower probability of the correct decision for the
rational decision maker (η = 1). In sum, when we include commitment, the first
effect increases the probability of the correct decision while the second effect lowers
it. The higher η, the stronger the first effect, while the second effect says the same.
Thus, the first effect overpowers the second effect for high levels of overconfidence.
Theorem 4.6 shows the comparative statics of the threshold η∗∗ with respect to Q
κσ2
.
Theorem 4.6. The threshold η∗∗
(
Q
κσ2
)
is decreasing in Q
κσ2
∈ (0,+∞) from pi2
4
to
1.
See Appendix C.6 for the proof.
Parameter Q
κσ2
is connected with the second effect. The lower Q
κσ2
, the more expen-
sive information is (κ is higher), the more the rational decision maker values the
flexibility that the dynamic model gives him, the stronger the second effect. Indeed,
he does not lose much by committing to a higher stopping time when information
is cheap. However, when information is expensive, increasing the stopping time
becomes more expensive too, so as the commitment. Thus, as Q
κσ2
decreases, the
region where commitment is good shrinks, or in other words, the threshold η∗∗
increases.
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Recall that η∗ = 2
√
2epiκσ2
Q
is the threshold such that the probability of choosing the
correct action in the static model is increasing before it and it is increasing after
(Theorem 4.3). Theorem 4.7 compares two thresholds, η∗ and η∗∗, as functions of
Q
κσ2
.
Theorem 4.7. There exists a unique q ∈ (0,+∞) such that η∗∗ ( Q
κσ2
)
< η∗ for all
Q
κσ2
< q and η∗∗
(
Q
κσ2
)
> η∗ for all Q
κσ2
> q.
See Appendix C.7 for the proof.
When Q
κσ2
is high, the commitment is bad at the optimal level of overconfidence η∗.
Intuitively, highQmeans the overconfidence is bad, as discussed on page 64. Thus,
the optimal level of overconfidence is low, which makes the first effect weak at this
level. Despite the fact that a higher Q also weakens the second effect, it decreases
the first effect even more because η∗ reflects the best we can do in the static model.
If we can control both the institute and the overconfidence level, commitment loses
its appeal when overconfidence is not desirable. Thus, high Q means the dynamic
model is better at η∗.
Optimal Contract
Section 4.4 assumes a binary control variable: we can choose either the model
with commitment (static model) or without commitment (dynamic model). In this
section we go further and assume we can also control the utility parameters, Q and
R.
More precisely, we consider a principal-agent model, where a rational principal
delegates the decision to an overconfident agent. We assume that the principal
knows the agent’s level of overconfidence η.7 The principal’s utility is characterized
by the pair (QP , RP ),QP > 0, so that she getsQP +RP from a correct decision and
RP from an incorrect decision. Since RP does not affect the principal’s incentives,
we can safely assume RP = 0. For simplicity, we assume that the agent does
not get anything from the decision other than what he gets from the principal.
The principal offers the agent a contract (Q,R,M), Q > 0, M ∈ {0, 1}, where
M = 1 corresponds to the dynamic information collection studied in section 4.2 and
M = 0 corresponds to the static model with normal distribution where the agent
has to commit to a stopping time.
7 An asymmetric information case is out of the scope of this paper.
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As in section 4.4, denote by ΠD
(
η, Q
κσ2
)
the probability of the correct decision in
the dynamic model and by ΠC
(
η, Q
κσ2
)
the probability of the correct decision in the
static model (see (4.18) and (4.20)).
Similarly, denote by ΥD (ΥC) the expected information collection cost in the dy-
namic (static) model.
For the dynamic model, we get
Lemma 4.1. ΥD (κσ2, η, Q) = κσ2
2
( 1−λλ )
1
η−1
( 1−λλ )
1
η +1
log
((
1−λ
λ
) 1
η
)
, where λ ∈ (0, 0.5)
solves (4.19).
See Appendix C.8 for the proof.
From (4.13) and (4.14), we get ΥC (κσ2, η, Q) = 2κσ
2ρ
η
, where ρ > 0 solves (4.21).
Denote
Π
(
η,
Q
κσ2
,M
)
= ΠD
(
η,
Q
κσ2
)
1 (M = 1) + ΠC
(
η,
Q
κσ2
)
1 (M = 0) ,
Υ
(
κσ2, η, Q,M
)
= ΥD
(
κσ2, η, Q
)
1 (M = 1) + ΥC
(
κσ2, η, Q
)
1 (M = 0) .
The contract (Q,R,M) is optimal if and only if it solves the following optimization
problem:
max
Q>0,R,M∈{0,1}
Π
(
η,
Q
κσ2
,M
)
(QP −Q)−R, (4.22)
s.t. Π
(
1,
Qη
κσ2
,M
)
Q+R−Υ
(
κσ2
η
, 1, Q,M
)
≥ 0. (4.23)
Note that the constraint (4.23) follows from the definition of an η-type decision
maker: he perceives the variance as being σ2/η rather than σ2 and he does not know
he is overconfident.
Theorem 4.8. For η > 1, the optimal contract (Q,R,M) is unique and has the
following form: M = 1, Q = +∞,
R =
κσ2
2η
(
1− log
(
κσ2
2η
)
+ log(Q)
)
−Q.
This contract gives UP = +∞ expected utility to the principal. The perceived
expected utility of the agent is equal to his reservation utility, that is 0. The actual
expected utility of the agent is ΠD
(
η, Q
κσ2
)
Q+R−ΥD (κσ2, η, Q), which is equal
to UA = −∞.
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See Appendix C.9 for the proof. Underconfident agents (0 < η < 1) as well as the
rational agent (η = 1) are not the main focus of our study; the optimal contract for
these types can be found in Appendix C.10.
Theorem 4.8 shows that even a slight deviation from rationality to the direction of
overconfidence gives an enormous advantage to the principal who can exploit this
little wedge between the perceived and the actual precision of information to the
maximum extent, receiving an infinite expected utility. Intuitively, an overconfident
agent thinks he has a better deal than he actually has because he overestimates the
quality of the information source, and therefore, for a fixed effort, he thinks he
has better chances of receiving Q than he actually has. By setting Q = +∞, the
principal basically eliminates the outcome when the agent does not discover the true
state. However, the agent underestimates the expected time he spends collecting
information, and the principal gets the difference. Given Q = +∞, this difference
is infinite, thus UP = +∞ and UA = −∞.
Note that the optimal contract setsM = 1, which means the principal does not want
the agent to commit to the amount of information he collects ex-ante. However, if
we constrain the set of feasible contracts by requiringM = 0, the principal can still
find a contract that gives him UP = +∞ (see Appendix C.9 for the proof).
So far we assumed that the principal can take money from the agent, that is, R
can be negative. This leads to a somewhat controversial result when by setting
R = −∞ and Q = +∞, the principal can achive an infinite expected payoff. Now
let’s assume that R cannot be negative, so that contract (Q,R,M) is optimal if and
only if it solves the following optimization problem:
max
Q≥0,R≥0,M∈{0,1}
Π
(
η,
Q
κσ2
,M
)
(QP −Q)−R, (4.24)
s.t. Π
(
1,
Qη
κσ2
,M
)
Q+R−Υ
(
κσ2
η
, 1, Q,M
)
≥ 0.(4.25)
Theorem 4.9. For η > 0, the optimal contract (Q,R,M) is essentially unique8 and
8 Non-uniqueness appears in the following cases: (1) when Q = 0 the value ofM is irrelevant,
(2) when QPκσ2 = q(η) both (Q
D,M = 1) and (QC ,M = 0) give exactly the same expected payoff
for the principal.
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has the following form9: R = 0,
Q =

0, QP
κσ2
≤ min
{
4, 2pi√
η
}
,
QD, min
{
4, 2pi√
η
}
< QP
κσ2
< q(η),
QC , q(η) < QP
κσ2
,
M =
1, min
{
4, 2pi√
η
}
< QP
κσ2
< q(η),
0, q(η) < QP
κσ2
,
where q(η) =

2pi√
η
, η ≥ pi2
4
,
∈
(
2pi√
η
,+∞
)
, 1 < η < pi
2
4
,
+∞, 0 < η ≤ 1
is continuous and strictly decreasing
for η ≥ 1, QD = κσ2
η
(
1−2λ
2λ(1−λ) − log
(
λ
1−λ
))
and λ ∈ (0, 0.5) solves
ηQP
κσ2
=
1− 2λ
2λ(1− λ) − log
(
λ
1− λ
)
+
η
2λ(1− λ)
(
1 +
(
λ
1− λ
)− 1
η
)
, (4.26)
QC = κσ
2
η
4eρ
√
piρ and ρ > 0 solves
ηQP
κσ2
= 4eρ
√
pi
√ρ+ e ρη√η(1 + 2ρ)
√
ρ/η∫
−∞
e−x
2
dx
 . (4.27)
See Appendix C.11 for the proof.
Basically, Theorem4.9 formalizes the same idea as does Theorem4.5: when η is low,
the dynamic contract is better, while if η is high, the static contract is better. More
precisely, Theorem 4.9 follows the following logic. When R ≥ 0, the constraint
(4.25) is not binding, and optimal (Q,M) maximize Π
(
η, Q
κσ2
,M
)
(QP − Q). By
Theorem 4.5, ΠD
(
η, Q
κσ2
)
> ΠC
(
η, Q
κσ2
)
if and only if η < η∗∗
(
Q
κσ2
)
. Thus, for a
fixed Q,M = 1 is optimal if and only if η < η∗∗
(
Q
κσ2
)
. By Theorem 4.6, η∗∗
(
Q
κσ2
)
is decreasing from pi2
4
to 1. Thus:
1. If η < 1, then η < η∗∗
(
Q
κσ2
)
for all Q and thereforeM = 1 is optimal.
2. If η > pi2
4
, then η > η∗∗
(
Q
κσ2
)
for all Q and thereforeM = 0 is optimal.
3. If 1 < η < pi2
4
, then M = 1 is optimal for small Q and M = 0 is optimal
for high Q. Since Π
(
η, Q
κσ2
,M
)
is increasing in Q, there is an optimal Q
9 The definitions of QD and QC imply that the optimal Q is continuous at point QPκσ2 =
min
{
4, 2pi√η
}
.
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for each M (QD when M = 1 and QC when M = 0) that balances two
terms, Π
(
η, Q
κσ2
,M
)
and 1− Q
QP
. As QP is increasing, both QD and QC are
increasing. Thus, for lowQP , bothQD andQC are low enough so thatM = 1
is optimal, whileM = 0 is optimal for high QP .
The threshold q(η) is decreasing, which implies that M = 1 is optimal for low η,
whileM = 0 is optimal for high η.
Theorem 4.10. WhenM = 1 is optimal, the principal’s expected utility UP and the
social welfare (UP + UA, where UA is the actual expected utility of the agent) are
both decreasing in η. When M = 0 is optimal, UP is increasing if η < ηˆP
(
QP
κσ2
)
and it is decreasing otherwise; UP + UA is increasing if η < ηˆPA
(
QP
κσ2
)
and it is
decreasing otherwise. Moreover, ηˆPA
(
QP
κσ2
)
< ηˆP
(
QP
κσ2
)
for all QP
κσ2
.
See Appendix C.12 for the proof.
Theorem 4.10 echoes Theorems 4.2 and 4.3. Theorems 4.10 and 4.2 both state
that when there is no commitment to the stopping time, increasing the level of
overconfidence is always bad. Similarly, Theorems 4.10 and 4.3 both state that in
the static model, there is an optimal level of overconfidence. The difference is in
the criteria function for “good” and “bad” notions. While Theorems 4.2 and 4.3
imply maximization of the probability of the correct decision, disregarding both
the cost of information and the benefit Q from the correct decision, Theorem 4.10
takes it all into account. More precisely, it considers the matter from the principal
perspective and from the social welfare perspective (when both the principal and the
agent’s objective expected utility is taken into account). Notably, the optimal level
of the agent’s overconfidence is lower from the social welfare perspective than from
the principal’s perspective. The reason for this is similar to the intuition behind
Theorem 4.8: the principal can exploit the wedge between the perceived and the
actual precision of information. This exploitation mitigates the negative effect from
the overconfidence.
4.5 Conclusion
We presented three forces that shape the effect that overconfidence has on the
quality of the final decision, or equivalently, on the amount of information collected
in equilibrium. Two aspects of the information collection process are crucial to
understand the effect that misperception of information quality has on information
investment in a particular scenario. First, whether the information investment choice
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space is binary (collect or not) or continuous (how much to collect). In the latter
case, there is a trade-off between increased quality of already collected information,
which pushes the overconfident agent to collect less information, and increased
quality of the marginal piece of information, which pushes him to collect more
information. Second, if the information investment choice is continuous, whether
information has been collected all at once or not. In the latter case, misperception
of information quality creates a systematic bias between how much information the
decisionmaker expects to collect and howmuch information he actually collects. An
overconfident agent overestimates the expected amount of information he is going
to collect in the future.
The normative implication from our analysis is the conditions under which the
commitment to the amount of information the decision maker is going to collect is
optimal. It is optimal when the level of overconfidence is high enough.
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A p p e n d i x A
APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 2
A.1 Proofs
Sufficiency
Theorem 2.1 (Sufficiency). In any non-extreme q-quantile matching mechanism
truth-telling is not regret-free; that is ∀q ∈ (0, 1) we can find a market (M,W,) ∈
(2M , 2W ,P) such that ∃i ∈ N = M ∪W and a µ = φq() where i regrets i at µ
through some ′i∈ Pi, formally
(∀ −i∈ I) [φq(′i,−i) i µ] (A.1)
(∃˜−i ∈ I) [φq(′i, ˜−i) i µ] (A.2)
Proof. Fix q ∈ (0, 1). Without loss of generality, consider i = m1. Define the
function ′m1 : Pi → Pi
′m1 :
w ′m1 w′ ⇐⇒ w m1 w′ ∀(w,w′) ∈ W 2w ′m1 m1 ⇐⇒ w m1 φq(m1 ,−m1)(m1) ∀w ∈ W
Although ′m1 is a function of  we suppress it from the notation.
Remark. A(′m1) ⊆ A(m1)
(Lemma 2.1). S(′m1 ,−m1) = {µ ∈ S(m1 ,−m1) : µ m1 φq()} ∀ ∈ P
Proof of Lemma. We prove it in two steps,
Claim A.1. S(′m1 ,−m1) ⊆ S(m1 ,−m1)
Proof of claim. Suppose not, then there exists µ ∈ S(′m1 ,−m1) and µ /∈ S(m1
,−m1). It must be the case that µ is either blocked by a pair or by an individual. If
µ is not individually rational under (m1 ,−m1) then it is not individually rational
under (′m1 ,−m1). This is straightfoward since ′−m1=−m1 , and for m1 it is a
consequence of A(′m1) ⊆ A(m1) by construction of ′m1 . Suppose it is blocked
by a pair (mj, w) : mj 6= m1, then since′−m1=−m1 , (mj, w) also blocks µ under
preference profile (′m1 ,−m1). Then it has to be the case that the blocking pair
involves m1. If µ(m1) = w′, then it must hold that w′ m1 w and w ′m1 w′, but
80
it contradicts the construction of ′m1 since it does not permute binary relations
that do not involve alternativem1, which denotes remaining single. Lastly, consider
the case µ(m1) = m1 then it means m1 must be single in every stable matching
under (′m1 ,−m1). If µ is blocked by a pair (m1, w), then it must be that ∀µ′′ ∈
S(m1 ,−m1) : µ′′(m1) ∈ W .1 Next we note that A(′m1) ⊇ {µM(m1 ,−m1)}
since by construction of ′m1 it follows that ∀w ∈ W : w m1 φq(m1 ,−m1) it
holds that w ∈ A(′m1) (for any quantile stable mechanism q ∈ (0, 1)). Suppose
µM(m1 ,−m1) = m1 contradicts hypothesis (same argument as in the footnote).
On the other hand, if µM(m1 ,−m1) 6= m1 then µM(′m1 ,−m1) 6= m1, this
holds since theM -proposing DA algorithm follows the same steps; if at some point
µM(′m1 ,−m1)(m1) rejected him at any step, then it should have rejected him in
µM(m1 ,−m1)(m1).
By the construction of ′m1 if follows that S(′m1 ,−m1) ⊆ {µ m1 φq()}.
Claim A.2. µ ∈ S(m1 ,−m1) and µ m1 φ(m1 ,−m1) =⇒ µ ∈ S(′m1
,−m1).
Proof of claim. Suppose not, so µ /∈ S(′m1), then either it is not individual rational
or it is blocked by a pair. If j j µ(j) for j 6= {m1} then µ /∈ S(m1), on the
other hand if m1 ′m1 µ(i) then µ m1 φq() m1 m1. If it is blocked by a pair
(mj, w) j 6= {1} then they are also a blocking pair to µ under (m1 ,−m1). Lastly
consider the blocking pairs (m1, w). Ifµ(m1) 6= m1, since by construction′m1 does
not change the binary relations not involving the alternative of being singlem1, they
would also be a blocking pair to (m1, w). Lastly, if µ(m1) = m1, w ′m1 m1 and
since A(′m1) ⊆ A(m1), w m1 m1 which contradicts µ ∈ S(m1 ,−m1).
1Suppose not, so that µ′′(m1) = m1 ∀µ′′ ∈ S(m1 ,−m1); since (m1, w) is the blocking pair,
it follows that w m1 m1 andm1 w µ(w). Now let
µ˜ =

µ(j) ∀j /∈ {m1, w, µ(w)}
w form1
m1 for w
µ(w) for µ(w)
µ˜ is an individually rational matching. Either, µ˜ is stable, in which case µ˜(m1) = w ∈ W which
contradicts @µ ∈ S(m1 ,−m1) : µ(m1) 6= m1, or µ˜ is unstable. If the latter holds, still it must
be individually rational (since it was stable for (′m1 ,−m1)), then by the strong stability property
(Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Theorem 3.4, p. 56) there exists µ¯ ∈ S(m1 ,−m1) : µ¯ m1 µ˜ and
µ¯ w µ˜. Since µ˜(m1) = w then µ¯(m1) ∈W which is a contradiction.
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Remark A.1. for any q ∈ (0, 1), φq(′m1 ,−m1) m1 φW (′m1 ,−m1) = φq(m1
,−m1).
Theorem (Theorem 4 in Chen, Egesdal, Pycia, and Yenmez (2014)). For any
q, q′ ∈ (0, 1] : q 6= q′ there exists a matching market such that φq(·) is different than
φq
′
(·).
The key for this result is to find a market with k large enough, k = |S()|, such
that k(q′ − q) > 1, that is a market large enough (in terms of the number of stable
matches) such that the non-extreme quantile mechanism and the extreme one result
in different matches. Note that a priori we need a little more, since it could be the
case that the matches are different but m1 is matched to the same partner in both.
Putting together the remark the theorem, and taking into account the construction
of ′m1 we get the following corollary,
Corollary A.1. For fixed q ∈ (0, 1), denote k?(q) = min{k ∈ N : k(1 −
q) ≥ 1}. If ∃(′m1 ,−m1) ∈ P : |S(′m1 ,−m1)| ≥ k?(q) and µ(m1) 6=
µ′(m1) for all µ, µ′ ∈ S(′m1 ,−m1) then φq(′m1 ,−m1) m1 φW (′m1 ,−m1
) = φq(m1 ,−m1)
Consider the following preferences: Let kˆ : inf{k ∈ N : dkqe ≥ k?(q)}
m1 :w1  w2  · · ·  wkˆ−1  wkˆ wkˆ :m1  m2  · · ·  mkˆ−1  mkˆ (?)
m2 :w2  w3  · · ·  wkˆ  w1 wkˆ−1 :mkˆ  m1  · · ·  mkˆ−2  mkˆ−1
... ...
mkˆ :wkˆ  w1  · · ·  wkˆ−2  wkˆ−1 w1 :m2  m3  · · ·  mkˆ  m1
This is a fairly standard way of generating amatching with |S(m1 ,−m1)| = kˆ (see
Thurber (2002) and Chen, Egesdal, Pycia, and Yenmez (2014)) namely, to construct
preferences such that they form a Latin square marriage of order kˆ (see Claim A.3).2
But moreover, each individual gets a different partner in each stable matching. As a
2Dénes and Keedwell (1991): A Latin square of order n is an n× n matrix L whose entries are
taken from a set S of n symbols and which has the property that every symbol from S occurs exactly
once in each row and exactly once in each column.
82
consequence of Lemma 2.1, if |S(m1 ,−m1)| = kˆ(q) and {kˆ ∈ N : dkˆqe ≥ k?(q)}
it follows that |S(′m1 ,−m1)| ≥ k?(q), then corollary A.1 applies and we get that
φq(′m1 ,−m1) m1 φq(m1 ,−m1)
which contradicts truth being regret-free.
Consequently, for any non-extreme (q ∈ (0, 1)) q−quantile stable matching mech-
anism, we can find a market (M,W,) where an agent i ∈ N regrets truth i
through some other report ′i.3,4
Claim A.3. |S()| = kˆ where preference profile  is described in (?).
Proof. The preference profile described in (?) yields an associated kˆ × kˆ ranking
matrix A where each entry aij denotes man i’s rank of woman j according to i,
e.g. suppose man i’s favorite woman is t then ait = 1; given the construction in
(?) such entries are enough to characterize the preferences of both men and women,
since they are perfectly opposed, that is the sum of man i and woman j about each
other is exactly kˆ + 1.5
m1 : w1 w2 w3 . . . wk−1 wk
m2 : w2 w3 w4 . . . wk w1
... . . .
mk : wk w1 w2 . . . wk−2 wk−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Preferences of Men according to (?)

w1 w2 w3 . . . wk−1 wk
m1 : 1 2 3 . . . k − 1 k
m2 : k 1 2 . . . k − 2 k − 1
... . . .
mk : 2 3 4 . . . k 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Associated Ranking Matrix
Figure A.1
In such matrix, a matching corresponds to a selection of kˆ cells, such that each
column and row has only one cell selected. Suppose that (i, j) are a blocking pair
3The theorem holds for every (M,W,) : M ≥ M?(q) = kˆ(q) andW ≥ W ?(q) = kˆ(q) the
reason being that it will be a Latin rectangle which can be completed into a Latin square, this is a
consequence of Hall’s theorem
4This is a maximal domain result; for any q it gives us an instance where someone regrets and
tells us that for any instance greater than that it also will; however, this does not mean that it is the
smallest instance at which an agent would regret truth in the q−quantile mechanism
5This is known as the Latin square subproblem of the stable marriage problem, see Thurber
(2002).
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to a given matching µ. Then aiµ(i) > aij > aµ(j)j , that is, man i prefers woman j to
µ(i) which is represented by assigning a higher rank (lower number) and for woman
j it is the case that larger numbers in her column correspond to more preferable
matches, aij > aµ(j)j ⇐⇒ i j µ(j). We refer to the entry in the ranking matrix
corresponding to a blocking pair as a blocking cell. See figure A.2.
1 2 3 . . . k − 1 k
k 1 2 3 . . . k − 2 k − 1
k − 1 k 1 2 . . . k − 3 k − 2
... . . . ...
3 4 5 6 . . . 1 2
2 3 4 5 . . . k 1


The circled cells represents a match: ∀m /∈
{m1,m2}: amµ(m) = 2.
1 2 3 4 . . . k − 1 k
k 1 2 3 . . . k − 2 k − 1
k − 1 k 1 2 . . . k − 3 k − 2
... . . . ...
3 4 5 6 . . . 1 2
2 3 4 5 . . . k 1


a12 = 2 in red represents a blocking cell.
m1 would rather be matched to his second
best choice than his third, while w2 rather be
matched to her k − 1-th choice than to her
k-th
Figure A.2: A matching represented in the associated ranking matrix.
Step 1) To see that the Latin square of order kˆ generates at least kˆ stable matches,
note that there is always a permutation of rows such that the elements of the diagonal
have the same value (and it is still a Latin square). For fixed ` ∈ {1, . . . , kˆ} let
the matching be aii = ` for all i ∈ M after the row-permutation and suppose it is
blocked by some cell aij , then it has to be the case that the blocking cell satisfies:
aii > aij > ajj which is impossible given that aii = ajj = `. This means that for
fixed `, the matching µ with associated entries in the ranking matrix aii = ` ∀ ∈M
is a stable matching. Since ` ∈ {1, . . . , kˆ} was arbitrary, this means there are kˆ
of such matchings, denote this setM. Note that µM , µW ∈ M, so the M -optimal
and W -optimal matchings belong to this set. Moreover for any µ, µ′ ∈ M either
µ M µ′ or µ′ M µ, that is all matching in this set are strictly order for all men,
each individual has kˆ different stable partners, all acceptable partners are stable and
attained in some matching inM. There is no stable matching outside ofM that is
strictly ranked for all men, this is immediate from the previous observation.6
6Suppose µ /∈ M : for any µ′ ∈ M either µ M µ′ or µ′ M µ. Denote µ¯ = {µ′ ∈
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Step 2) Suppose ∃λ ∈ Mc ∩ S(), since µM , µW ∈ M then ∃µ¯, µ where µ¯(λ) =
infM{µ ∈ M : µ M λ} and µ(λ) = supM{µ ∈ M : λ M µ}, transitivity
ensures µ¯ M µ and use µ¯, µ for short. Consider the setM(λ) = PM(µ) ∩QM(µ¯)
where PM(x), QM(x) denotes the set of predecessors and succesors of x in set
M under order M respectively. Formally, PM(µ) = {µ ∈ M : µ M µ} and
QM(µ¯) = {µ ∈M : µ¯ M µ}. If
1. M = ∅
Suppose µ¯ M λ M µ, λ ∈ S() \ {µ, µ¯}. If a man is getting his r-th
best partner in µ, then he gets his (r− 1)-th best partner at µ¯. By assumption
there exists two nonempty sets of men M ′,M ′′ such that M ′ = {m ∈ M :
λ M ′ µ¯} and M ′′ = {m ∈ M : λ ∼M ′′ µ¯}. The matching λ must be such
that for everym ∈M ′ it assigns him his (r− 1)-th best partner, and for every
m ∈M ′′ assigns his r-th best best partner. Without loss of generality assume
m1 ∈M ′, then by construction (?) it follows that µ(µ(m1)) = m2, that is his
match under λ must be m2’s match under µ; in general µ(µ(mt)) = mt+1
for t ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and µ(µ(mk)) = m1.So the improvement cycle by
going from µ to λ involves all men, then M ′ = M and M ′′ = ∅, which is a
contradiction.
2. M = {µ}
Suppose µ¯ M λ M µ, λ ∈ S() \ {µ, µ¯, µ} and λ, M⊀M µ. Notice that if
men are getting their r-t best stable partner in µ, then they are getting their
(r − 1)-th in µ and (r − 2)-th in µ¯. The fact that λ and µ are not ordered
according to M means there exists sets M¯ 6= ∅, M˜ ,M 6= ∅ such that
∀m ∈

M¯ λ M¯ µ
M˜ λ ∼M˜ µ
M µ M λ
Notice that λ cannot assign any man anything worse than his r-th best stable
choice since λ M µ, similarly cannot assign anything better than his (r−2)-
th best stable partner.
M : µ′ is the M -greatest element for which µ′ M µ}, analogously define µ = {µ′ ∈ M :
µ′ is the M -least element for which µ M µ′}, so µ¯ M µ M µ. Both µ¯ and µ are well defined
since M is a complete order onM ∪ {µ}. Suppose that in µ each man is getting their r-th best
stable partner, by construction in µ¯ each man gets its (r− 1)-th best stable partner. Then µ(m) must
give each man a strictly better stable partner than the r-th but strictly worst than his r− 1 which is a
contradiction.
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Claim A.4. M = M and M¯ = ∅
Proof of claim. We proceed by induction. Suppose without loss of generality
that m1 ∈ M , notice that µ(m1) = wr−1 m1 wr = λ(m1) = µ(m2), so
λ(m2) 6= µ(m2). Then for λ to be a matching a satisfy the case assumptions it
has to be the case that λ(m2) ∈ {µ(m1), µ(m3)}. Now given our construction
(?) if λ ∈ S() then λ(m2) 6= µ(m1) since (m1, wr) would form a blocking
pair. To see this notice that in the associated ranking matrix it holds that
a1r = r > (r − 1) = a1(r−1) > (r − 2) = a2(r−1).
Next we show that if ∀t < j, t, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} it holds that λ(mt) = µ(mt+1)
then λ(mj) = µ(mj+1), where the indexes are mod k. By induction hy-
pothesis λ(mj) 6= µ(mj) = λ(mj−1). Given the restrictions imposed by the
existence of µ and µ¯ it follows λ(mj) ∈ {µ(mj−1), µ(mj+1)}. Next we no-
tice that if λ(mj) ∈ µ(mj−1) then (mj−1, µ(mj−1)) is a blocking pair, since
the associated ranking matrix has entries: amj−1λ(mj−1) = r > (r − 1) =
amj−1µ(mj−1) > (r−2) = amjµ(mj−1). Consequently,mj ∈M . The induction
argument impliesM = M and M¯ = ∅, which is a contradiction.
1 2 3 4 . . . k − 1 k
k 1 2 3 . . . k − 2 k − 1
k − 1 k 1 2 . . . k − 3 k − 2
... . . . ...
3 4 5 6 . . . 1 2
2 3 4 5 . . . k 1


Figure A.3: The
coordinates of the
circled cells corre-
spond to a matched
couple in the asso-
ciated ranking ma-
trix.The black cir-
cles correspond to
λ and µ. The blue
circles correspond
only to µ. The red
circles correspond
only toλ. The cyan
cell is a blocking
pair.
3. |M| ≥ 2,
Proof 1. Since µ, µ′, λ ∈ S() then µ ∨ λ, µ′ ∧ (µ ∨ λ) ∈ S() since they
are join and meet of stable matchings (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Theorem
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m1 : w1 w2 w3 . . . wk−1 wk
m2 : w2 w3 w4 . . . wk w1
... . . . ...
mk : wk w1 w2 . . . wk−2 wk−1


Preferences of Men according to (?)
Matching with
r = 3,
µ¯: first column.
µ: second col-
umn.
µ: third column.
Trying to make
one man worse
than in µ yet
weakly better
than in µ leads
to a cycle that
involves the
whole set of
men.
Figure A.4
5.31) Then
µ ∧ (µ′ ∧ (µ ∨ λ)) =(µ ∧ µ′) ∧ (µ ∨ λ)
=µ ∧ (µ ∨ λ)
=µ
where in the first equality we are using the associativity, in the second the fact
that µ′ M µ and the absortion property of lattices in the third equality. This
implies µ′ ∧ (µ ∨ λ) M µ and by definition of ∧, µ′ M µ′ ∧ (µ ∨ λ). This
means there exists a stablematching λˆ = µ′∧(µ∨λ) such thatµ′ M λˆ M µ,
whose existance we have already ruled out in case 1, therefore we have reached
a contradiction.
For the interested reader we provide a second proof that, though longer, makes
use of a different technique.
Proof 2. We shall show that in this case, the alleged stable set contains a
pentagon as a sublatticewhich implies the lattice is not distributive, therefore it
cannot correspond to a stable set lattice. First we recall some basic definitions:
Definition (Birkhoff (1967) who attributes to Dedekind). A lattice is a poset
P any two of whose elements have greatest lower bound or meet denoted a∧ b
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and a least upper bound or join denoted a ∨ b.7
A lattice L is complete when each of its subsets X has a g.l.b. and a l.u.b. in
L.
A lattice L is distributive if for every a, b, c ∈ L the following equalities hold:
a∧ (b∨ c) = (a∧ b)∨ (a∧ c) and a∨ (b∧ c) = (a∨ b)∧ (a∨ c). Notice that
not all lattices satisfy the distributive property.
A sublattice of a lattice L is a subset X of L such that a ∈ X, b ∈ X ⇒
a ∧ b ∈ X and a ∨ b ∈ X .
A sublattice X of L is called a pentagon if X is isomorphic to N5 =
{i, o, a, b, c : b ∨ c = i, a ∧ c = o, a > b}.
i
c
a
b
o
Figure A.5: Pentagon N5
Theorem (attributed to Conway). When preferences are strict, the set of stable
matchings is a distributive lattice under M .
Theorem. If a lattice L is distributive then it does not contain a sublattice
isomorphic to N5 (pentagon).
By assumption there must exist µ, µ′ ∈ M such that x ⊀λ for x ∈ {µ, µ′},
wlog assume µ′  µ (notice this is well defined since µ, µ ∈M), µ′ being the
immediate predecessor of µ according to M (this hold by transitivity). Let
µ? = µ ∨ λ and µ? = µ ∧ λ. Analogous definitions for µ′? and µ′?. Notice
(µ?, µ?, µ
′
?µ
′?) are all stable matchings since they are join and meet of stable
matchings. One of the following cases must hold
a) µ? ∈M, µ? ∈M.
b) µ? /∈M, µ? ∈M.
7We recall some basic yet useful properties of ∧ and ∨.
a) Associativity: a ∧ (b ∧ c) = (a ∧ b) ∧ c and a ∨ (b ∨ c) = (a ∨ b) ∨ c
b) Commutative: a ∧ b = b ∧ a and a ∨ b = b ∨ a
c) Absortion: a ∧ (a ∨ b) = a and a ∨ (a ∧ b) = a
d) Idempotency: a ∧ a = a and a ∨ a = a
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c) µ? ∈M, µ? /∈M.
d) µ? /∈M, µ? /∈M.
We show the contradiction for the first case, similar constructions work for
the other cases.
Claim A.5. (µ, µ′, µ?, µ?, λ) is a sublattice of S() isomorphic to N5
Proof of claim. First we show that the set {µ, µ′, µ?, µ?, λ} constitutes a sub-
lattice of S() under the assumptions. To do so first we show: µ? = µ′?.
Notice µ? M µ¯ by definition of µ¯, µ′ ∈ QM(µ¯0) implies µ? M µ′ and
µ? M λ, which imply µ? is an upper bound to {µ′, λ}. Suppose it is not
the least upper bound, then ∃µ′′ : µ? M µ′′ such that µ′′ is also an upper
bound to {µ′, λ}, and given that µ′ M µ, then µ? cannot be the least upper
bound on {µ, λ}, which contradicts the definition of µ? = µ ∨ λ. Similar
reasoning shows µ? = µ′?. Consequently meets and joins of every pair of el-
ements are by construction inside the set (µ, µ′, µ?, µ?, λ) Then the following
φ : {µ, µ′, µ?, µ?, λ} → N5 = {i, o, a, b, c : b ∨ c = i, a ∧ c = o, a > b} is an
isomorphism to N5:
φ(·) :

µ? 7−→ i
µ′ 7−→ a
µ 7−→ b
λ 7−→ c
µ? 7−→ o
µ?
λ
µ′
µ
µ?
Figure A.6: Sublattice
Consequently, we have shown that the set cannot correspond to a stable
matching lattice.
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Necessity
Existence
Theorem 2.1 (Necessity). ∀i ∈ N = M ∪ W , i is regret-free in φ(·) ∈
{φM(·), φW (·)}
The result is established through four claims: Claim A.6 shows that truth-telling is
regret-free for the proposing side, as a consequence of dominant strategy incentive
compatibility. Consequently the rest of the proof focuses only on the receiving side.
Claim A.7, A.8 and A.9 show that there does not exist a report through which i
regrets telling the truth. Each claim deals with reports that differ from the truth in
a specific manner. Claim A.7 shows that changing the order of alternatives that are
preferred to the observed match will not change the resulting matching. Claim A.8
and A.9 show that any other report that differs from the truth in an essential manner
is never a safe deviation compared to telling the truth, in the sense that whenever it
may result in a more preferable match it may also result in a less preferable as well.
Claim A.8 deals with those deviations where an alternative which is less preferred
to the observed match by the true preference profile is reported as preferred to the
said match. Claim A.9 deals with deviations where the relative order between two
alternatives that are less preferred to the observed match is reversed. All reports that
differ from the truth in an essential way have to fit into the conditions of (at least)
one of these claims.
Proof. Let (M,W,) be a private information matching market where φ() =
µM() ∀ ∈ P , that is theM -proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. Take an
arbitrary agent i and fix an arbitrary µ = φ(i,−i) for some −i∈ P−i. Define
UCiφ()(i) = {j ∈ J : j i φ()(i)}
LCiφ()(i) = {j ∈ J : φ()(i) i j}
that is, UCiφ()(i) denotes the upper contour set with respect to φ()(i) under i,
that is the set of partners that player i considers strictly preferable (according to
his/her true preference) to the partner under φ(); analogously interpret LCiφ()(i).
Claim A.6. Truth-telling is regret-free for every agent in the proposing side.
Proof of Claim. Follows directly from strategy-proofness for men.
90
Consequently we can focus on the receiving side (so i ∈ W from now on). We must
show that for an arbitrary agent on the receiving side and for an arbitrary matching
that may result from her reporting her true preference, there is no alternative report
through which that agent regrets truth-telling. We start by showing (Claim A.7)
that a report that differs from truth only in the way that it orders elements that are
preferred to the observed matching cannot yield a better matching for the agent.
Claim A.7. For any µ = φ(i,−i) for some −i∈ Pi, if ′i: UCiφ()(i) =
UC
′i
φ()(i) and a ′i b ⇔ a i b ∀a, b ∈ LCiφ()(i) ∪ {φ()(i)} ⇒ φ(i
,−i) = φ(′i,−i).
Proof of Claim. The player does not reject an offer under′i that was accepted under
i, she cannot affect the set of offers that are made to her, and consequently cannot
affect the outcome favorably.8
Claim A.8. Suppose ∃(′i, ˆ−i) such that
(i) φ(i, ˆ−i) = µ
(ii) ′i: ∃j˜ ∈ LCiφ()(i) and j˜ ∈ UC
′i
φ()(i)
(iii) φ(′i, ˆ−i) i φ(i, ˆ−i)
then ∃˜−i such that φ(i, ˜−i) = µ and φ(i, ˜−i) i φ(′i, ˜−i).
Proof of claim. Case 1. Truncation j˜ = i It is enough to consider the following
preference profile to see that the truncation can leave the agent worse off than telling
the truth
˜k : φ()(k) ˜k k ˜k . . . ∀k 6= i
Notice that the profile is consistent with the observed matching since everyone
considers their assigned partner as their unique acceptable partner. However under
′i that match is no longer acceptable for i. Since φ(·) is stable with respect to
the reported preferences (in particular individually rational) it leaves i unmatched
8Player i did not receive any offer from a member of UCiφ()(i) in φ() by construction of the
DA. Since everyone else’s preference is the same as before, the first round of offers does not change;
since player i’s offers are the same (and belong to LCiφ()(i) ∪ {φ()(i)}) and her preferences over
those alternatives did not change, the set of active players in the next round is the same. The set of
active players in the second round is the same, again she faces choices on LCiφ()(i) ∪ {φ()(i)},
and makes the same choice. An inductive argument finishes the proof.
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under′i, which is a strictly worse off situation from the point of view of i’s the true
preference profile.
Case 2. A non-truncation (j˜ 6= i). Similar to the truncation case it is enough to
consider:
˜j˜ :i ˜j˜ φ()(j˜) ˜j˜ j˜ ˜j˜ . . .
˜k :φ()(k) ˜k k ˜k . . . ∀k 6= {j˜, i}
It is straightforward to verify that the preference profile is consistent with the ob-
served matching. Under the alternative report, everyone except i has the same
preference profile as before, so first round proposals are the same. However, under
′i agent j˜ is declared as preferred to φ()(i), which means that agent i accepts
j˜’s offer. Since there are no more active players the algorithm stops and matches
agent i to j˜ which is a strictly worse outcome under i’s true preference profile, that
is φ(i, ˜−i)(i) = φ()(i) i j˜ = φ(′i, ˜−i)(i). Consequently, i cannot regret
truth-telling (i) through a deviation (′i) consistent with the claim at the observed
matching (µ) in DA.
Claim A.9. Suppose ∃(′i, ˆ−i) such that
(i) φ(i, ˆ−i) = µ
(ii) ′i: ∃u, v ∈ LCiφ()(i) such that u i v and v ′i u
(iii) φ(′i, ˆ−i) i φ(i, ˆ−i)
then ∃˜−i such that φ(i, ˜−i) = µ and φ(i, ˜−i) i φ(′i, ˜−i).
Proof of Claim. The general structure of the proof is the same as in the previous
claim so we just described the preference profile that we need to take into consider-
ation. Let ˜−i be the following:
˜v :i ˜v φ()(v) ˜v . . .
˜u :i ˜u φ()(u) ˜u . . .
˜φ()(v) :v ˜φ()(v) φ()(i) ˜φ()(v) . . .
˜φ()(i) :φ()(v) ˜φ()(i) i ˜φ()(i) . . .
˜k :φ()(k) ˜k k ˜k . . . ∀k 6= {i, u, v, φ()(i), φ()(v)}
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This preference profile is consistent with the observed matching. Where i to report
′i instead,
w1 . . . i φ()(v) φ()(u) . . . w|W |
1st φ()(w1) . . . u,v φ()(i) . . . φ()(w|W|)
2nd u
φ(′i, ˜−i) φ()(w1) . . . v φ()(i) u . . . φ()(w|W|)
The resulting allocation matches i to v, which is a worse outcome for agent i
according to her true preference profile, that is φ(i, ˜−i)(i) = φ()(i) i v =
φ(′i, ˜−i)(i). Consequently, i cannot regret truth-telling (i) through a deviation
(′i) consistent with the claim at the observed matching (µ) in DA.
The analysis shows that there is no report through which agent i can regret telling
the truth at µ. Since this was done for an arbitrary µ ∈ M|i , it holds for all such
matchings that may result from telling the truth. Consequently, there is no µ at which
i regrets truth-telling which means truth-telling is regret-free for agent i. Since this
conclusion holds for an arbitrary agent in either side of the market (proposing or
receiving), putting together the previous claims the proposition is proven.
Let Ti = {′′i∈ Pi : Ai(′′i ) = Ai(i) and a ′′i b⇔ a i b ∀a, b ∈ Ai(i)∪{i}}
denote the set of all preferences for i that only differ from the true one in how they
rank unacceptable choices between themselves. Note that by construction of the DA
the matching generated by truth and by a report in Ti is the same, which means i
cannot regret telling the truth through an element in Ti. However this reports differ
from the truth only in an inessential manner.
Corollary A.2. Any report that differs from the truth only in how it ranks the
elements of the unacceptable set among themselves (′i∈ Ti) is also regret-free.
Proof. Since the DA does not take into account the relative ranking among alter-
natives in the unacceptable set ∀ ′i∈ Ti,∀˜−i ∈ P−i φ(i, ˜−i) = φ(′i, ˜−i),
then any ′i∈ Ti is regret-free.
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Uniqueness
Proposition 2.1. Truth is the essentially unique regret-free report in the DA mech-
anism. Moreover, i regrets any other report through truth.
Proof of Proposition. Any ′i∈ Pi \ Ti must belong to one of the following cases:
1. ′i∈ Pi such that ∃k : k ∈ A(i) and U(′i).
2. ′i∈ Pi such that ∃j ∈ Ui(i) and j ∈ Ai(′i).
3. ′i involves a permutation among the acceptable set.
Cases 1 and 2 are tackled below in A.2.
Here we tackle case 3.
We develop an algorithm to find a µ ∈M|′i at which i regrets reporting′i through
i for an arbitrary i in the receiving side. An analogous argument works for an
agent in the proposing side.9
Let |J | denote the cardinality of the agents on the proposing side that are acceptable
to i with respect to her true preference profile. Relabel agents such that their index
reflects their position according to i, that is j1 is the i-maximal element (agent)
on Ai,1(i) = Ai(i), j2 the i-maximal element on Ai,2(i) = Ai,1(i) \ {j1},
etc.
Step 1. If the index of the′i-maximal element on Ai,|J |−1(i) is smaller than
the index of the ′i-maximal element on Ai,|J |(i), then go to step 2.
Otherwise, set µ ∈ M|′i : µ(i) = {′i-maximal element on Ai,|J |−1(i)}
and µ(k) = k ∀k 6= {i, µ(i)}.10 Break.
Step k ∈ {2, . . . , |J | − 1}. If the index of the ′i-maximal element on
Ai,|J |−k(i) is smaller than the index of the′i-maximal element onAi,|J |−(k−1)(i
), then go to step k + 1.
Otherwise, set µ ∈ M|′i : µ(i) = {′i-maximal element on Ai,|J |−k(i)}
and µ(k) = k ∀k 6= {i, µ(i)}. Break.
9In the case of the receiving side described in the text the algorithm looks for the first switch
in the preference relation from least to most preferred acceptable alternative. In the case of the
proposing side the search is done from most to least preferred acceptable partner.
10The essential part of the matching found by the algorithm is to whom agent i is matched, the
choice of leaving everyone else unmatched is arbitrary and not unique.
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Given that′i is a permutation ofi onAi(i) it cannot be the case that ∀j ∈ Ai(i)
jk ′i jl whenever k < l. Therefore the algorithm necessarily sets a µ. Next we
explain why at such µ i regrets ′i through i.
First, consider a case where the algorithm stops after step 1, setting µ(i) = x = {′i-
maximal element onAi,|J |−1(i)}. By construction of DA, i can only have received
offers from x and y = {′i-maximal element on Ai,|J |(i)}, necessarily so from
x since it is matched to him under the observed matching. The preference profiles
˜−i ∈ M|′i are divided into those cases in which i received an offer from y and
those in which it did not; there always exist preference profiles that satisfy each
condition. If she did not, then she only observed an offer from x and consequently,
φ(i, ˜−i) = φ(′i, ˜−i) = x since i does not reject or accept any offer differently
under ′i than under i. On the other hand, if i received an offer from y it means at
some point she decided between y and x in favor of x. However, since the algorithm
stopped to produce µ it means that y i x, consequently φ(i, ˜−i) i φ(′i, ˜−i).
The same logic extends to the case where the algorithm stops at a step k: i cannot
have received offers from any z ′i µ(i). For any s, t ∈ J : µ(i) ′i s and µ(i) ′i t
it is the case that s ′i t ⇐⇒ s i t. That is, the binary relation between the
options that can potentially have made an offer to i is the same under ′i than under
i, which means that any offer that did not involve µ(i) is accepted or rejected in the
same manner under both′i andi. The only cases in which they differ are in those
where µ(i) was chosen over some s ∈ J : µ(i) ′i s and s i µ(i). Consequently
φ(i, ˜−i) i φ(′i, ˜−i).
A.2 Remarks
Existence and Uniqueness not guaranteed in general
Remark 2.1. There exists a mechanism φ such that no agent has a regret-free report,
namely the Boston Mechanism. In contrast, every report is regret-free in a constant
mechanism.
Proof. By way of example,
Constant Mechanism
Consider the following trivial mechanism, φ()(i) = i ∀i ∈ M ∪W . Trivially
every report yields the same outcome, therefore no report can ex-post dominate
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another and consequently multiple and (essentially) different reports can be regret-
free at the same time; at least if we do not restrict the mechanism to be stable.
Particularly note that both a truncation strategy and truth-telling are both being
regret-free at the same time.
Boston Mechanism
Wewill show that in the Bostonmechanism, for a specificmarket size and preference
profile of a player, this player has no regret-free report at his disposal. Let |M | =
|W | = 3 and m1 : w1  w2  w3. He is allowed to make any of the following
reports:11
1)123∅ 2)132∅ 3)1∅23 4)1∅32 5)13∅2 6)12∅3
7)312∅ 8)321∅ 9)3∅12 10)3∅21 11)32∅1 12)31∅2
13)2∅13 14)2∅31 15)23∅1 16)231∅ 17)21∅3 18)213∅
m1 regrets′m1∈ {3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17} at amatchingwhereφ(′m1
,−m1)(m1) = m1 through= {1}, that is the true preference profile. First we note
that the Boston Mechanism is individually rational, therefore m1 cannot do worst
than being single by reporting the truth, no matter what the true preference profile
of others is. Note that any ′m1 6= involves declaring some acceptable alternative
wj as unacceptable. Then we note that when wj : m1  φ(′m1 ,−m1)(wj) (∼)wj
and k: φ(′m1 ,−m1) (∼) k for k ∈ M ∪W \ {m1, wj} the Boston mechanism
allocates φ(m1 ,−m1)(m1) = wj which is strictly preferred by m1 according to
his true preference profile than remaining single.
m1 regrets ′m1∈ {2, 7, 8} and ′′m1∈ {16, 18} at a matching φ(′m1 ,−m1) =(
w1 w2 w3 ·
m3 m2 · m1
)
and φ(′′m1 ,−m1) =
(
w1 w2 w3 ·
m3 · m2 m1
)
respectively through = {1}.
By individual rationality of BM he cannot do worst by telling the truth and there is
always the possibility that the reason he ends up single is in fact trying to compete
for what is reported as his first choice, and therefore losing his potential seat in the
remaining ones, which would not happen (for at least some preference profile) by
telling the truth.
11With exception of declaring every alternative as unacceptable.
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m1 regrets ′m1= {2} at matching φ(′m1 ,−m1 ) =
( w1 w2 w3 ·
m3 m2 · m1
)
through = {1}, when the profile is
w1 :312 m1 :·
w2 :123 m2 :123
w3 :23∅ m3 :132
m1 regrets ′m1∈ {7, 8} at matching φ(′m1 ,−m1 ) =
( w1 w2 w3 ·
m3 · m2 m1
)
through = {1}, when the profile is
w1 :132 m1 :·
w2 :23∅ m2 :312
w3 :213 m3 :123
m1 regrets′m1∈ {16, 18} at a matching where φ(′m1 ,−m1 ) =
( w1 w2 w3 ·
m3 · m2 m1
)
through= {1}, when the profile
is
w1 :132 m1 :·
w2 :213 m2 :213
w3 :23∅ m3 :132
Stability and regret-free reports
Remark. If a mechanism is stable then (i) no report that declares some acceptable
partner as unacceptable can be regret-free. Similarly, (ii) no report that declares an
unacceptable partner as acceptable can be regret-free. Moreover in each of these
cases the individual regrets the report through truth.
Proof. Let ′i∈ Pi be such that ∃k : k ∈ A(i), U(′i). Take the matching
φ(′i,−i) =
(
· i ·
k · ·
)
That is, i remains single.12 Consider the preference profile consistent with such
matching
i : · · · ′ i ′ k
k :i ′′ φ(′,−i)(k) ′′(∼) k
j :φ(′,−i)(j) ′′(∼) j(′′ i)
By individual rationality, φ(·,−i) i i. And we note that for ′′−i, φ(i,′′−i) =
k i i because of stability (not IR) since otherwise (i, k) constitute a blocking pair.
This establishes (i).
To establish (ii), suppose ′i is such that ∃j ∈ Ui(i) and j ∈ Ai(′i). Then,
∃µ ∈M|′i : µ(i) = j. Since φ(·) is individually rational, φ(i, ˜−i) i j.
12To see this note that if you run the DA with i’s side proposing it remains single, then by the
rural hospital theorem, imust be single in any stable matching, consequently, no matter which stable
φ(·) selects, it will still have i as single.
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Independence of stability and regret-free truth-telling
Stability and regret-free truth-telling are independent properties in the sense that
neither is implied by the other.
φ Stable Unstable
RFTT DA Serial Dictatorship
Not RFTT Median Stable Mech. Boston Mechanism
Table A.1: Independence of stability and regret-free truth-telling.
where RFTT stands for Regret-Free Truth-Telling. DA was shown to be stable and
RFTT in section 2.4. The median stable mechanism was shown to fail regret-free
truth-telling in section 2.4. For Boston Mechanism, see section A.2. Lastly, the
serial dictatorship is known to be an unstable mechanism. It trivially satisfies RFTT
since it is strategy-proof mechanism.
A.3 Switching DA: Stable, not RFTT
Consider the following mechanism: Let φ() = φW () ∀ 6= {′} and φ(′
) = φM(′) where ′ is the following:
m1 :w1 ′ w2 ′ ∅ w1 :m2 ′ m1 ′ ∅
m2 :w2 ′ w1 ′ ∅ w2 :m1 ′ m2 ′ ∅
m3 :∅ w3 :∅
Claim A.10. w1 regretsw1 : m2 ′ m1 ′ ∅ at µ =
(
m1 m2 m3 ·
w1 w2 · w3
)
through
w1 : m2  m1  m3  ∅.
Proof. First, if (′w1 ,′−w1) then
φ(′) = φM(′) =
(
m1 m2 m3 ·
w1 w2 · w3
)
if insteadw1 had reportedw1 : m2  m1  m3  ∅ then φ(w1 ,′−w1) = φW (w1
,′−w1), then
φW (w1 ,′−w1)(w1) = m2 ′w1 m1 = φM(′)(w1)
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Now we need to show that ∀ −w1∈ P : φ(′w1 ,−w1) = µ it holds that φ(w1
,−w1) ′w1 φ(′w1 ,−w1).
If −w1 6=′−w1 then µ = φW (′w1 ,−w1), in which case it means w1 proposed to
m2 - potentially got tentatively accepted and then rejected, then proposed to m1
which accepted and never rejected w1. Since the −w1 is fixed and the order of
proposals made by w1 did not change it has to be the case that w1 is still matched to
m1 (so it is not worse-off).
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A p p e n d i x B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We start with a preference profile with a unique stable
matching µ that satisfies the One and a Half Cycle Condition. That preference will
ultimately correspond to one state in the economy, denoted θ1. Suppose the cycle
guaranteed by the One and a Half Cycle Condition has a spoiler w¯ that blocks the
swaps determined by the cycle with firm fk¯, who is to be matched with wk¯ = µ(fk¯)
under the unique stable matching µ. As mentioned in the body of the text, for the
sake of expositional transparency, we restrict attention to the case where there is a
unique spoiler and a unique firm that would block the swap for at least one cycle.1
Suppose, then, that w¯ is a unique spoiler, who blocks the swap determined by the
cycle only with fk¯.
We construct a preference profile that will ultimately define another state in the
economy, denoted θ2. To do so, we take the half cycle identified for the original
preferences and define preferences for firms that turn it into a full cycle. This implies
that the sub-market involving the corresponding workers and firms has multiple
stable matchings. In addition, we make sure that the constructed preference profile
belongs to the domain of preference profiles generating a unique stable matching.
This implies that there must be a spoiler corresponding to the proper cycle in the
constructed preferences. The spoiler is (intentionally) chosen to be wk¯. In this way,
the roles of spoiler and spoiled are reversed across the two states. We construct
preferences so that workers maintain their match preferences from the original
preference ordering, while firms’ preferences are specified as follows:2
for any f ′k′ ∈ F ′ \ fk¯ f ′k′ : w
′
k′ , w
′
k′−1,∅, . . .
for fk¯ fk¯ : w¯, wk¯, w′K′ ,∅, . . .
for any f /∈ F ′ f : ∅, . . .
By design, the firm-proposing DA in market θ2 generates the matching:
1This restriction is weakened in the Online Appendix.
2The preferences described are certainly very specific and are by no means the only ones that
would generate the multiplicity claimed in the Theorem. Their choice is design to simplify our
arguments.
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for any f ′k′ ∈ F ′ \ fk¯ µ(θ2)(f ′k′) =w′k′
for fk¯ µ(θ2)(fk¯) =w¯
for any f /∈ F ′ µ(θ2)(f) =∅
In fact, µ(θ2) is the unique stable matching in θ2. To see this, consider any firm
or worker f outside the half cycle. By the Rural Hospital Theorem, they must be
unmatched in every stable matching. Thus, if there is any multiplicity of stable
matchings, it must come from rematching the workers and firms in the original
half cycle. There is only one other candidate matching to be stable in θ2, which is
the matching that results by implementing the swap desired by the workers in the
generated cycle of θ2. However, the matching resulting from such a swap would be
blocked by firm fk¯ and worker wk¯. Therefore µ(θ2) is the unique stable matching.3
With respect to this generated cycle in state θ2, notice that worker wk¯ plays the role
of spoiler in state θ2. Moreover, the firm and worker pair,wk¯ and fk¯, form the unique
blocking pair to the matching resulting from the swap. Thus, in θ2, the sub-market
without worker wk¯ presents multiple stable matchings.
Now, consider the sub-market in state θ2 that excludes wk¯. Worker w¯ has two stable
partners, f ′2 and fk¯ in this sub-market. In fact, that sub-market has two stable match-
ings. Thus, faced with the firm-proposing DA, if all other agents in the sub-market
are truth-telling, w¯ has an incentive to misrepresent his preferences. In particular,
the best he can do through any strategy is to achieve his most preferred stable part-
ner in the sub-market, firm f ′2. Consider then the following dropping strategy for
w¯: declare fk¯ as unacceptable, but report preferences truthfully otherwise. If w¯
plays this dropping strategy, he can force the firm-proposing DA to implement the
matching resulting from the swap, and thus obtain his most preferred stable partner
in the sub-market (which is the best he can do).4
One way in which w¯ effectively faces the sub-market that excludes wk¯ is if wk¯
is himself playing a dropping strategy in which he declares fk¯ as unacceptable,
3Naturally, we could have shown uniqueness more directly by illustrating that the worker-
proposing DA generates µ(θ2) as well. We spell out these arguments as they will be useful in what
follows.
4To see this, notice that if w¯ uses a dropping strategy instead of being truthful, then w¯ cannot
be matched to fk¯ as result of the firm-proposing DA. Consequently, the matching resulting from the
swap in the sub-market must be implemented. Notice also that this outcome cannot be achieved by
any strategy where w¯ declares fk¯ as acceptable.
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and ranks all other firms truthfully, while all other agents report their preferences
truthfully. This means that conditional on wk¯ playing a dropping strategy, it is a best
response (in state θ2) for w¯ to play a dropping strategy.
The dropping strategy carries a cost for w¯ in state θ1 since, if wk¯ plays the dropping
strategy, w¯ would be effectively giving up fk¯ for a less desirable firm. If the utility
of matching with f ′2 is high enough, however, then playing the dropping strategy is
a best response for w¯, as it maximizes his expected utility when wk¯ uses the above
dropping strategy, and all other workers and firms are truthful.
To show this profile constitutes an equilibrium we have to argue that it is also a
best response for wk¯ to play a dropping strategy, and for the remaining agents to be
truthful. Since the roles of w¯ and wk¯ are reversed across states, the argument that a
dropping strategy is optimal forwk¯, for appropriate choices of cardinal representation
of preferences, is analogous. Indeed, if the state is θ1 and w¯ plays a dropping strategy,
then wk¯ is facing a sub-market with multiple stable partners, in which case he has
an incentive to misrepresent his preferences by playing a dropping strategy. If the
state is θ2, and w¯ is playing the dropping strategy then wk¯ is giving up fk¯ for a less
preferred alternative. If the utility of matching with fk¯+1 is high enough, then wk¯
playing the dropping strategy is a best response as it maximizes his expected utility
given that w¯ uses a dropping strategy, and all other workers and firms truthful.
Last, notice that being truthful is a weakly dominant strategy for firms in the firm-
proposing DA, which we assumed they follow. For workers other than the spoiler
and spoiled, reporting preferences truthfully is also a best-response given the profile
of strategies under consideration. To see this, take an arbitrary workerw /∈ {w¯, wk¯},
and consider his incentives when w¯ and wk¯ play the dropping strategies described
above and the remaining workers are truthful. In each state, if w is honest, there is a
unique stable matching. Consequently, w has no incentive to deviate from truthful
reporting.
The profile we describe, in which wk¯ or w¯ both use dropping strategies, therefore
constitutes an equilibrium. In this equilibrium, wk¯ or w¯ cannot be matched with
their true stable partners in either θ1 or θ2, respectively, since they declare them
unacceptable. Thus, the outcome of this equilibrium is necessarily (complete-
information) unstable in each state. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Towards a contradiction, assume there exists an equilib-
rium that induces an unstable matching λ(θ) for some state of the world θ. Then
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there exists a firm fi∗ ∈ F and a worker wj∗ ∈ W that block λ(θ). That is,
U fi∗j∗(θ) > U
f
i∗λ(θ;i∗)(θ) and U
w
i∗j∗(θ) > U
w
λ(θ;j∗)j∗ .
Since U fi∗j∗(θ) > U
f
i∗λ(θ;i∗)(θ), it follows that wλ(θ;i∗) has a lower priority than wj∗ in
the common preference of firms. This, in turn, means that firm i∗ proposed to wj∗
and, in equilibrium, he rejected rejected fi∗ for a less desirable offer. Had he instead
reported truthfully, he would have matched to someone ranked at least as highly as
fi∗ in state θ.
Moreover, since state by state wj∗’s option set (the set of firms he can match to) is
independent of his report, in each of those states truthful reporting would achieve at
least a good a partner as any other strategy. Therefore, wj∗ is not best responding,
in contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Let µ(θ) denote the unique (complete-information) stable
matching in state θ. Suppose there exists an equilibrium yielding the matching λ(θ)
in each state θ such that λ(θ) 6= µ(θ) for at least one state θ. Consider the smallest
integer k such that λ(θ; fk) 6= µ(θ; fk) for some state θ.
It follows that worker w = µ(fk) either reports fk as unacceptable or reports λ(w)
as preferable to fk. Suppose that, in this equilibrium, w reports ∗ such that
fpi(k+1) ∗ fpi(k+2) ∗ ... ∗ w ∗ fpi(j) ∗ ... ∗ fpi(n)
for some permutation pi : {k+1, ..., n} → {k+1, ..., n}.We claim that the following
deviation is profitable for w : a report of ′ such that
f1 ′ f2 ′ ... ′ fk ′ fpi(k+1) ′ fpi(k+2) ′ ... ′ w ′ fpi(j) ′ ... ′ fpi(n).
Let λ′(θ) be the resulting stable matching in each state θ.
Claim B.1. In any state θ˜ in which µ(θ˜;w) = fj for j ∈ {1, ..., k}, under worker w
λ′(θ˜;w) w λ(θ˜;w) = fj .
Proof of Claim B.1. First, suppose that j = 1. Under the reported preferences, w
and f1 are one another’s favorites, and so λ′(θ˜;w) = f1 w λ(θ˜;w).
Suppose now that j > 1. Without loss of generality, suppose that in state θ˜,
µ(θ˜; fi) = wi for all i, so that w = wj . Notice that, by construction, w1 is f1’s
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favorite, f2 either prefers w1 to w2 or has w2 as her favorite, f3 can only prefer either
w1 or w2 to w3, and so on.
If λ′(θ˜;wj) ≺w λ(θ˜;wj), from stability of λ′(θ˜) for the reported preferences, it
must be the case that λ′(θ˜; fj) = wj(1) fj wj and, therefore, j(1) < j. By the
minimality of k, λ(θ˜;wj(1)) = fj(1) and therefore, under the reported preferences,
fj(1) wj(1) fj (else, (fj, wj(1)) would block λ(θ˜)). From stability of λ′(θ˜) it then
follows that λ′(θ˜; fj(1)) = wj(2) , where j(2) < j(1). We can continue recursively
till we reach j(m) = 1. If, under the reported preferences, fj(m−1) w1 f1 then
(fj(m−1) , w1) block λ(θ˜) under the reported preferences. f1 has to be acceptable to
w1 under the reported preferences for λ(θ˜) to be individually rational. It follows
that f1 w1 fj(m−1) , in which case (f1, w1) block λ′(θ˜), achieving our contradiction.
Figure 2 below describes the process, where arrows pointing to the right describe
preferences of firms (the target node being the more preferred worker) derived from
the stability of λ′(θ˜) and arrows pointing to the left describe preferences of workers
(again, the target node being the more preferred firm) derived from the stability of
λ(θ˜).
Figure B.1: Idea of Proof of Proposition 3.3
Claim B.2. In any state θ¯ in which µ(θ¯;w) = fj with j > k, under worker w’s the
original preferences, λ′(θ¯;w) w λ(θ¯;w).
Proof of Claim B.2. From the definition of k and the structure of the deferred
acceptance algorithm, λ′(θ¯; fi) = λ(θ¯; fi) = µ(θ¯; fi) for i = 1, ..., k − 1. Further-
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more, f1, ..., fk−1 will not form a blocking pair with any worker in {µ(θ¯; fi)}ni=k,
regardless of the preferences those workers report. Consider then the sub-market
with firms {fi}ni=k and workers {µ(θ¯; fi)}ni=k, with preferences induced by the full
market. It suffices to look at the firm-optimal stable matching in that sub-market.
Consider then the deferred acceptance algorithm on this sub-market. If fk makes an
offer tow, λ′(θ¯;w) = fk w λ(θ¯;w). Otherwise, the deferred acceptance algorithm
coincides with that corresponding to the original preferences in this sub-market and
λ′(θ¯;w) = λ(θ¯;w).
Last, in the state θ in which λ(θ; fk) 6= µ(θ; fk), under the reported preferences,
λ′(θ;w) = fk w λ(θ; fk). The proposition then follows. 
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A p p e n d i x C
APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 4
C.1 Proof for Theorem 4.1
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
min
{
L(p), V (p)− max
v∈{G,I}
U(v, p)
}
= 0, (C.1)
where
L(p) = κ− 2
σ2
p2(1− p)2V ′′(p),
gives the sufficient condition for a continuously differentiable function V : [0, 1]→
R to be the value function
V (p) = sup
(τ,v)
IE [U(v, pτ )− κτ | p0 = p]. (C.2)
Differential equation L(p) = 0 has the following solution:
V (p) = C1 + pC2 + κσ
2f(p),
where f(p) =
(
p− 1
2
)
log
(
p
1−p
)
and C1 and C2 are some constants.
Consider the following class of functions defined on p ∈ [0, 1] parameterized with
λ ∈ (0, 0.5]:
Vλ(p) =

pQ+R, p ≥ 1− λ,
(1− p)Q+R, p ≤ λ,
(1− λ)Q+R + κσ2 (f(p)− f(λ)) , otherwise.
Note that these functions are continuous, symmetric around p = 0.5, that is Vλ(p) =
Vλ(1 − p), and satisfy L(p) = 0 for λ < p < 1 − λ. Moreover, function Vλ(p) is
continuously differentiable if and only if
lim
p→λ+0
V ′λ(p) = −Q,
which is equivalent to (4.3). Note that the left hand side of (4.3) is a decreasing
function of λ ∈ (0, 0.5] from +∞ to 0. Thus, the solution to (4.3) always exists and
unique.
Finally, note that
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1. Vλ(p) ≥ max
v∈{G,I}
U(v, p) for λ < p < 1− λ since Vλ(p) is convex for λ < p <
1− λ,
2. L(p) ≥ 0 for p ≥ 1− λ and p ≤ λ since the utility function is linear over the
belief.
Thus, Vλ(p) is the value function and therefore the strategy (4.2) is the unique
optimal one.
C.2 Proof for Theorem 4.2
First, we calculate λ′ (σ2) from (4.3) holding κ, Q, R fixed:
λ′
(
σ2
)
=
(1− λ)λ
σ2
(
1− 2λ− 2(1− λ)λ log
(
λ
1− λ
))
. (C.3)
Substituting (C.3) into
X ′ (σ2) = 1
2
(
log
(
1− λ
λ
)
− σ
2
(1− λ)λλ
′ (σ2)) , (C.4)
we get X ′ (σ2) = g (λ (σ2)), where for any λ ∈ (0, 0.5) function g(λ) is defined as
g(λ) = λ− 1
2
+
(
1
2
− (1− λ)λ
)
log
(
1− λ
λ
)
.
Function g(λ) is decreasing in λ ∈ (0, 0.5) from+∞ to 0. Thus, it is always positive
and therefore X ′ (σ2) > 0.
C.3 Proof for Theorem 4.3
Consider function g(η) = ηc(η)−cˆ. c′(η) > 0 if g(η) < 0 and c′(η) < 0 if g(η) > 0.
Since g′(η)|g(η)=0 = c(η) > 0, function g(η) can cross 0 only once and only from
below. From (4.14), if the solution to g(η∗) = 0 exists, it is equal to η∗ = 1
Qh′(cˆ) .
Substituting η∗ = 1
Qh′(cˆ) to (4.14), we get c(η
∗) = cˆ
η∗ and thus g(η
∗) = 0.
C.4 Proof for Theorem 4.4
Differentiating (4.17), we get c′(η) = cQh
′(ηc)
1−ηh′(ηc)Q > 0.
C.5 Proof for Theorem 4.5
For λ ∈ (0, 0.5), denote by ρ(λ) ∈ (0,+∞) the unique solution to
4eρ
√
piρ =
1− 2λ
2λ(1− λ) − log
(
λ
1− λ
)
. (C.5)
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For η > 0 and λ ∈ (0, 0.5), denote
Y (η, λ) =
1
1 +
(
λ
1−λ
) 1
η
−
12 + 1√pi
√
ρ(λ)
η∫
0
e−x
2
dx
 .
It is equal to zero if and only if ρ(λ) = f(η, λ), where
f(η, λ) = η
erf−1
 2
1 +
(
λ
1−λ
) 1
η
− 1
2 ,
where erf−1(·) is the inverse error function.
Lemma C.1. For any λ ∈ (0, 0.5), function f(η, λ) is decreasing in η ∈ (0,+∞)
from − log ( λ
1−λ
)
to 0.
Proof. ∂f(η,λ)
∂η
= g
((
λ
1−λ
) 1
η
)
, where
g(x) = erf−1
(
2
1 + x
− 1
)(
erf−1
(
2
1 + x
− 1
)
+
2
√
pix log(x)e(erf
−1( 21+x−1))
2
(1 + x)2
)
.
Note that since λ ∈ (0, 0.5) and η > 0, we must have ( λ
1−λ
) 1
η ∈ (0, 1). As we can
see from Figure C.1, g(x) < 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1). Thus, f(η, λ) is decreasing in
η ∈ (0,+∞). 
Figure C.1: Function g(x).
For λ ∈ (0, 0.5), denote
l(λ) = − log
(
λ
1− λ
)
− ρ(λ).
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Figure C.2 shows that function l(λ) is always positive (it is decreasing from +∞
to 0). Thus, the solution η(λ) ∈ (0,+∞) to ρ(λ) = f(η, λ) always exists and it is
unique.
Figure C.2: Function l(λ).
For λ ∈ (0, 0.5), denote by η(λ) ∈ (0,+∞) the unique solution to ρ(λ) = f(η, λ).
Lemma C.2. Function η(λ) is increasing from 1 to pi2
4
.
Proof.
Figure C.3: Function η(λ) and its derivative.
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Figure C.3 shows that function η(λ) is increasing.
From (C.5) we get lim
λ→0
ρ(λ) = +∞, lim
λ→0
(
8eρ(λ)
√
piρ(λ)λ
)
= 1 and therefore
lim
λ→0
ρ(λ) + log(λ)
log log
(
1
λ
) = −1
2
. (C.6)
Since η(λ) is increasing, we have lim
λ→0
η(λ) < +∞ and therefore lim
λ→0
(
λ
1−λ
) 1
η(λ) = 0.
Thus,
lim
λ→0
f(η(λ), λ) + log(λ)
log log
(
1
λ
) = −1
2
lim
λ→0
η(λ). (C.7)
(C.6) and (C.7) together imply lim
λ→0
η(λ) = 1.
From (C.5) we get lim
λ→0.5
ρ(λ) = 0, lim
λ→0.5
eρ(λ)
√
piρ(λ)
1−2λ = 1 and therefore
lim
λ→0.5
ρ(λ)
(1− 2λ)2 =
1
pi
. (C.8)
Since η(λ) is increasing, we have lim
λ→0.5
η(λ) > 0 and therefore lim
λ→0.5
(
λ
1−λ
) 1
η(λ) = 1.
Thus,
lim
λ→0.5
f(η(λ), λ)
(1− 2λ)2 =
pi
4 lim
λ→0.5
η(λ)
. (C.9)
(C.8) and (C.9) together imply lim
λ→0
η(λ) = pi
2
4
. 
For λ ∈ (0, 0.5), denote
F (λ) =
1− 2λ
2λ(1− λ) − log
(
λ
1− λ
)
.
It is easy to see that function F (λ) is decreasing for λ ∈ (0, 0.5) from +∞ to 0.
Thus, since η(λ) is increasing, there exists a unique solution λ
(
Q
κσ2
) ∈ (0, 0.5) to
F (λ) = Qη(λ)
κσ2
.
Consider function y
(
η, Q
κσ2
)
= ΠD
(
η, Q
κσ2
)−ΠC (η, Q
κσ2
)
. It is equal to zero if and
only if η = η
(
λ
(
Q
κσ2
))
. Moreover, from (4.19) and (4.21) we have lim
η→0
y
(
η, Q
κσ2
)
=
1
1+e
− Q
2κσ2
− 1
2
> 0. So, y
(
η, Q
κσ2
)
is positive for η < η
(
λ
(
Q
κσ2
))
and negative for
η > η
(
λ
(
Q
κσ2
))
.
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C.6 Proof for Theorem 4.6
Since η(λ) is increasing (Lemma C.2) and F (λ) is decreasing, we conclude that
λ
(
Q
κσ2
)
is decreasing and therefore the threshold η
(
λ
(
Q
κσ2
))
is decreasing. It is easy
to see that lim
Q
κσ2
→0
λ
(
Q
κσ2
)
= 0.5 and lim
Q
κσ2
→+∞
λ
(
Q
κσ2
)
= 0. Thus, lim
Q
κσ2
→0
η
(
λ
(
Q
κσ2
))
=
pi2
4
and lim
Q
κσ2
→+∞
η
(
λ
(
Q
κσ2
))
= 1.
C.7 Proof for Theorem 4.7
η∗∗
(
Q
κσ2
)
> η∗ if and only if
η
(
λ
(
Q
κσ2
))
>
2
√
2epiκσ2
Q
. (C.10)
Since F (λ) = Qη(λ)
κσ2
, (C.10) is equivalent to
F
(
λ
(
Q
κσ2
))
> 2
√
2epi. (C.11)
As F (λ) is decreasing in λ ∈ (0, 0.5) from +∞ to 0 and λ ( Q
κσ2
)
is decreasing
in Q
κσ2
∈ (0,+∞) from 0.5 to 0, we conclude that F (λ ( Q
κσ2
))
is increasing in
Q
κσ2
∈ (0,+∞) from 0 to +∞. Thus, there exists a unique solution q ∈ (0,+∞)
such that (C.11) is equivalent to Q
κσ2
> q.
C.8 Proof for Lemma 4.1
For a given threshold χ, strategy (4.6) leads to
κχ
(
e
2χ
σ2 − 1
)
e
2χ
σ2 + 1
(C.12)
For the η-type decision maker, the optimal threshold is χ = X
(
σ2
η
)
. Substituting
this threshold into (C.12), we get the statement.
C.9 Proof for Theorem 4.8
Obviously, constraint (4.23) is binding, so that
R = Υ
(
κσ2
η
, 1, Q,M
)
− Π
(
1,
Qη
κσ2
,M
)
Q. (C.13)
Substituting (C.13) into (4.22), we get
max
Q,M
F (Q,M, η, κσ2, QP ), (C.14)
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where
F (Q,M, η, κσ2, QP ) =
Π
(
η,
Q
κσ2
,M
)
(QP −Q) + Π
(
1,
Qη
κσ2
,M
)
Q−Υ
(
κσ2
η
, 1, Q,M
)
.
First, we optimize over Q for a givenM .
Since
lim
Q→+∞
F (Q,M, η, κσ2, QP ) = +∞, (C.15)
we conclude that Q = +∞ is optimal for η > 1.
Moreover, when η > 1, we have
lim
Q→+∞
F (Q, 1, η, κσ2, QP )
Q
η−1
η
=
(
κσ2
2η
) 1
η
, (C.16)
lim
Q→+∞
F (Q, 0, η, κσ2, QP )(
Q√
logQ
) η−1
η
=
√
η
2
√
pi
(
4
√
piκσ2
η
) 1
η
. (C.17)
Comparing (C.16) and (C.17), we conclude thatM = 1 is optimal for η > 1.
Substituting Q→ +∞ andM = 1 into (C.13), we get R→ −∞. More precisely,
lim
Q→+∞
Υ
(
κσ2
η
, 1, Q,M
)
− Π
(
1,
Qη
κσ2
,M
)
Q+Q− κσ
2
2η
log(Q)
=
κσ2
2η
− κσ
2
2η
log
(
κσ2
2η
)
, (C.18)
which implies R =
(
κσ2
2η
− κσ2
2η
log
(
κσ2
2η
))
−
(
Q− κσ2
2η
log(Q)
)
in the optimum
for η > 1.
C.10 Optimal Contract for η ∈ (0, 1]
Theorem 4.8 covers only the overconfidence case, η > 1. Here, we focus on
0 < η ≤ 1.
Theorem C.1. For 0 < η ≤ 1, the optimal contract (Q,R,M) is unique and has
the following form: M = 1,
R
(
η, κσ2, QP
)
=
κσ2
2η
(
2− 1
λ
+ log
(
λ
1− λ
))
,
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Q
(
η, κσ2, QP
)
=
κσ2
η
(
1− 2λ
2λ(1− λ) − log
(
λ
1− λ
))
,
where λ ∈ (0, 0.5) is uniquely defined from
ηQP
κσ2
=
1− 2λ
2λ(1− λ)−log
(
λ
1− λ
)
+
η
2λ
((
λ
1− λ
)1− 1
η
− 1
)(
1 +
(
λ
1− λ
) 1
η
)
.
(C.19)
This contract gives the following expected utility to the principal:
UP
(
η, κσ2, QP
)
=
κσ2
2η
(
η
λ
((
λ
1− λ
)1− 1
η
− 1
)
− 2 + 1
λ
− log
(
λ
1− λ
))
.
The perceived expected utility of the agent is equal to his reservation utility, that is
0. The actual expected utility of the agent is ΠD
(
η, Q
κσ2
)
Q + R −ΥD (κσ2, η, Q),
which is equal to
UA
(
η, κσ2, QP
)
=
κσ2
2η
1− 2λ
1− λ
1− 1
λ
(
1 +
(
1−λ
λ
) 1
η
)
 .
Proof. We are going to use the notation F (Q,M, η, κσ2, QP ) from the proof of
Theorem 4.8.
Since
lim
Q→+∞
F (Q,M, η, κσ2, QP ) = −∞,
we conclude that Q = +∞ is not optimal for η ≤ 1.
To optimize for Q when η ≤ 1, we consider
∂F (Q,M, η, κσ2, QP )
∂Q
=

2(1−λ)λ( λ1−λ)
1
η
η
(
1+( λ1−λ)
1
η
)2 (ηQPκσ2 − g(λ, η)) , M = 1,
e
−(1+ 1η )ρ
4pi
√
η(1+2ρ)
(
ηQP
κσ2
− h(ρ, η)) , M = 0, (C.20)
where λ ∈ (0, 0.5) solves (4.19), ρ > 0 solves (4.21) and
g(λ, η) =
1− 2λ
2λ(1− λ)−log
(
λ
1− λ
)
− η
2λ
(
1−
(
λ
1− λ
)1− 1
η
)(
1 +
(
λ
1− λ
) 1
η
)
,
h(ρ, η) = 4eρ
√
pi
√ρ+ e ρη√η(1 + 2ρ)
√
ρ/η∫
√
ρ
e−x
2
dx
 .
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Lemma C.3. If 0 < η ≤ 1, then g(λ, η) is strictly decreasing in λ ∈ (0, 0.5) from
+∞ to 0.
Proof. lim
λ→0
g(λ, η) = +∞, g(0.5, η) = 0, ∂g(λ,η)
∂λ
=
(
1+( λ1−λ)
− 1η
)
(1−ηλ)
2(1−λ)2λ g1(λ, η),
where g1(λ, η) =
(
λ
1−λ
) 1
η
−1 η(1−λ)−1
1−ηλ − 1.
Since ∂g1(λ,η)
∂λ
= − (
λ
1−λ)
1
η η
λ2(1−ηλ)2
(
(η−1)2
η2
− (2η − 3)(1− λ)λ
)
< 0, lim
λ→0
g1(λ, η) = −1
and g1(0.5, η) = −2, we get that g1(λ, η) is strictly decreasing in λ ∈ (0, 0.5) from
-1 to -2.

Lemma C.4. If 0 < η ≤ 1, then h(ρ, η) is strictly increasing in ρ > 0 from 0 to
+∞.
Proof. lim
ρ→0
h(ρ, η) = 0, lim
ρ→+∞
h(ρ, η) = +∞, ∂h(ρ,η)
∂ρ
= 4e
ρ+
ρ
η
√
pi(1+3η+2(1+η)ρ)√
η
h1(ρ, η),
where h1(ρ, η) =
eρ
eρ/η
√
η
− 1
2
eρ
√
ρ( 1η+1+
2
1+2ρ)
+
√
ρ/η∫
√
ρ
e−x
2
dx.
h1(ρ, η) > 0 for all 0 < η ≤ 1, ρ > 0 since:
• if eρ
eρ/η
√
η
> 1
2
, then h1(ρ, η) > 0;
• lim
ρ→0
h1(ρ, η) = +∞, lim
ρ→+∞
h1(ρ, η) = 0;
• ∂h1(ρ,η)
∂ρ
= −(
3−η
2
+ η
1+2ρ)(1+η+
2η
1+2ρ)+
ρ+η−η2
(
4(ρ−1)
(1+2ρ)2
+1+ρ
)
ρ
(
eρ
eρ/η
√
η
− 1
2
)
2eρ
√
ρ(1+η+ 2η1+2ρ)
2 ;
• if eρ
eρ/η
√
η
≤ 1
2
and ρ+ η − η2
(
4(ρ−1)
(1+2ρ)2
+ 1 + ρ
)
≤ 0, then ∂h1(ρ,η)
∂ρ
< 0;
• if ρ+η−η2
(
4(ρ−1)
(1+2ρ)2
+ 1 + ρ
)
> 0, then ∂h1(ρ,η)
∂ρ
< − h2(ρ,η)
2eρ
√
ρ(1+η+ 2η1+2ρ)
2 , where
h2(ρ, η) = 1−
2η2
(
3−(ρ+ 32)
2
)
ρ(1+2ρ)2
+ η
(
1− 1
2ρ
+ 4
1+2ρ
)
;
• if 0 < η < 2ρ, then h2(ρ, η) > 0;
• if eρ
eρ/η
√
η
≤ 1
2
, then 0 < η < 2ρ.
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Lemma C.3 and derivative (C.20) imply that if 0 < η ≤ 1, then F (Q, 1, η, κσ2, QP )
is strictly increasing in Q ∈ (0, QD) and it is strictly decreasing in Q ∈ (QD,+∞),
where QD > 0 is defined from
ηQD
κσ2
=
1− 2λ
2λ(1− λ) − log
(
λ
1− λ
)
, (C.21)
where λ ∈ (0, 0.5) is uniquely defined from
ηQP
κσ2
= g(λ, η). (C.22)
(C.21) and (C.22) imply QP ≥ QD for 0 < η ≤ 1.
Lemma C.4 and derivative (C.20) imply that if 0 < η ≤ 1, then F (Q, 0, η, κσ2, QP )
is strictly increasing in Q ∈ (0, QC) and it is strictly decreasing in Q ∈ (QC ,+∞),
where QC > 0 is defined from
ηQC
κσ2
= 4eρ
√
piρ, (C.23)
where ρ > 0 is uniquely defined from
ηQP
κσ2
= h(ρ, η). (C.24)
(C.23) and (C.24) imply QP ≥ QC for 0 < η ≤ 1.
To maximize overM , we compare F (Q, 1, η, κσ2, QP ) and F (Q, 0, η, κσ2, QP ) for
0 < η ≤ 1 and 0 < Q ≤ QP .
Lemma C.5. F (Q, 1, η, κσ2, QP ) > F (Q, 0, η, κσ2, QP ) for all 0 < η ≤ 1 and
0 < Q ≤ QP .
Proof. By Theorem 4.5, we have ΠD
(
η, Q
κσ2
)
> ΠC
(
η, Q
κσ2
)
for all 0 < η ≤ 1.
The agent’s expected utility from contract (Q,R,M) is
Π
(
1,
Qη
κσ2
,M
)
Q+R−Υ
(
κσ2
η
, 1, Q,M
)
.
Obviously, the agent strictly prefersM = 1 overM = 0 since he thinks he is better
off with more flexibility. Thus,
ΠD
(
1,
Qη
κσ2
)
Q−ΥD
(
κσ2
η
, 1, Q
)
> ΠC
(
1,
Qη
κσ2
)
Q−ΥC
(
κσ2
η
, 1, Q
)
.
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Using QP ≥ QD and QP ≥ QC for 0 < η ≤ 1 and Lemma C.5, we have
F (QD, 1, η, κσ2, QP )− F (QC , 0, η, κσ2, QP ) = F (QD, 1, η, κσ2, QP )
− F (QC , 1, η, κσ2, QP ) + F (QC , 1, η, κσ2, QP )− F (QC , 0, η, κσ2, QP )
≥ F (QC , 1, η, κσ2, QP )− F (QC , 0, η, κσ2, QP ) > 0.
Thus,M = 1 is optimal for η ≤ 1.
Substituting QD andM = 1 into (C.13), we get
R =
κσ2
2η
(
2− 1
λ
+ log
(
λ
1− λ
))
,
where λ ∈ (0, 0.5) is uniquely defined from (C.22). Note that R < 0.
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To give some intuition for the optimal contract provided in Theorem C.1, we provide
the comparative statics results. Corollary C.1 covers all cases when a variable of
interest is monotone with respect to a parameter.
Corollary C.1. For 0 < η < 1,
• R (η, κσ2, QP ) is decreasing in η and QP ;
• Q (η, κσ2, QP ) is increasing in η, QP and κσ2;
• Q (η, κσ2, QP ) +R (η, κσ2, QP ) is increasing in QP and κσ2;
• UP (η, κσ2, QP ) is increasing in η and QP but decreasing in κσ2;
• UA (η, κσ2, QP ) is decreasing in η but increasing in QP ;
• UP (η, κσ2, QP ) + UA (η, κσ2, QP ) is increasing in QP but decreasing in
κσ2.
Proof. − 1
κσ2
∂R(η,κσ2,QP )
∂η
,−∂R(η,κσ
2,QP )
∂QP
, 1
κσ2
∂Q(η,κσ2,QP )
∂η
, ∂Q(η,κσ
2,QP )
∂(κσ2)
, ∂Q(η,κσ
2,QP )
∂QP
,
∂(Q(η,κσ2,QP )+R(η,κσ2,QP ))
∂(κσ2)
, ∂(Q(η,κσ
2,QP )+R(η,κσ2,QP ))
∂QP
,
1
κσ2
∂UP (η,κσ2,QP )
∂η
, −∂U
P (η,κσ2,QP )
∂(κσ2)
, ∂U
P (η,κσ2,QP )
∂QP
,
− 1
κσ2
∂UA(η,κσ2,QP )
∂η
, ∂U
A(η,κσ2,QP )
∂QP
,
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−∂(U
P (η,κσ2,QP )+UA(η,κσ2,QP ))
∂(κσ2)
, ∂(U
P (η,κσ2,QP )+UA(η,κσ2,QP ))
∂QP
can be expressed as
functions of η and λ ∈ (0, 0.5) that solves (C.19). Each of these functions are
positive for all η ∈ (0, 1) and λ ∈ (0, 0.5).
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The comparative statics with respect to the underconfidence parameter η is the most
interesting one. As the agent become more underconfident (η is decreasing), he
has to be compensated more to agree to take the risk of the contract (R becomes
larger), as he thinks he has to spend a lot of effort collecting what he thinks being
very noisy signals. At the same time, his benefit compensation Q is decreasing, as
the agent’s strategy becomes less sensitive to it (in the extreme case, when η → 0,
the agent does not collect any information at all, no matter how large Q is). This
irrationality of the agent decreases the principal’s expected payoff from the contract
(in the extreme case, when η = 1, the agent gets 0 and collects the optimal amount
of information from the rational person point of view, which gives the highest utility
to the principal).
The most interesting result is that the agent “wins” from his irrationality: a more
underconfident agent gets higher actual expected utility. This happens because the
principal has to persuade the agent to agree to a deal that has a higher return than
the agent thinks.
Whether it is socially optimal for the agent to be more underconfident (that is,
whether UP +UA is decreasing in η) depends on the parameters’ values. Figure C.4
demonstrates this point. Formost values, the social welfare is decreasing as the agent
becomes more underconfident. However, when it is socially optimal to collect a lot
of information (that is when QP
κσ2
is high), increasing the level of underconfidence
might increase the total expected utility.
C.11 Proof for Theorem 4.9
By Theorems 4.8 and C.1, the constraint R ≥ 0 is binding. Thus, R = 0 and the
optimization problem (4.24)-(4.25) becomes
max
Q≥0,M∈{0,1}
Π
(
η,
Q
κσ2
,M
)
(QP −Q) ≡ F (Q,M, η, κσ2, QP ), (C.25)
s.t. Π
(
1,
Qη
κσ2
,M
)
Q−Υ
(
κσ2
η
, 1, Q,M
)
≥ 0. (C.26)
Constraint (C.26) says that themaximum subjective expected utility the agent can get
cannot be less than 0. Since he gets R = 0 from the wrong decision and R+Q ≥ 0
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Figure C.4: Social welfare UP (η, κσ2, QP ) + UA (η, κσ2, QP ) as a function of η.
from the correct decision, this expected utility must be greater or equal to zero for
anyQ ≥ 0 andM ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, the optimization problem (4.24)-(4.25) becomes
(C.25), without any constraints.
Optimizing over Q ≥ 0 for a givenM , we find the first order condition for (C.25):
∂F (Q,M, η, κσ2, QP )
∂Q
=

2(1−λ)λ( λ1−λ)
1
η
η
(
1+( λ1−λ)
1
η
)2 (ηQPκσ2 − g(λ, η)) , M = 1,
e
−(1+ 1η )ρ
4pi
√
η(1+2ρ)
(
ηQP
κσ2
− h(ρ, η)) , M = 0,
where λ ∈ (0, 0.5) solves (4.19), ρ > 0 solves (4.21) and g(λ, η) is the right hand
side of (4.26), while h(ρ, η) is the right hand side of (4.27).
Lemma C.6. Function g(λ, η) is strictly decreasing in λ ∈ (0, 0.5) from +∞ to 4η.
Function h(ρ, η) is strictly increasing in ρ > 0 from 2pi√η to +∞.
Proof. ∂g(λ,η)
∂λ
= −1+η(1−2λ)
2(1−λ)2λ2
(
1 +
(
λ
1−λ
)− 1
η
)
< 0,
∂h(ρ,η)
∂ρ
= 4eρ
√
pi
1+2ρ√
ρ
+ e
ρ
η
1+3η+2(1+η)ρ√
η
√
ρ/η∫
−∞
e−x
2
dx
 > 0. 
Summarizing, we have:
• if ηQP
κσ2
≤ min{4η, 2pi√η}, then F (Q,M, η, κσ2, QP ) is strictly decreasing
in Q⇒ the optimal Q is zero (the value ofM is irrelevant in this case since
there will be no information collection);
• if 4η < ηQP
κσ2
≤ 2pi√η, then F (Q, 0, η, κσ2, QP ) is strictly decreasing in
Q while F (Q, 1, η, κσ2, QP ) is strictly increasing in Q ∈ (0, QD) and it is
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strictly decreasing in Q ∈ (QD,+∞) ⇒ the optimal M = 1 and Q = QD
(note that F (0,M, η, κσ2, QP ) = QP2 does not depend onM );
• if 2pi√η < ηQP
κσ2
≤ 4η, then, by similar reasoning, the optimal M = 0 and
Q = QC ;
• if max
{
4η, 2pi
√
η
}
< ηQP
κσ2
, then the optimal Q given M is QD if M = 1
and QC ifM = 0 (note that QD < QP and QC < QP ), and it is not obvious
whetherM = 1 orM = 0 is optimal. To find it out, we need to find the sign
of the function
f
(
η, κσ2, QP
)
= max
Q≥0
F (Q, 1, η, κσ2, QP )−max
Q≥0
F (Q, 0, η, κσ2, QP )
=
κσ2
2λ(1− λ)
(
λ
1− λ
)− 1
η
− 4e
ρ+ ρ
η (1 + 2ρ)κσ2√
η

√
ρ/η∫
−∞
e−x
2
dx

2
,
where λ ∈ (0, 0.5) solves (4.26) and ρ > 0 solves (4.27).
Lemma C.7. If η ≥ pi2
4
, then
• if ηQP
κσ2
≤ 2pi√η, then the optimal Q is zero;
• if ηQP
κσ2
> 2pi
√
η, then the optimalM = 0 and Q = QC .
Proof. First of all, note that η ≥ pi2
4
is equivalent to 2pi√η ≤ 4η. Thus, for
ηQP
κσ2
≤ 4η, the statement follows from the summary above.
From Theorems 4.5 and 4.6 it follows that ΠD
(
η, Q
κσ2
)
< ΠC
(
η, Q
κσ2
)
for all η ≥ pi2
4
and Q > 0. Since QD < QP , this implies
f
(
η, κσ2, QP
)
= F (QD, 1, η, κσ2, QP )− F (QC , 0, η, κσ2, QP )
= F (QD, 1, η, κσ2, QP )− F (QD, 0, η, κσ2, QP ) + F (QD, 0, η, κσ2, QP )
− F (QC , 0, η, κσ2, QP ) ≤ F (QD, 1, η, κσ2, QP )− F (QD, 0, η, κσ2, QP )
=
(
ΠD
(
η,
QD
κσ2
)
− ΠC
(
η,
QD
κσ2
))
(QP −QD) < 0.

Lemma C.8. If η ≤ 1, then
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• if ηQP
κσ2
≤ 4η, then the optimal Q is zero;
• if ηQP
κσ2
> 4η, then the optimalM = 1 and Q = QD.
The proof of Lemma C.8 is similar to the proof of Lemma C.7.
Lemma C.9. If 1 < η < pi2
4
, then there exists q(η) > 2pi√
η
such that
• if ηQP
κσ2
≤ 4η, then the optimal Q is zero;
• if 4η < ηQP
κσ2
< ηq(η), then the optimalM = 1 and Q = QD;
• if ηQP
κσ2
> ηq(η), then the optimalM = 0 and Q = QC .
Proof. For ηQP
κσ2
≤ 2pi√η, the statement follows from the summary above.
Thus, when ηQP
κσ2
= 2pi
√
η, we have f (η, κσ2, QP ) > 0. Moreover, it is not hard to
proof that lim
QP→+∞
f (η, κσ2, QP ) = −∞. Thus, function f (η, κσ2, QP ) crosses 0
at least once onQP > 2piκσ
2√
η
, and the first crossingmust be from above (from positive
values). To prove that f (η, κσ2, QP ) crosses 0 exactly once, it is sufficient to show
that all local optima with respect to QP are local maximums: if ∂f(η,κσ
2,QP )
∂QP
= 0,
then ∂
2f(η,κσ2,QP )
∂Q2P
< 0.
∂f(η, κσ2, QP )
∂QP
= ΠD
(
η,
QD
κσ2
)
− ΠC
(
η,
QC
κσ2
)
If ∂f(η,κσ
2,QP )
∂QP
= 0, then
1. λ = Λ(ρ, η) ≡ 1
1+
(
2
erfc(
√
ρ
η )
−1
)η , where erfc (z) = 1 − 2√pi
z∫
0
e−t
2
dt is the
complementary error function, ρ > 0 solves (4.27) and λ ∈ (0, 0.5) solves
(4.26).
2. L(ρ, η) = 0, where ρ > 0 solves (4.27) and function L(ρ, η) is defined as
follows:
L(ρ, η) =
1−
√
1 +
(
l(ρ, η)− 4η
erfc(
√
ρ
η )
)
l(ρ, η)
2l(ρ, η)
+
1
2
− Λ(ρ, η),
l(ρ, η) = h(ρ, η) + η log
 2
2− erfc
(√
ρ
η
) − 1
 .
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One can check that function L(ρ, η) is strictly increasing in η ∈
(
1, pi
2
4
)
from L(ρ, 1) < 0 to L
(
ρ, pi
2
4
)
> 0. Thus, there exists a unique solution
η˜(ρ) ∈
(
1, pi
2
4
)
to L(ρ, η) = 0.
The second order derivative ∂
2f(η,κσ2,QP )
∂Q2P
can be written as 1
κσ2
f2 (ρ, λ, η), where
ρ > 0 solves (4.27) and λ ∈ (0, 0.5) solves (4.26). If ∂f(η,κσ2,QP )
∂QP
= 0, then this
derivative is equal to 1
κσ2
f2 (ρ,Λ(ρ, ηη˜(ρ)), η˜(ρ)) ≡ 1κσ2F2(ρ) for a certain ρ > 0.
Figure C.5 shows that F2(ρ) < 0 for all ρ > 0.
Figure C.5: Function F2(ρ) and its derivative for ρ > 0. Note that lim
ρ→0
F2(ρ) = 0
and lim
ρ→+∞
F2(ρ) = 0
That proves that if there is a local optimum of function f(η, κσ2, QP ) with respect
to QP > 0, then this optimum must be a local maximum. Thus, we conclude that
there exists a unique QP > 2piκσ
2√
η
such that f (η, κσ2, QP ) = 0. From the definition
of function f (η, κσ2, QP ), it immediately follows that such QP is equal to κσ2,
times some function that depends only on η. Denote this function as q(η).

Lemma C.10. Function q(η) is strictly decreasing in 1 < η < pi2
4
from +∞ to 2pi√
η
.
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Proof.
q′(η) =
ΠD
(
η, Q
D
κσ2
)
q1(λ)− ΠC
(
η, Q
C
κσ2
)
q2(ρ)
η2
(
ΠD
(
η, Q
D
κσ2
)
− ΠC
(
η, Q
C
κσ2
)) ,
q1(λ) =
(
1− 1
2λ(1− λ)
)
log
(
λ
1− λ
)
− 1− 2λ
2λ(1− λ) , q2(ρ) = 2e
ρ√piρ(2ρ−1),
where ρ > 0 solves (4.27), λ ∈ (0, 0.5) solves (4.26) and QP
κσ2
= q(η).
Since ∂f(η,κσ
2,QP )
∂QP
< 0 at the point QP = κσ2q(η), we have ΠD
(
η, Q
D
κσ2
)
<
ΠC
(
η, Q
C
κσ2
)
. Figure C.6 shows that q′(η) is negative.1
Figure C.6: Function
q′(η)
(
ΠD
(
η,Q
D
κσ2
)
−ΠC
(
η,Q
C
κσ2
))
2
√
pieρ
√
ρ log(ρ+1)
, where ρ > 0 solves (4.27) and
QP
κσ2
= q(η), for 1 < η < pi2
4

C.12 Proof for Theorem 4.10
The principal’s expected utility is equal to
UP
(
η, κσ2, QP
)
=

κσ2
2λ(1−λ)
(
λ
1−λ
)− 1
η , M = 1,
4κσ2e
ρ+
ρ
η (1+2ρ)√
η
√ρ/η∫
−∞
e−x
2
dx
2 , M = 0,
1When η → 1 from above, ρ→ +∞.
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while the agent’s actual expected utility is equal to
UA
(
η, κσ2, QP
)
=

κσ2
2η
(
1+ λ
1−λ
1+( λ1−λ)
1
η
(
1
λ
− 2)− log ( λ
1−λ
))
, M = 1,
2κσ2
η
2eρ√ρ
√
ρ/η∫
−∞
e−x
2
dx− ρ
 , M = 0,
where λ ∈ (0, 0.5) solves (4.26) and ρ > 0 solves (4.27).
WhenM = 1, we have
∂UP (η, κσ2, QP )
∂η
=
κσ2f1(λ)
2(1− λ)λη2
(
1 +
(
λ
1−λ
) 1
η
) < 0,
∂
(
UP (η, κσ2, QP ) + U
A (η, κσ2, QP )
)
∂η
=
κσ2
2η2(1 + η(1− 2λ))×
(
1
λ(1−λ) − 1 +
(
λ
1−λ
) 1
η
)
(1− 2λ)η log ( λ
1−λ
)
1 +
(
λ
1−λ
) 1
η
+
f2(λ)
(
λ
1−λ
) 1
η(
1 +
(
λ
1−λ
) 1
η
)2 +
1 + ( λ1−λ) 1η 1−2λη(1−λ)λ(
1 +
(
λ
1−λ
) 1
η
)2
 ( λ1−λ) 1η
1 +
(
λ
1−λ
) 1
η
f1(λ)
 < 0,
because f1(λ) = 1 − 2λ + (1 − 2λ(1 − λ)) log
(
λ
1−λ
)
< 0 and f2(λ) = (1 −
2λ)
(
1
λ(1−λ) − 2
) (
1 + 2 log
(
λ
1−λ
))
+ 4λ
3
1−λ log
(
λ
1−λ
)
< 0 for all λ ∈ (0, 0.5).
WhenM = 0, we have
∂UP (η, κσ2, QP )
∂η
= −2κσ
2
η2
eρ
√
ρ(2ρ− 1)
√
ρ/η∫
−∞
e−x
2
dx
Since ρ (η, κσ2, QP ) is increasing in η (as follows from (4.27)), UP (η, κσ2, QP )
has a unique maximum, and ρ = 0.5 at this maximum. From (4.27), we have
ηˆP
(
QP
κσ2
)
= 1
2y2
, where y > 0 solves
4
√
2epiy
y + 2ey2 y∫
−∞
e−x
2
dx
 = QP
κσ2
. (C.27)
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As for the social welfare forM = 0, we have
∂
(
UP (η, κσ2, QP ) + U
A (η, κσ2, QP )
)
∂η
=
2κσ2f2(η, ρ)
 1√
η(1+2ρ)
+ e
ρ/η√
ρ
f1(ρ) +
√
ρ/η∫
0
e−x
2
dx

η2e
ρ
η
−ρ
(
1
ρ
+
(
1
2
+ 1
2η
+ 1
1+2ρ
)
Z
(
ρ
η
))
where Z(z) = 2ez√
z
√
z∫
−∞
e−x
2
dx, f1(ρ) =
√
pi
2
− e−ρ
√
ρ
1+2ρ
> 0 for all ρ > 0, and
f2(η, ρ) =
1
2
− ρ−
(
ρ+
√
2 + 1
2
)(
ρ−
√
2− 1
2
)
Z
(
ρ
η
)
.
Then this derivative is positive if and only if f2(η, ρ) > 0. It is easy to show
that if f2(η, ρ(η)) = 0 for some η, then ddηf2(η, ρ(η)) < 0, where ρ(η) is defined
from (4.27). Recall that ρ(η) is increasing in η > 0 from 0 to +∞, so that
f2(0, ρ(0)) > 0 and f2(+∞, ρ(+∞)) < 0. Thus, there exists a unique η > 0 that
solves f2(η, ρ(η)) = 0. Denote this η as ηˆPA
(
QP
κσ2
)
.
To compare ηˆP
(
QP
κσ2
)
with ηˆPA
(
QP
κσ2
)
, consider function f2(η, ρ(η)) at point η =
ηˆP
(
QP
κσ2
)
(recall that ρ
(
ηˆP
(
QP
κσ2
))
= 0.5):
f2 (ηˆP , ρ(ηˆP )) = −e
y2
y
y∫
−∞
e−x
2
dx < 0,
where y > 0 solves (C.27). Thus, ηˆPA
(
QP
κσ2
)
< ηˆP
(
QP
κσ2
)
.
C.13 Dynamic Model, δ > 0
The decision maker faces the following optimization problem:2
sup
(τ,v)
IE
e−δτU(v, pτ )− κ τ∫
0
e−δtdt
 . (C.28)
Before presenting the optimal strategy, we need to make one more assumption:
2A more general strategy space includes the opportunity to allocate partial attention to the
information flow. If the agent allocates ∆ ∈ [0, 1] amount of attention at time t, then he pays κ∆dt
and observesXt+∆dt −Xt. It turns out that it is never optimal to allocate partial attention when the
discount factor is positive. Suppose ∆∗ > 0 is optimal. Then L(pt,∆∗) = min
∆∈[0,1]
L(pt,∆) = 0,
whereL(p,∆) = ∆ (κ− 2σ2 p2(1− p)2V ′′(p))+δV (p), V (p) is the value function. Thus, whenever
δV (p) 6= 0, we must have ∆∗ = 1.
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Assumption C.1. −κ < (Q+R)δ.
This assumption says that if R < −Q, then δ should be small enough. It guarantees
that stopping is optimal if the true state is known. Indeed, if R < −Q, then the
decision maker gets negative utility when he makes the decision. Basically, the
final utility payment acts as a cost. If the discount factor is large, he would want
to postpone the payment of this cost forever. If Assumption C.1 does not hold, the
optimal strategy does not exist.
Theorem C.2. The optimal strategy exists and is given by (4.2), where threshold
λ ∈ (0, 0.5) is uniquely defined by
2λ(1− λ)(
1− 2
1+( 1−λλ )
√
1+2δσ2
)
√
1 + 2δσ2 − 1 + 2λ
− (1− λ) = R +
κ
δ
Q
. (C.29)
Proof. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (C.1), where
L(p) = κ− 2
σ2
p2(1− p)2V ′′(p) + δV (p),
gives the sufficient condition for a continuously differentiable function V : [0, 1]→
R to be the value function
V (p) = sup
(τ,v)
IE
e−δτU(v, pτ )− κ τ∫
0
e−δtdt | p0 = p
. (C.30)
Differential equation L(p) = 0 has the following solution:
V (p) = −κ
δ
+ C1p
1−
√
1+2δσ2
2 (1− p) 1+
√
1+2δσ2
2 + C2p
1+
√
1+2δσ2
2 (1− p) 1−
√
1+2δσ2
2 ,
where C1 and C2 are some constants.
Consider the following class of functions defined on p ∈ [0, 1] parameterized with
λ ∈ (0, 0.5]:
Vλ(p) =

pQ+R, p ≥ 1− λ,
(1− p)Q+R, p ≤ λ,( 1−pp )
√
1+2δσ2
2 +( p1−p)
√
1+2δσ2
2
√ (1−p)p
(1−λ)λ
(
(1−λ)Q+R+ c
δ
)
( 1−λλ )
√
1+2δσ2
2 +( λ1−λ)
√
1+2δσ2
2
− c
δ
, otherwise.
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Note that these functions are continuous, symmetric around p = 0.5, that is Vλ(p) =
Vλ(1− p), and satisfy L(p, 1) = 0 for λ < p < 1− λ. Moreover, function Vλ(p) is
continuously differentiable if and only if
lim
p→λ+0
V ′λ(p) = −Q,
which is equivalent to (C.29). Note that the left hand side of (C.29) is an increasing
function of λ ∈ (0, 0.5] from -1 to +∞. Thus,
• if R+
κ
δ
Q
> −1, then the solution to (C.29) always exists and unique,
• if R+
κ
δ
Q
≤ −1, then there is no λ ∈ (0, 0.5] such that Vλ(p) is continuously
differentiable.
Note that (C.29) implies that (1− λ)Q+R + κ
δ
> 0.
Finally, note that
1. Vλ(p) ≥ max
v∈{G,I}
U(v, p) for λ < p < 1− λ since Vλ(p) is convex for λ < p <
1− λ as long as (1− λ)Q+R + κ
δ
> 0,
2. L(p) ≥ 0 for p ≥ 1− λ and p ≤ λ as long as (1− λ)Q+R + κ
δ
≥ 0.
Thus, Vλ(p) is the value function and therefore the strategy (4.2) is the unique
optimal one. 
Note that when Assumption C.1 just holds, that is when (Q+R)δ+κ is very small,
the optimal λ is very close to 0, which corresponds to long learning.
Theorem C.3. X (σ2) defined by (4.10) and (C.29) is increasing in σ2.
Proof. First, we calculate λ′ (σ2) from (C.29) holding κ, Q, R, δ fixed:
λ′
(
σ2
)
=
(1− λ)λ
((
1−λ
λ
)2√1+2δσ2
+ 2
√
1 + 2δσ2
(
1−λ
λ
)√1+2δσ2
log
(
1−λ
λ
)− 1)(
1 +
(
1−λ
λ
)√1+2δσ2)2
σ2
√
1 + 2δσ2
.
(C.31)
Substituting (C.31) into (C.4), we get X ′ (σ2) = g (λ (σ2) ,√1 + 2δσ2), where for
any λ ∈ (0, 0.5) and α > 1 function g(λ, α) is defined as
g(λ, α) =
1 + α
(
1 +
(
1−λ
λ
)2α)
log
(
1−λ
λ
)− (1−λ
λ
)2α
2α
(
1 +
(
1−λ
λ
)α)2 .
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For any fixed α > 1, function g(λ, α) is decreasing in λ ∈ (0, 0.5) from +∞ to 0.
Thus, it is always positive and therefore X ′ (σ2) > 0. 
C.14 Dynamic Asymmetric Model
Consider a general form of the utility function:
U(v, p) = pu(v, I) + (−p)u(v,G).
Assumption C.2.
u(A, I) > max{u(A,G), u(C, I)}, u(C,G) > max{u(C, I), u(A,G)}.
Denote
p∗ =
u(C,G)− u(A,G)
u(C,G)− u(A,G) + u(A, I)− u(C, I) .
Then, the judge wants to acquit when p > p∗ and he wants to convict when p < p∗.
Without loss of generality, assume that the judge is weakly biased towards convicting
Assumption C.3. p∗ ≥ 0.5.
Theorem C.4. The optimal strategy exists and is given by
τ = inf {t ≥ 0: pt /∈ (λ, µ)} , v =
A, pτ ≥ µ,C, pτ ≤ λ, (C.32)
where pt is the belief that the true state is I at time t. Thresholds 0 < λ < p∗ < µ < 1
are uniquely defined by
f(µ)− f(λ) = G
2
, µ =
1
2
(
1 +
√
1− 4(1− λ)λ
1 + (2p∗ − 1)G(1− λ)λ
)
, (C.33)
where G = 2(u(A,I)−u(A,G)+u(C,G)−u(C,I))
κσ2
, f(x) = log
(
x
1−x
)− 1−2x
2(1−x)x .
The proof is similar to Theorem 4.1.
In asymmetric case, the choice of the welfare function is not so obvious. In sym-
metric case, it is natural to take the probability of the correct decision as the welfare
criterion. When there is bias in prior belief and / or in preferences u(v, z), there are
many different options one can take as the welfare criterion. We are not going to
consider them all and just focus on how the strategy changes with the overconfidence
level.
Theorem C.5 confirms the conclusion of Theorem 4.2 for the upper threshold:
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Theorem C.5. σ2
2
log
(
µ(σ2)
1−µ(σ2)
)
is increasing in σ2.
However, this conclusion is no longer true for the lower threshold:
Theorem C.6. When p∗ > 1
2
, there exists Σ2 > 0 such that σ2
2
log
(
λ(σ2)
1−λ(σ2)
)
is
decreasing for σ2 < Σ2 and it is increasing for σ2 > Σ2.
Theorem C.6 states that there is a unique level of overconfidence η = σ2
Σ2
that
minimizes the lower threshold for Xt. Intuitively, there is a trade-off between the
preference bias and the overall precision of the decision. When there is a lot of
noise in information, the bias is more prominent since the decision is not precise
anyway. As information becomes more precise, the trade-off optimal resolution
moves towards the decision precision, which means that the thresholds become
more symmetric.
